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France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944

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In other readings of World War II, I had always felt I did not have a solid grounding in the history of Vichy France. I have been greatly intrigued for some time as to how a country like France could have collaborated to such a degree. This gap in knowledge, I hoped, could be filled by a general treatise on the subject. Having reviewed several books on Vichy France I chose 'France- The Dark Years, 1940-1944' as the one work upon which I would rely.
While I did admire the scope of the work, and have no argument that this book may be called the latest definitive source, be warned that this book is not written for those who do not have a working knowledge on the subject. The author does not spend time on set-up: the reader is presumed to know of not only the leading political figures in France during the 1930's-40's, but also those of greater obscurity. The list goes on with the presumptions of the author- we are supposed to know about newspapers of the era (of which there were many), political parties, both major and insignificant, and the names of resistance groups.
Again, this would not be critical if I had the requisite knowledge of the politics and society of France during this era, of which I do know some. But this book is written for the doctoral level student of this era in history, not for those seeking a more general overview.

Thirty years ago Robert Paxton publishes his classic book on Vichy France which demonstrated both the vigor the Petain/Laval regime sought collaboration as well as the political failure and moral horror of their policies. At the same time Paxton also demonstrated both the widespread support Petain could count on, at least at the beginning, as well as the fact that the regime was not consistently reactionary but also had modernizing elements which the Fourth and Fifth Republics would build upon. Now Julian Jackson has provided his account of the dark years. What has he done to modify Paxton's account?

Like Jackson's two previous books on 1930s France, The Dark Years is based largely on secondary literature and memoir literature. Notwithstanding that Jackson's account is unusually thorough. He starts off with a discussion of the interwar years, which looks over such ingredients of Vichy as pacifism, the German threat, Action Francaise, the shock of the first world war and the Depression. He then discusses the Vichy regime, then goes on to discuss popular opinion about the occupation. There is then a large section on the Resistance, followed by one on the Liberation and the postwar Remembrance of the Occupation.

Ever since Paxton's book appeared people have commented on how the French have been unwilling to confront the shame of Vichy. Jackson's response to this is a breath of fresh air: "The problem with such comments is not only the unwarranted condescension which underlies them--the assumption that `we', the British, would have faced up to things much better in similar circumstances--but also the fact that they are so patently false....Far from being years which French historians avoid, the Vichy period is probably at present the most intensively researched in French history..."

Jackson also points out that the historiography of Vichy was not subsumed in euphemistic darkness before Paxton came along. More important is the emphasis on a fact that Paxton did not sufficiently emphasize. The Germans were never popular under the occupation. The Germans' own reports on public opinion were consistently pessimistic. As one German professor noted in June 1941 "The French rejoice at the fact that British planes are attacking their cities..." The National Revolution under Vichy has some support, and there were powerful quasi-fascist movements in France before the war began, but its popularity too was limited. Petain, by contrast, was popular, at the beginning, though often this was because many people incorrectly believed he was a double game against the Germans (he was not). The fact that Petain did not have a reputation as a Monarchist led many people to believe he was more liberal than he actually was. The remarkable crowds which greated him a few months before liberation were, as Jackson points out, less an endorsement of him than an opportunity to show French flags after their banning under the occupation. At the same time plans for a more modern and planned economy, greater emphasis on physical education and contempt for the defeated Third Republic would continue into the post-war years. (Similarly, Jackson is also good at how the invaluable contribution made to the Resistance by immigrants to France was ignored and downplayed in the following years.)

Jackson is good at pointing out the nuances of the occupation. He properly emphasizes the wide support many ordinary French men and women gave to persecuted Jews that was crucial to their high survival rate. He also refutes the Vichyist argument that their "interference" accounted for the lower rate of Frenchmen involuntarily drafted to labour in Germany. To the extent this was true, it was because of widespread resistance to the considerable efforts Vichy made to enforce German wishes. Jackson is also good on specific individuals. Henry de Montherlant's reaction to the occupation looks much less pleasant in retrospect. By contrast Lucien Febvre's continued publication of Annales looks more principled than has been given credit for, while Paul Claudel's praise of Petain should not lead one to ignore the fact that he was pro-British and against collaboration from the very beginning. Jackson is also good on the resistance. While the Allies would have liberated France without them, they made it considerable easier and they would have done more if the Allies had given them more arms. Although the Resistance's relations with the populace were strained, "the peasantry's attitude toward the Maquis was one of solidarity tempered by prudence, respect tempered by apprehension. Whether one stresses the prudence or the solidarity, there is no dobut that the Maquis could not have survived without the peasantry." If it is true that the number of resisters increased dramatically at the time immediately before liberation, this was also the time when they faced the greatest physical danger. Perhaps the greatest virtue of Jackson's book is that it shows why glib sneers about French "cowardice" are no longer acceptable.

Julian Jackson's history is the most distinguished account I've read on France during the period from 1940 through 1944. He makes an excellent case noting how the Vichy Regime was indeed part of a longstanding political tradition in France which went as far back as the Ancien Regime; he makes a similar observation of the Resistance, noting how its political philosophy could be traced directly back to the French Revolution. Jackson clearly notes the intense dislike - if not outright hatred - of many French towards their German occupiers, noting that such sentiments may have played a decisive part in ensuring the survival of more French Jews than their counterparts in other Nazi-occupied countries. Much to my surprise, he clearly demonstrates how support for the Vichy Regime came not only from a staunchly conservative elements - but also liberal, and indeed socialist elements - within French society. He also succeeds in noting how figures such as French resistance leader Jean Moulin and future French president Francois Mitterand underwent transformations - some major, but also minor - in their politics, eventually shifting their support from the Vichy regime to DeGaulle's Free French movement. Despite Vichy's reputation for cultural as well as political repression, Jackson shows that cultural activities ranging from the fine arts through film not only survived, but also flourished, at least during the early history of the Vichy Regime.

Although I knew something about de Gaulle, Vichy, "The Resistance," etc; usually these topics were tangential to some other main topic I was reading. Jackson's BIG book set me straight on everything I always wanted to know about Vichy, the Germans, and the Free French, Petain, de Gaulle, etc.

France 1940-1944 covers highly controversial "history."
Almost none of the various personalities and political parties survive Jackson's detailed analysis without taking their "lumps." France 1940-1944 presents an ambiguous, painful story about collaboration, indifference and a few resisters.
Surely the French will never escape the shame of Vichy

Jackson often delivers clever insights and mixed judgments. Jackson gives you enough background to evaluate some of the following puzzles:

·Why did Churchill recognize De Gaulle in 1940, instead of the Vichy Government?

·Why did FDR try so hard to get rid of "Le Grand Charles" (De Gaulle)?

·Why did many French literally cheer when France lost the War with Germany in June 1940?

·Why did powerful and influential French express such bitterness, invective, and hatred against Jews?

·Why did the "Resistance" accept De Gaulle in 1944? After all, thousands of French fought and died inside France while De Gaulle remained safely in England and Africa.

·Why didn't the Communists launch a takeover at the time of the Liberation?.

After you read this book you will understand some of the powerful destabilizing forces in French society. But Dark Years is a long book, it's serious reading, and it's written in
a rather academic style -- dull if you are not really intrigued by France, the French, De Gaulle, the Germans, the Jews, etc.

This is a fine book on France during the Occupation period. Until approximately 25 years ago, this period of French history was largely uninvestigated. Starting with the pioneering work of the American historian Robert Paxton, there has been explosive growth in the literature related to the occupation period. Not surprisingly, much of this literature has involved controversial topics such as the culpability of the Vichy regime in the Holocaust, the importance of the Resistance movements, the role of Communists in the resistance, and the exact role of DeGaulle and his supporters. Prof. Jackson does a fine job of summarizing and analyzing this extensive literature. He provides a nuanced analysis of the Vichy regime, presents the Resistance in a clear and evenhanded manner, and is quite enlightening on DeGaulle's role and behavior during the war. This book was undoubtedly difficult to write. In addition to the large literature on this subject, France during this period was divided into several units, each of which experienced the Occupation in rather different ways. The basic distinction was between the Occupied and Vichy controlled zones but Occupied France was further subdivided into portions controlled as part of the administration of Belgium (the far Northwest), as part of Germany itself (Alsace-Lorraine), and the remainder of occupied France. Add to this complex mixture the need to describe the complex history of the Gaullist Free French outside France.

The heart of Jackson's book is the analysis of Vichy and its counterpart, the Resistance. As shown well, Vichy defies simple characterization. It was possible, for example, to be pro-Vichy and anti-German, at least at the beginning of the regime. Vichy benefited from the general disgust with the politics of the Third Republic and was seen by many as a potential vehicle for renewal of the French nation. Vichy leaders deluded themselves that an accomodationist policy would result in benefits, such as a peace treaty and end of the Occupation. As the war progressed, the Vichy regime would become increasingly collaborationist and the Vichy government participated willingly in German efforts to deport Jews to the concentration camps and in efforts to by German economic planners to acquire coerced French labor. Jackson also does a very nice job of revealing the tangled origins and history of the Resistance and its complex relationship with the Gaullist movement.

Jackson is a competent though not outstanding writer. Because of the complex nature of the subject, a strictly chronological approach is not possible and there is some cutting back and forth among chapters. Numerous individuals and organizations are discussed, the latter often represented by acronyms. This book requires some concentration to keep track of all these people and organizations. If future editions are published, a good addition would be a couple of tables listing organizations, acronyms, and important individuals.

By all accounts, this is the penultimate history of "the dark years" in France during 1940-44. I agree wholeheartedly. The approach is at once scholarly without being pedantic. Every page is a gem. I have learned so much about not only the years of the occupation, but also about France itself, and why its history (political and social) contributed greatly to the rise of the Vichy government. There are, according to Jackson, proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, many,many strands of influence upon not only Vichy but the Resistance and how both were viewed during and after the war. To those who complain that it is "geared toward specialists", I suggest that you choose your topics a bit more carefully if you want something a bit more simplistic. The subject is not easy, but Jackson does a masterful job of keeping the prose interesting and vibrant. This would get SIX stars if it were possible. Bravo. A tour de force that belongs in every historian's library.

This book is very well documented and thoroughly researched. Its length and fine print are quite forbidding. But to a child (now 77) it brings back memories and emotions. This was indeed one of darkest hours of French history, for which I am still ashamed. The book leaves no stones unturned. It is a definitive document for WWII.

This book is an excellant source for any scholar or amateur historian interested in the European theater of World War II. Although it did not adequately address the concerns that the Americans had for supporting the French resistance early in the war, it still provided emensely important information. The book begins by explaining the deep social rifts in French society between the socialist-elements and the conservatives prior to the war, and how this dynamic played a role in the fall of France and the establishment of Vichy France. It also very clearly identifies the complex sentiments the french people had for Vichy France, including the early feelings of legitimacy and mild support in the founding months of the regime, and how this feeling of support gradually crumbled under the shadow of National Socialism. It also goes into deep detail about the various overlooked actors of the french resistance, including the roles that Jews, women, and even foreign volunteers (even ethnic anti-nazi Germans!) played in the story of the resistance. It describes how different resistance grops formed under different circumstances, with an emphasis on the differences in resistance group formation in the occupied and unoccupied zones of France. It continues by describing how the roles that De Gaulle and Moulin played in orchastrating the various groups and how the concept of the resistance played into French culture and identity in the formation of the fourth republic.

Julian Jackson's book is so well thought-out, so utterly comprehensive and so intelligent that it has become like a bible to those studying France's dark years. It is perhaps not quite as readable as his 'The Fall of France' and I think it would require a certain amount of prior knowledge on the part of the reader. I would nevertheless highly recommend this to anyone interested in the period.

`The history of France in this period cannot be understood in separate compartments like `the Vichy regime,' `the Resistance', or `collaboration': these existed in dynamic relation to each other, and the history of France in this period must be conceived as a whole. These are strands but they make up one history.' `Vichy contained modernizers as well as conservatives... reinserted Vichy into a longer historical context, drawing out continuities with France's past and future. The future of the history of the Resistance needs to embrace its full diversity - Gaullist and non-Gaullist, Communist and non-Communist, North and South, men and women, French and immigrants - but also to reconnect the history of the Resistance to the society around it, to the French past, and to the Vichy regime.'

The social ideology of the governing elite after the fall of France owed its pedigree to the crisis of confidence in parliamentary Republic during the 1930s. `Maurras's movement, Action francaise synthesized royalism, nationalism, and Catholicism into a single doctrine which he called "integral nationalism".' `Nonconformists of the 1930s' whose disillusion with the Republic went deeper,' and their `Order Nouveau' repudiated liberal capitalism as `incapable of developing a rationally organized society.' The political paralysis after the Great Depression (the 1932 elections and their seventeen ministries in eighteen months; radical governments and their efforts to rally conservative support for socialist policies.) opened the way for `direct action by social groups,' where the `illustration of political polarization was less the violence of the extremes than the blurring of the boundaries between the parliamentary right, and the extreme right.' The massive majority that empowered Daladier to revise the constitution `revealed an erosion of faith in the institutions of the Republic across the entire political spectrum.'

Vichy was `a testimony to the long-term corrosive effect of Action francaise on French liberalism: all strands of French conservatism were present at Vichy.' Its National Revolution `defined itself first and foremost in opposition to liberal individualism which uprooted people from the `natural' communities of family, workplace, and region.' In its measures against foreigners, like the repeal of the 1939 Marchandeau decree prohibiting the publication of material inciting racial hatred, `Vichy was only extending legislation which had been started under the Republic.' Nonetheless, the National Revolution took a back seat to economic realities (e.g. married women became liable for labor service in Germany, regional constitution reinforcing state control rather than returning to `natural communities.') `The regime, or organizations which developed with its benediction, had up to a point, enjoyed many intellectuals' support, is testimony to the crisis of traditional republican values in France at the end of the 1930s. All these people had shared a certain number of preoccupations: a sense of living through a profound crisis of civilization which required a remaking of mankind; a belief that liberal individualism was incapable of embracing humanity in all its wholeness; and a conviction that the void which had opened up in France in 1940 offered vast possibilities.'

On collaboration, Vichy `realpolitik was wishful thinking based on a complete misreading of Germany': the regime `believed that it had trump cards - the fleet, the Empire, the Free Zone - but paradoxically the very existence of these prevented a more robust policy. Precisely because it did have something to lose, the Vichy government was always terrified to push its case too far for fear of provoking the Germans. Vichy only won paltry concession.' In the abortive Protocols of Paris May 1941, Darlan `had taken France to the brink of military collaboration and that he drew back for want of German political concession.' In 1940, `Laval's policy of collaboration had had little chance of success because the Germans hardly wanted anything France had to offer; in 1942, it had no chance of success because the Germans wanted so much that nothing the French offered would be enough.' With the German occupation of the rest of France in November 1942, `everything Vichy had salvaged from the catastrophe of 1940 was irremediably lost: the fleet, the Armistice Army , the Free Zone, and the Empire.'

In spite of the higher Jewish survival rate in France than in much of Western Europe, Jackson inculpated Vichy's role in Jewish persecution for its active co-operation with the Germans. According to Jackson, `the fate of the Jews depended on a variety of factors: the presence of an independent government able to interpose itself between the Jews and the Germans; the willingness of such government to do so; the numbers of German occupation troops; the timing of German anti-Jewish policies; the reactions of public opinion and the organizations which expressed it; the effectiveness of rescue networks; the geography and topography of the country; the size and distribution of the Jewish population. None of these factors was decisive in itself, and what mattered was how they combined.' `Without French police cooperation, it would have been difficult for the Germans to arrest the foreign Jews. About ¾ of all Jews were arrested by French police.' Furthermore, `Vichy's desire always to keep up with the Germans meant that anti-Semitism spiraled continuously in a more radical direction; Vichy continued to implement its own separate policy of persecution. (e.g. the French government imposed the Jewish Statutes, not the Germans). `The truth is that without Vichy's co-operation, it would have been impossible for the Germans to arrest as many Jews as they did.'

Demonstrating the dynamic relationship between Vichy and the Resistance, `being directly confronted with Vichy, the Southern movements evolved in response to it, while the Northern ones did not. In the North, those starting hostile to Vichy remained so; other were slow to rethink their position. In the South, however, ideology became central to the self definition of the Resistance, which started to develop a common rhetoric, drawing on the traditions of French republicanism.' `Given the reputation of the Republic by the end of the 1930s, this reassertion of republican values was not self-evident. It was a situation which Vichy itself created by becoming so identifiably a right-wing regime. It was Vichy which ensured that the Resistance would be Republican.' Jackson assailed the de Gaulle's Resistance myth - despite a few traitors, the French nation, united behind de Gaulle, had liberated itself and what occurred between 1939 and 1944 was represented not as a French civil war, but as an episode in a longer struggle against Germany - was problematic because `it imposed a unitary vision on what had been highly fragmented experience.'

Jackson concluded that `clearly any attempt to build an identity around the idea that Vichy was not France will be doomed to failure: de Gaulle's assertion that Vichy was null and void no longer serves any purpose in contemporary France. On the other hand, it is no less misleading to repudiate the existence of a Resistance which also represented `France'... the French past must be faced in all its contradictions and complexity. Only then can it be critically evaluated, and instead of serving to salve the conscience of the present, it can become a usable memory for the future.'