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The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871

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For the past four decades, the most comprehensive English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 has been Professor Michael Howard's book, first published in 1961. Geoffrey Wawro, the U.S. Naval War college professor who in 1996 wrote an interesting revisionist history of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, has now written a book to compete with Howard's classic. In a nutshell, Wawro's book is quite good, but it complements rather than replaces Howard's book.

Wawro's assessment of the opposing military systems is rather biased in favor of the conscription-based German armies over the smaller French regular army. Wawro focuses on one problematic French regiment and uses it to categorize the entire French army as riddled with poor morale, incompetent leadership and lax discipline. Indeed, Wawro equates alcohol consumption in the French army with unsoldierly behavior - what about the famous alcoholic general named Grant who took Vicksburg seven years before? While Wawro frequently notes drunken German troops later in the campaign, somehow this did not represent German indiscipline. Wawro also makes a big point about the superiority of German pre-war planning, but this is questionable on two accounts. First, the French were hardly alone in lacking detailed contingency war plans in 1870 - few other nations had them either. Second, Wawro admits the German operational plan - to encircle both French armies on the frontier - failed (MacMahon's army escaped to Chalons and while Bazaine's army was encircled, it was due to French lethargy, not the German plan).

Wawro's two main theses about the war are continuations of earlier themes from his book on the Austro-Prussian War. His first thesis - that incompetent French leadership was at the root of the defeat - equates General Bazaine's fumbling behavior at Metz with Austrian General Benedek's mistakes at Königgrätz. However, there are problems with this thesis. Bazaine had demonstrated real battlefield competence in previous wars, while Benedek was more of a paper-pusher. Bazaine's conduct indicates that political calculations - rather than incompetence - were at the root of the general's failure to act. Furthermore, Bazaine was a mere corps commander in 1870, not commander-in-chief like Benedek, meaning that the Austrian commander was in a much better position to ensure readiness for war and sound operational planning than Bazaine.

The author's second thesis is that French defeat was attributable to tactical defects, namely that French superiority in the chassepot rifle was trumped by superior German artillery; these technical disparities made the French troops more defensive-minded while the Germans were more aggressive. It is unfortunate that Wawro does not delve deeper into the opposing infantry and artillery tactics. Both the German and French infantry used large numbers of skirmishers, but the Germans were more inclined to conduct reckless frontal attacks. Neither army had a doctrine for tactical withdrawals, which meant that retreats quickly turned into routs. As for the artillery, the German Krupp breech-loaders were certainly more advanced than the French artillery, but the range advantage was smaller than Wawro suggests only (150 - 750 meters further), giving the German artillerymen a 5-27% advantage in range and 0-60% advantage in rate of fire. German fuses were also better and the Germans pushed their artillery further forward, but none of this added up to a decisive advantage. Wawro fails to note that post-war analysis revealed that only 8% of all casualties were caused by artillery fire, which seriously undermines his tactical thesis.
French defeat was primarily due to the haphazard military reforms enacted by Napoleon III. While the emperor did push the chassepot and mitrailleuse, he allowed the legislature to veto funds for artillery modernization and he squandered millions on adventures like Mexico and his own personal embezzlements of public funds. Napoleon III also over-spent on his navy to match English strength, but this fleet was virtually useless against threats from Prussia; a smaller French navy would have provided the manpower for another French corps as well as funds for artillery modernization. The French logistic collapse - never mentioned by Wawro - was caused by lack of preparations for a mobile campaign, such as buying more horses. Once the French army moved away from its supply depots it quickly became an unfed and short of ammunition - is it any wonder that morale deteriorated? German logistics were equally close to collapse once they pushed deep into France, and this over-reliance on distant rail heads would come back to haunt Germany in future wars.

Throughout the narrative, I was suspicious that Wawro was concealing facts that indicated French success or German failure. According to Wawro, the French naval blockade of Germany's coast accomplished nothing - he doesn't mention that they captured 80 German merchantmen in the first month of the war. Wawro is reticent about German losses, such as failing to mention the 10,000 German casualties at Froeschwiller. Later, Wawro omits critical details about the French counterattack to relieve Belfort in January 1871; he asserts that the French "sat idly on the road ..[to] Belfort from 10-13 January." In fact, Howard's account details the French victory at Villersexel on 9 January that led to a 5-mile advance toward Belfort in this period; why does Wawro ignore one of the few French tactical victories?

The Franco-Prussian War can be viewed simplistically as a triumph of German aggressiveness and technical skill over French sloth - as Wawro does - or it could be viewed as an opportunistic event where one nation was better placed to exploit temporary advantages. The French army of 1870 was far better than the outcome of the war indicated and indeed, this was probably the best French army the Germans ever fought. In term of casualty ratios, the Germans inflicted 3.8 casualties for everyone of their own in the 1914 invasion of France, 2.5 to 1 in the 1940 campaign but only 0.7 to 1 in the 1870 invasion. Had the French army in 1866 obtained the 13 million francs it needed for artillery modernization, is there any doubt that the results of the Franco-Prussian war would have been much different - Bazaine or no Bazaine?

Geoffrey Wawro established himself as a preeminent military historian and author with his previous volumes, "The Austro-Prussian War" and "Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914". His latest work, "The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871" is yet another example of the brilliant research and presentation Mr. Wawro is known for.

The world watched in surprise as Prussia easily defeated Austria in the Austro Prussian War (1866), nearly annihilating the Austrian army at the Battle of Koniggratz. The new Prussian breech-loading rifle, the Dreyse Needle Gun, allowed the Prussian forces an overwhelming superiority in fire power over the slower muzzle-loading weapons of the Austrian army. In addition, Prussian "swarm" infantry tactics, which called for units advancing in supporting skirmish lines until they overlapped the enemy's flanks, confused the Austrians. Lastly, the Prussians had completely revised their tactics regarding the use of artillery, allowing batteries to be quickly moved and concentrated anywhere on the field of battle, pulverizing enemy forces. Military strategists all over the world analyzed the conflict and tried to adapt their doctrine to the new style of waging war introduced by the Prussians.

The Franco-Prussian War forever changed the social, political and economic balance in Europe. The major European powers were stunned as the military might of France was devastated by a newly united Germany, and the seeds were sown for the constant political maneuvering and arms race that lasted until the start of the First World War.

France was largely caught unprepared when war came in mid-July 1870, even though war with Prussia had nearly occurred every year since 1866. Prussian leaders, King Wilhelm Hohenzollern and the Statesman Otto von Bismark, were motivated by a desire for revenge against France stemming from the Napoleonic Wars, the possibility of regaining Alsace and Lorraine, formerly German territory, and providing a national motive for uniting Prussia and the independent German States. The French sought to "keep Prussia in it's place", and maintain France's position as the leading power in Europe.

The French defeat was owed as much to deficiencies on the part of the French themselves as it was to Prussian superiority. Emperor Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte III was corrupt, indecisive and unschooled in military matters. France's generals had a penchant for political infighting and bitter rivalry, created in large part by the Emperor's habit of passing over senior officers to promote his friends and supporters, subordinating the more experienced commanders to their juniors. France's generals also were indoctrinated to believe that their strengh lay in defense rather than attack, and French officers repeatedly passed up opportunities to attack and destroy smaller or weaker Prussian units, even when French forces were overwhelmingly superior.

Organizationally, the French had a larger professional army than Prussia, as well as a system of reserves. The French army, however, proved to be poorly disciplined and the reserve system was wholly inadequate, as were mobilization plans, railways, etc. The Prussian army, though smaller, was better educated and trained, and backed up by a vast, quickly mobilized reserve. The one bright spot for France was their superb infantry rifle, the Chassepot. This powerful breech-loading rifle had double the effective range of the Prussian Dreyse, allowing the French troops to cut Prussian infantry to pieces before they closed. Unfortunately for the French, the Prussians more than offset this advantage with their overwhelming artillery, blasting French units to pieces under a rain of high explosive shells.

Aside from the discussion of the actual fighting, Mr. Wawro treats all the facets of this brief but bloody struggle, from personal accounts of soldiers of both antagonists and the foreign observers and reporters of the conflict (which included US General Phillip Sheridan) to the Republican rebellion after the Prussian capture of Emperor Louis-Napoleon.

For those interested in military or European history this book is a must have!

Wawro has written an excellent history of the Franco-Prussian War that details why the Prussians won and the French lost the conflict. According to Wawro the French had inferior tactics because they would mass their soldiers in defensive formations to take advantage of the superior French rifle over the dispersed German formations but these tactics made the French army unable to counter attack or take personal intiative in combat. The Prussians would take advantage of these French weaknesses by outflanking and eventually surrounding the immobile French formations despite the high causalties that the Prussian army took from the superior French rifles. The Germans also massed their artillery batteries to follow in close formation with the infantry and replied on time to any threats from the French riflemen. As a result the French were pounded mercilessly by the Prussian artillery and could not use their rifles or reply to Moltke's armies. Wawro also blames the inept performance by General Bazaine for the French defeat. Bazaine did not take advantage of the situation at Mars-la-Tour and failed to reinforce his vulnerable right wing at St Privat during the battle of Gravelotte. Wawro believes that Bazaine's greatest error was leaving his forces at Metz to be surrounded rather than marching east to German territory and threataning Prussian supply lines or marching north to relieve MacMahon's besieged forces at Sedan.I would strongly reccomend this book for anyone interested in a concise account of the Franco-Prussian War.

In the Franco-Prussian War Geoffrey Wawro once again demonstrates a solid command of his subject, from researching minute details to crafting impressive theories with logical conclusions. This book is a follow up to his Austro-Prussian War and often uses that war as a backdrop for events a half a decade later.

The book is an indictment of French generalship that in many ways should have either won the war or at least battled Moltke?s forces to a bloody stalemate. Prussia was not the military machine of perfect tactical execution myth would have us believe. In fact both France and Prussia committed blunders during battles, but Prussia owed much of its early success to the accuracy of its artillery. Bismarck and Moltke were willing to throw thousands of men to their deaths at the hand of the dreaded French Chassepot rifle, while French generals Bazaine and Bourbaki squandered every advantage through inactivity.

In a course of five weeks, German forces had routed every French army leaving Paris open for conquest. But here is where France?s indecisiveness actually aided it. With Napoleon III out of the way, there was no legitimate French government to negotiate a peace. Prussia dispatched forces to the Loire Valley in attempts to defeat any French force in the field, which confounded Bismarck and strained the Prussian economy.

In the end Bismarck forced France to accept a humiliating peace that festered in French politicians hearts and minds for four decades. Though this war represents the end of Bismarck?s use of conflict to realize his realpolitik, the impression on France had been made. One cannot really understand the First World War without first understanding the Franco-Prussian War.

Wawro?s knowledge is incredibly detailed and his writing style is very readable, though casual ?history buffs? will probably not grasp the full comprehensiveness of this magnificent work.

If the book has a fault, perhaps it is the lack of coverage of the Paris Commune and the revolution of post-Second Empire France. He gives this topic brief coverage, but the detail of which he described the road to war and the conflict itself is surprisingly missing.

Not only does Wawro do a very creditable job of covering the color and drama of the war, but he does a brilliant job of explaining the broader issues. I teach foreign relations and, in just a few pages, Wawro does a better job of explaining how Napoleon III and Bismarck upset the European balance of power than any specialist writer in the field. He also does a superb job of explaining the significance of the revolution in weaponry and tactics that would come to fruition (or doom) in WWI. All done in a very readable and accessible style.

Wawro's scholarship passes muster with the professional historian and (as important to the layman) his narrative enjoyably occupies the general reader. Wawro is a good writer.

Both sides to the conflict of 1870-71 had their share of dunderheads in the field, but German planners had worked out their strategy well and well-in-advance. French planners hadn't. Though France knew by 1866 that a clash must come with a suddenly and dangerously expanded Prussia their ideas for the coming war were vague and only lazily vetted. In 1870 their expression might be conveyed as: ""Oh! we've gotten ourselves into a war. Now what do we do?" Even the logistics of getting men and supplies to the front was a lost battle all by itself.

France's effort was further hobbled by, among others, a vainglorious, incompetent supreme commander Napoleon III and by that sick soul, the once-valuable General Bazaine. Though the French were gifted with the most rapid-firing gun of its age, the man-deconstructing Chassepot, technology was trumped by superior Prussian field tactics. Morally and emotionally distraught, the French threw away battles that could and should have been theirs.

Wawro's earlier work "The Austro-Prussian War" shares the virtues of this later study . For readers interested in how and why the 1866 and 1870 conflicts happened and played out as they did, Wawro's accounts are rich with fascinating detail and insight that are the product of extensive and original research. Jim Smith

Wawro's book on the Franco-Prussian War is thoroughly researched and well-written. This book offers a detailed look at the causes of the war, the major political and military figures on both sides like Napoleon III and Otto von Bismarck, developments and improvements in military tactics and weaponry, and of course the major battles of the war between France and Prussia.

The contrasts between the French and Prussian armies were stark. The French officers and soldiers were on average older, less disciplined and lacking in high morale. Many of the highest ranking French officers were poor leaders and many were plagued with a defeatist mentality even early on during the conflict. Marshal Bazaine was a good example of this. One of the few advantages the French had was their primary infantry rifle known as the Chassepot, which had a longer range of accuracy and could fire more rounds per minute than the Prussian rifle. However, Prussian artillery would be far superior to that of the French and would play a decisive role in many of the battles.

The Prussians were indeed fortunate to have confronted such hesitant and generally poor French military commanders. Prussian victory was no sure thing at the beginning of the conflict, but they did seem to catch all the lucky breaks they needed to secure victory. This is not to say that the Prussians did not make mistakes. Several impetuous officers who launched several of the battles, including the battles at Spicheren and Gravelotte, paid a high price in terms of heavy casualties for their units as a result of their over zealousness to start a battle. Overall, however, they did seem to demonstrate better mastery of military tactics, including better use of reconnaisance and skirmish lines than their French counterparts. They used massed artillery at pivotal points on the battlefield with major effect and their infantry units could break down into smaller more mobile units to exploit any advantages on the battlefield.

The end result was victory for the Prussians and a humiliating defeat for the French. The results of this war would lead to further political unease and instability in Europe that would only further the tensions leading up to World War I nearly fifty years later. This book is definitely worth reading.

Mr. Wawro's account of the Franco-Prussian War provides enough background information for anyone not familiar with the history surrounding the conflict to comfortably jump into it and follow along. The book also provides detailed information about the post-war events that would ultimately unfold into the many causes for the next large-scale conflict that would engulf Europe, and the world, less than fifty years later. Most definitely a pleasant read.

The book gives a comprehensive and very detailed description of the events/battles of this conflict. Good maps. Well written.

As an introduction to the Franco-Prussian War, I have little hope that I could have stumbled across a better writer to acclimate me to that history.

After having just read Keegan's "The First World War", itself an excellent and thorough work (which, however, suffered from moving at a pace more compelled by the events than by the author), I wanted to read about one of the origins of conflict, being France's declaration of war on and eventual defeat by the blossoming Prussian Empire, 1870-71. I can say without the slightest hint of gratuity that Wawro's account of that contest is a vibrant literary work.

Let me open by saying that more than just a tale of two armies, Wawro successfully captures the social and political perspectives of the two nations and weaves them seamlessly with the military aspect of the narrative in such a way...well, think of it in musical terms when three notes are used in creating a song, sometimes individually and sometimes as a chord but always within the perfect framework of the song, I guess, would be the way I would like to describe it.

But more than that in making this a great read, and in fact the most compelling factor of all, is simply Wawro's abilities as an storyteller; rather than a dry discourse on an instance in history, I imagine that Wawro must be amongst the great historians for his ability to capture the wonder of the reader. The text has bounce, it finds an interia immediately and sustains it throughout, it is humorous and grave, and he gives it the daring and adventure one normally finds in fiction. He is also impeccable in his choice of quotes further lending to the spirit of the atmosphere he creates of the history.

Marvelous reading! Before I was halfway through the book I also purchased a copy of his history of the Austrio-Prussian War and am enjoying that special circumstance of knowing that when one finishes a fantastic book, there is another waiting on the nightstand.