The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 [Hardcover]

Geoffrey Wawro (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0521584361 | ISBN-13: 978-0521584364 | Publication Date: August 25, 2003 | Edition: First Edition

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 violently changed the course of European History. Alarmed by Bismarck's territorial ambitions and the Prussian army's crushing defeats of Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866, French Emperor Napoleon III vowed to bring Prussia to heel. Digging into many European and American archives for the first time, Geoffrey Wawro's Franco-Prussian War describes the war that followed in thrilling detail. While the armies mobilized in July 1870, the conflict appeared "too close to call." Prussia and its German allies had twice as many troops as the French. But Marshal Achille Bazaine's grognards ("old grumblers") were the stuff of legend, the most resourceful, battle-hardened, sharp-shooting troops in Europe, and they carried the best rifle in the world. From the political intrigues that began and ended the war to the bloody battles at Gravelotte and Sedan and the last murderous fights on the Loire and in Paris, this is the definitive history of the Franco-Prussian War. Dr. Geoffrey Wawro is Professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Wawro has published two books: The Austro-Prussian War (Cambridge, 1996) and Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (Routledge, 2000). He has published articles in The Journal of Military History, War in History, The International History Review, The Naval War College Review, American Scholar, and the European History Quarterly, and op-eds in the Los Angeles Times, New York Post, Miami Herald, Hartford Courant, and Providence Journal. Wawro has won several academic prizes including the Austrian Cultural Institute Prize and the Society for Military History Moncado Prize for Excellence in the Writing of Military History. He has lectured widely on military innovation and international security in Europe, the U.S., and Canada and is host of the History Channel program Hardcover History--a weekly book show with leading historians, pundits, critics, statesmen and journalists.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

The brief, seldom-sung but crucial Franco-Prussian war gets its due in this superb history. Military historian Wawro gives a comprehensive and lucid account of the political and diplomatic dimensions of the war, which redrew Europe's map and announced the arrival of the German Empire as a world power, but his emphasis is on the conflict as an omen of the future of warfare. Dominated by the firepower of modern rifles and artillery, the bloody fighting foreshadowed the mass slaughter of World War I, while Prussia's lightning victory over France helped lay the groundwork for that conflict by stoking German militarism and enshrining a tragically mistaken confidence in the kind of onrushing offensives that would be undone by machine guns and trenches. Wawro's account is both a gripping narrative and an analytic tour-de-force. He moves easily between visceral depictions of the chaos of combat and strategic overviews of the unfolding battles and campaigns, providing along the way shrewd character studies of the politicians and generals on both sides. At the same time, he keeps a firm grasp of the foundations of military performance in weaponry, logistics and organization, based on an illuminating comparison between the undisciplined and outdated French army and the supremely professional and meticulous Prussians, whose innovations in tactics, planning, staff work and mass mobilization revolutionized European warfare. Full of colorful details and compelling insights, Wawro's vigorously written account should become the standard treatment of this watershed in military history.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review

"The brief, seldom discussed but crucial Franco-Prussian war gets its due in Wawro's gripping narrative history and analytic tour de force." --Publishers Weekly

"Wawro has...taken up the challenge, drawing on a wide range of sources to offer a brisk, readable, and sharp account.: --Foreign Affairs

"Wawro has written an extraordinary history of the Franco-Prussian War, one of the most significant wars in modern European history...Highly recommended." --Choice

"This is an extraordinarily luminous book about not only a war but also a continent and a century. Written with verve and wit, The Franco-Prussian War harnesses scholarship and story-telling to wonderful effect. Geoffrey Wawro has given us a magnificent yarn." --Rich Atkinson, author of An Army at Dawn and winner of the 2003 Pulitzer Prize for History

"Wawro's [book] is so much fun to read...an excellent read for professional and interested public alike." Canadian Military History Book Review Supplement

"An insigtful account of one of perhaps the most critical European war of the period between the Waterloo and the 'Guns of August'...a readable, often detailed account..." - The NYMAS Review, A.A. Nofi

"Military historians will be delighted by the appearance of this clear, well-written and effective operational history of the war...[Wawro] deserves congratulations for his fine narrative." Renaissance Quarterly

"Wawro has...taken up the challenge, drawing on a wide range of sources to offer a brisk, readable, and sharp account." Foreign Affairs

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 344 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; First Edition edition (August 25, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521584361
• ISBN-13: 978-0521584364
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.3 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (31 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #84,624 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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76 of 89 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Don't Throw Howard's Book Out Just Yet, February 21, 2004

By 

R. A Forczyk (MD, USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (Hardcover)

For the past four decades, the most comprehensive English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 has been Professor Michael Howard's book, first published in 1961. Geoffrey Wawro, the U.S. Naval War college professor who in 1996 wrote an interesting revisionist history of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, has now written a book to compete with Howard's classic. In a nutshell, Wawro's book is quite good, but it complements rather than replaces Howard's book.

Wawro's assessment of the opposing military systems is rather biased in favor of the conscription-based German armies over the smaller French regular army. Wawro focuses on one problematic French regiment and uses it to categorize the entire French army as riddled with poor morale, incompetent leadership and lax discipline. Indeed, Wawro equates alcohol consumption in the French army with unsoldierly behavior - what about the famous alcoholic general named Grant who took Vicksburg seven years before? While Wawro frequently notes drunken German troops later in the campaign, somehow this did not represent German indiscipline. Wawro also makes a big point about the superiority of German pre-war planning, but this is questionable on two accounts. First, the French were hardly alone in lacking detailed contingency war plans in 1870 - few other nations had them either. Second, Wawro admits the German operational plan - to encircle both French armies on the frontier - failed (MacMahon's army escaped to Chalons and while Bazaine's army was encircled, it was due to French lethargy, not the German plan).

Wawro's two main theses about the war are continuations of earlier themes from his book on the Austro-Prussian War. His first thesis - that incompetent French leadership was at the root of the defeat - equates General Bazaine's fumbling behavior at Metz with Austrian General Benedek's mistakes at Königgrätz. However, there are problems with this thesis. Bazaine had demonstrated real battlefield competence in previous wars, while Benedek was more of a paper-pusher. Bazaine's conduct indicates that political calculations - rather than incompetence - were at the root of the general's failure to act. Furthermore, Bazaine was a mere corps commander in 1870, not commander-in-chief like Benedek, meaning that the Austrian commander was in a much better position to ensure readiness for war and sound operational planning than Bazaine.

The author's second thesis is that French defeat was attributable to tactical defects, namely that French superiority in the chassepot rifle was trumped by superior German artillery; these technical disparities made the French troops more defensive-minded while the Germans were more aggressive. It is unfortunate that Wawro does not delve deeper into the opposing infantry and artillery tactics. Both the German and French infantry used large numbers of skirmishers, but the Germans were more inclined to conduct reckless frontal attacks. Neither army had a doctrine for tactical withdrawals, which meant that retreats quickly turned into routs. As for the artillery, the German Krupp breech-loaders were certainly more advanced than the French artillery, but the range advantage was smaller than Wawro suggests only (150 - 750 meters further), giving the German artillerymen a 5-27% advantage in range and 0-60% advantage in rate of fire. German fuses were also better and the Germans pushed their artillery further forward, but none of this added up to a decisive advantage. Wawro fails to note that post-war analysis revealed that only 8% of all casualties were caused by artillery fire, which seriously undermines his tactical thesis.
French defeat was primarily due to the haphazard military reforms enacted by Napoleon III. While the emperor did push the chassepot and mitrailleuse, he allowed the legislature to veto funds for artillery modernization and he squandered millions on adventures like Mexico and his own personal embezzlements of public funds. Napoleon III also over-spent on his navy to match English strength, but this fleet was virtually useless against threats from Prussia; a smaller French navy would have provided the manpower for another French corps as well as funds for artillery modernization. The French logistic collapse - never mentioned by Wawro - was caused by lack of preparations for a mobile campaign, such as buying more horses. Once the French army moved away from its supply depots it quickly became an unfed and short of ammunition - is it any wonder that morale deteriorated? German logistics were equally close to collapse once they pushed deep into France, and this over-reliance on distant rail heads would come back to haunt Germany in future wars.

Throughout the narrative, I was suspicious that Wawro was concealing facts that indicated French success or German failure. According to Wawro, the French naval blockade of Germany's coast accomplished nothing - he doesn't mention that they captured 80 German merchantmen in the first month of the war. Wawro is reticent about German losses, such as failing to mention the 10,000 German casualties at Froeschwiller. Later, Wawro omits critical details about the French counterattack to relieve Belfort in January 1871; he asserts that the French "sat idly on the road ..[to] Belfort from 10-13 January." In fact, Howard's account details the French victory at Villersexel on 9 January that led to a 5-mile advance toward Belfort in this period; why does Wawro ignore one of the few French tactical victories?

The Franco-Prussian War can be viewed simplistically as a triumph of German aggressiveness and technical skill over French sloth - as Wawro does - or it could be viewed as an opportunistic event where one nation was better placed to exploit temporary advantages. The French army of 1870 was far better than the outcome of the war indicated and indeed, this was probably the best French army the Germans ever fought. In term of casualty ratios, the Germans inflicted 3.8 casualties for everyone of their own in the 1914 invasion of France, 2.5 to 1 in the 1940 campaign but only 0.7 to 1 in the 1870 invasion. Had the French army in 1866 obtained the 13 million francs it needed for artillery modernization, is there any doubt that the results of the Franco-Prussian war would have been much different - Bazaine or no Bazaine?

38 of 44 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Study of the First Modern War., June 5, 2004

By 

W. M. Robbins "The Badger" (The Beautiful Blue Ridge) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (Hardcover)

Geoffrey Wawro established himself as a preeminent military historian and author with his previous volumes, "The Austro-Prussian War" and "Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914". His latest work, "The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871" is yet another example of the brilliant research and presentation Mr. Wawro is known for.

The world watched in surprise as Prussia easily defeated Austria in the Austro Prussian War (1866), nearly annihilating the Austrian army at the Battle of Koniggratz. The new Prussian breech-loading rifle, the Dreyse Needle Gun, allowed the Prussian forces an overwhelming superiority in fire power over the slower muzzle-loading weapons of the Austrian army. In addition, Prussian "swarm" infantry tactics, which called for units advancing in supporting skirmish lines until they overlapped the enemy's flanks, confused the Austrians. Lastly, the Prussians had completely revised their tactics regarding the use of artillery, allowing batteries to be quickly moved and concentrated anywhere on the field of battle, pulverizing enemy forces. Military strategists all over the world analyzed the conflict and tried to adapt their doctrine to the new style of waging war introduced by the Prussians.

The Franco-Prussian War forever changed the social, political and economic balance in Europe. The major European powers were stunned as the military might of France was devastated by a newly united Germany, and the seeds were sown for the constant political maneuvering and arms race that lasted until the start of the First World War.

France was largely caught unprepared when war came in mid-July 1870, even though war with Prussia had nearly occurred every year since 1866. Prussian leaders, King Wilhelm Hohenzollern and the Statesman Otto von Bismark, were motivated by a desire for revenge against France stemming from the Napoleonic Wars, the possibility of regaining Alsace and Lorraine, formerly German territory, and providing a national motive for uniting Prussia and the independent German States. The French sought to "keep Prussia in it's place", and maintain France's position as the leading power in Europe.

The French defeat was owed as much to deficiencies on the part of the French themselves as it was to Prussian superiority. Emperor Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte III was corrupt, indecisive and unschooled in military matters. France's generals had a penchant for political infighting and bitter rivalry, created in large part by the Emperor's habit of passing over senior officers to promote his friends and supporters, subordinating the more experienced commanders to their juniors. France's generals also were indoctrinated to believe that their strengh lay in defense rather than attack, and French officers repeatedly passed up opportunities to attack and destroy smaller or weaker Prussian units, even when French forces were overwhelmingly superior.

Organizationally, the French had a larger professional army than Prussia, as well as a system of reserves. The French army, however, proved to be poorly disciplined and the reserve system was wholly inadequate, as were mobilization plans, railways, etc. The Prussian army, though smaller, was better educated and trained, and backed up by a vast, quickly mobilized reserve. The one bright spot for France was their superb infantry rifle, the Chassepot. This powerful breech-loading rifle had double the effective range of the Prussian Dreyse, allowing the French troops to cut Prussian infantry to pieces before they closed. Unfortunately for the French, the Prussians more than offset this advantage with their overwhelming artillery, blasting French units to pieces under a rain of high explosive shells.

Aside from the discussion of the actual fighting, Mr. Wawro treats all the facets of this brief but bloody struggle, from personal accounts of soldiers of both antagonists and the foreign observers and reporters of the conflict (which included US General Phillip Sheridan) to the Republican rebellion after the Prussian capture of Emperor Louis-Napoleon.

For those interested in military or European history this book is a must have!

26 of 31 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An excellent history of the Franco-Prussian War, September 16, 2003

By 

1. "John Henninger" (Littleton, CO United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 (Hardcover)

Wawro has written an excellent history of the Franco-Prussian War that details why the Prussians won and the French lost the conflict. According to Wawro the French had inferior tactics because they would mass their soldiers in defensive formations to take advantage of the superior French rifle over the dispersed German formations but these tactics made the French army unable to counter attack or take personal intiative in combat. The Prussians would take advantage of these French weaknesses by outflanking and eventually surrounding the immobile French formations despite the high causalties that the Prussian army took from the superior French rifles. The Germans also massed their artillery batteries to follow in close formation with the infantry and replied on time to any threats from the French riflemen. As a result the French were pounded mercilessly by the Prussian artillery and could not use their rifles or reply to Moltke's armies. Wawro also blames the inept performance by General Bazaine for the French defeat. Bazaine did not take advantage of the situation at Mars-la-Tour and failed to reinforce his vulnerable right wing at St Privat during the battle of Gravelotte. Wawro believes that Bazaine's greatest error was leaving his forces at Metz to be surrounded rather than marching east to German territory and threataning Prussian supply lines or marching north to relieve MacMahon's besieged forces at Sedan.I would strongly reccomend this book for anyone interested in a concise account of the Franco-Prussian War.