Customer Reviews

The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870-1871

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"It seems in retrospect as though fate had decided that there should be no humiliation which the French army should be spared." That one sentence accurately captures the tenor of Michael Howard's masterful history of the Franco-Prussian War.

First published in 1961-and representing Howard's debut as a military historian - his history of the stunning Prussian victory over the heavily favored French has stood the test of time and rightfully confirmed his place as one of the preeminent historians of war in the twentieth century.

Howard tells the story of the war primarily from the French perspective, and it is a stinging indictment of that country's political and military system at that time. Disgraced French commanders such as Bazaine or Bourbaki are more pitied by Howard than criticized for their performance. He argues that primary fault for the disasters that befell the French armies were more the product of a defective French military system that put such incompetent men in command of large armies, rather than the fault of the incompetent commanders themselves.

Only occasionally does Howard divert his attention to the Prussian side, and when he does it is most often to discuss the friction generated between Moltke and Bismark or to describe the usually quick and effective Prussian reaction to halting or diffident French moves. However, Howard seems to place no stock in the notion of a German genius for war. For instance, he is quick to point out the many mistakes Moltke's army made, particularly in the early days of the conflict, and notes that more often than not the French troops gave just as good as they got in open battles with the Germans.

In many ways, the Franco-Prussian War marked the culmination of the dramatic military reforms begun by Scharnhorst after the disastrous defeat at the hands of Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1806. Prussian improvements in military recruitment, training and organization, and most notably the development of a General Staff responsible for managing the immense requirements of modern war were all brought to bear on the French and in many accounts is credited with the stunning victory. Howard recognizes the revolutionary implications of the railroad, telegraph and rifled weaponry, and also notes the decisive influence Prussian military planning and organization had in the conflict. Indeed, he notes that the war was a watershed event in military history. On the one hand, the conflict included perhaps the last successful cavalry charge in history, as well as the final employment of Vauban's time-honored siegecraft techniques developed in the 17th century. Yet, the war also held some harbingers of future warfare, such as the deliberate bombardment of civilian populations at Strasburg and Paris in an attempt to undermine civilian morale and storm troop tactics developed to minimize casualties in attacking positions defended by troops with rapid firing rifled weaponry. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, Howard seems to credit the French more with defeat than the Prussians with victory.

Finally, it should be noted there are a lack of adequate campaigns maps, which makes many portions of the book difficult to follow.

The Franco Prussian War of 1870-1871 was one of the most important wars of The Nineteenth century. This war would set the stage for what European wars would be like from then on. It also optioned for Germany a respect and imitation for years to come. In this book many subjects are discussed. First the different technologies and reforms of the French and Prussians are chronicled. Then the different mobilizations of both sides, their battle plans and the concentrations of the armies before fighting started. Then the first engagements are described in great detail. Then the great battle of Sedan is laid out for all to see. Then the siege of Paris and the war in the south and west of France is told in great description. Lastly the last battles of Orleans are described and then the following peace treaty is laid out. In conclusion the Franco Prussian War by Michael Howard is a good book for anyone interested in history or politics. If the book has any problems it may be the lack of translation of French and German in the text and in the footnotes. Despite this problem the book represents the Nineteenth century very well.

The Franco-Prussian War is an unusual conflict in that it is in many ways a study in contrasts. Historically, it set the stage for two twentieth century conflagrations even as it settled scores from the early nineteenth century. Politically, it marked the zenith of French national influence, and the ascendancy of a united German power. Finally, militarily, it offered the first widespread use of breech-loading rifles and modern artillery, even as it often languished in the tactics of an earlier age.

It takes a broad brush to capture all of these elements, and in this book, Michael Howard has succeeded admirably. He has taken an often overlooked conflict and placed it squarely at the crossroads of modern Europe, and a new, more terrible type of war. For while the American Civil War (or even the Crimean War) is often referred to as the first modern war, it is in fact in the Franco-Prussian War that we see all the key elements of modern warfare: national mobilization, citizen soldiers under the guidance of a professional general staff, and the ascendancy of industrialization in both transport and new, more destructive, weapons. At the same time, newer, more insidious developments in the form of guerrilla warfare and the targeting of civilians centers for strategic reasons first make their appearance on a large scale.

Arising out of French objections to the Prussian selection of the Spanish monarch, this war, like many before and since, arose out of a complete lack of French appreciation for the changes that had overtaken the battlefield. While the French had relied on a small, professional army, the Prussians had adopted a model of mandatory service that allowed them to raise massive, reasonably competent forces with unprecedented speed. Thus, when hostilities broke out the French, who had assumed an easy victory, were caught on their heels and never regained the initiative.

Thus from the summer of 1870 through the depths of winter and into 1871, the story of the Franco-Prussian War is the story of the courage of the French soldier being failed utterly by inept leadership. It wasn't in the strength of Prussian arms, or in the courage of its soldiers that the war was won; rather, it was in the ability of the centralized Prussian command structure to adapt rapidly to events when their French counterparts were still in the dark that victory was secured.

Thus, while Howard's writing on the actual combat is vivid, it is in his appreciation of the fundamentally new Prussian way of war that he is most successful. From the king, through the Bismarck and Moltke, and on down through the rest of the senior command, he paints a vivid portrait of Prussian ideals and ambition. Conversely, he is equally successful at capturing the decrepitude and ineptness of a fragmented French government that lost the war in its opening days, and then prolonged it, to the never ending suffering of its soldiers, long after all hope was lost. Likewise along these lines, Howard nicely illustrates the increasing conflict that inevitable comes between politicians and the military in an era of total war.

That said, I do have a few minor complaints. The first is that Howard almost never translates quotes from the original French or German, and while I was just barely able to muddle through with what I remember from high school and college, any one who hasn't been exposed to these languages would certainly be frustrated. Secondly, as anyone familiar with European politics knows, nothing happens in a vacuum, and yet Howard spends precious little time discussing the implications of the conflict within the international system of the time. Finally, while Howard offers many maps, they offer little to know information about troop positions and lines of march, which leaves the reader flipping back rather than digesting a detailed map at a glance.

However, these are minor complaints about an otherwise eminently successful work. Howard has packed a tremendous amount of research into a readable and digestible volume. His appreciation of the politics and personalities is matched only by his understanding of the weapons of war and the nature of combat. Not only is this a successful history of the Franco-Prussian war, but also a model of what good history writing should be: balanced, well researched, and above all, readable. Finally, Howard's success elevates the Franco-Prussian War to its rightful significance as one of the root causes of the tensions that led to WWI, and hence, to WWII. Thus the student of history should appreciate this work not just for its success in considering immediate events, but for providing a bridge from the Great Power politics of the nineteenth century to the wars of the twentieth.

Jake Mohlman

I have read only the 1961 edition, so my apologies for any discrepancies between that and the current edition. A concise overview of the contemporary political and technical scene precedes a series of detailed accounts of major clashes in the war. The engagements are detailed to the extent of considering unit actions, down to regiments, and the terrain over which they operated. Leading figures on either side are appraised, usually scathingly. Translations into English are the norm, except in footnotes. The tone of the book, to the reviewer, was somewhat condescending towards civil authorities. In reply, it could be said that the book is primarily a military history. Still, the reviewer feels that a more expansive consideration of the political causes and consequences of the war, on both sides of the Rhine, would have been useful. Considering the book as a detailed study of the clash of arms that led to an astonishing tabula rasa in Europe and the World, "The Franco-Prussian War - The German Invasion of France 1870-1871" will be found very enlightening.

The Franco-Prussian war took place in 1870-1871, and is both the last of the wars featuring the traditional Imperial powers (France, Enland, Spain) and the first of the modern 20th century wars featuring the new Imperial powers (Germany, Japan, the US). There is also a direct linear relationship from this war to WWI (and thence to WWII). Because of this linear relationship, and because it was the only war between major European powers between the years of 1815 and 1914, more books have been written about it than any other war in history, relative to its length (a scant half-year). Unfortunately, few of these books still in print. This one, however, is available, and is a good summary of the war. Michael Howard takes us through the 60 years of peace from the end of the Napoleonic wars, commenting on the reforms in equipment, tactics, and strategy of both the French and Prussian armies after their last clash at Waterloo. Then follows the meat of the narrative, the war itself. We are taken through the battles and campaign in some detail, starting with the important initial Prussian victories at Sedan and Metz that sent most of the regular French army into captivity. This is followed by the seige of Paris and the running countryside battles between the regular Prussian soldiers and the barely-trained French scratch armies and Francs-tireurs (guerillas). Along with the action, there is some insightful analysis. Howard convincingly argues that in both terms of manpower and equipment, the two armies cancelled each other out (the superiority of the Prussian artillery should have been cancelled by the superiority of the quick-firing French rifles). Thus, the Prussian victory mostly arose from superior staff work and organisation, for which he credits Moltke and Bismark and blames Napolean III and his staff. Also interesting was the debate on tactics that took place in both armies, for instance, the effectiveness of bombarding civilian populations as opposed to military targets only (and Howard gives us further analysis in light of the World Wars). The book is liberally sprinkled with footnotes and is well documented. Many of the footnotes are added as proof by direct quotes from original sources, and are thus in the language of the combatants. A knowledge of French and German is not required, as Howard gives you the gist in the main text, so the narrative runs along smoothly. Unfortunately, the narrative tends to be dry and the maps are small and occasionally difficult to read, hence the 4-star rating instead of 5.

This is a very detailed account of the military and - to a lesser extent - political maneuverings of the Franco-Prussian War. Given the detail and the heavy footnoting, it is a surprisingly brisk read, though I do have one suggestion to assist future readers: photocopy the various pages that have maps on them so you can easily refer to them as you read on. Since I hadn't thought of this idea while reading the book, I found myself holding two or even three such pages open with the fingers of my left hand while reading battle descriptions many, many pages later.

One disappointment was in the very brief epilogue. The author discusses how the speed of the Prussian victory raised the stakes for all European powers, Germany in particular, but the author does not really discuss the aftermath of the war in France or explain how France formed a post-war government given the fractious way it had fought the war. Every history needs to stop at some point, of course, but a brief explanation of France's recovery seems in order.

This is a good book written by an exceptional soldier and historian, however, it's not for everyone. I'll try to quickly summarize the primary obstacles for the average American reader.

To begin with, this is an operational history and operational histories are, by their very nature, boring reads. It is particularly difficult to become engrossed with the movements of various armies, corps, and divisions when most Americans are generally unfamiliar with the detailed geography of Alsace-Lorraine and the faceless commanders of either side.

Sir Michael elected not to translate the frequent oblique French and German quotes of the participants provided to illuminate critical decisions and/or decisive actions. One must assume that the British audience of 1961 were well up on their French and German. Most Yanks will quickly tire of thumbing through their phrase books trying to figure out what was said.

Sir Michael must have also assumed his audience had a basic working knowledge of the primary cast of characters of the 1870 War. For example, few Americans are likely to be familiar with the Empress Eugenie, the influence she wielded over her Emporer husband and the French decision making process as a whole. Nor are American readers likely to understand such archaic references as "the stone", a malady suffered by Napoleon III, though they will no doubt eventually figure it out.

I'll readily admit that I spent a considerable amount of time online just trying to understand the background information surrounding the conflict. Several maps are included but unfortunately they are not very useful owing to inappropriate scale. At $30 per copy, this is a book best left in the public library and consulted when and if needed. If you're a die-hard military historian, then by all means, CHARLIE MIKE. If not, skip it.

Michael Howard utilizes the Franco-Prussian War as a case study to illustrate Germany's military dilemma of the mid-19th to mid-20th Centuries. On the one hand, Prussia employed every means at its disposal--military/industrial technology, professional military training and education, and rapid mobilization and deployment-- to set the president and become Europe's greatest military power. On the other hand, the recently united Germany's victory over France would create a fervor of nationalism and militarism that would transcend two world wars in the 20th Century in what Howard refers to as "a disaster: for herself and for the entire world" (p. 456). Howard incorporates the classic old style military history approach. The author describes the political atmosphere, causes, troop movements, weapons, strategy & tactics, battles and leaders that are common fare for this genre. To a lesser degree, Howard describes the affect the war had on society especially the Paris Commune that rose after the fighting subsided and the "precarious" peace that followed (p. 455). Throughout, Howard stresses the technological aspects of the conflict, especially the role of railroads. Even Howard admits the vast array of archival material that emerged from this war is too much for any one historian to master. He carefully selects and synthesizes primary sources from both sides of the conflict yet tends to lean more towards German language sources. Among these, Howard also consults diaries and memoirs from the major actors such as Bismarck and Moltke. Howard also credits the work of Emil Daniels who published a definitive one-volume history of the Franco-Prussian War in 1929. The social aspect of Howard's thesis pales in comparison with the military historical narrative. Much of Howard's contentions are found between the lines; a technique favored by some and shunned by other historians. Also, any treatment of vast units and their commanders describing intricate troop movements and tactics should include an order of battle in an appendix. The absence of an order of battle is a major weakness of this book. Finally, what maps are provided, are just those: maps. They show no movement of troops, offensive or defensive positions or tactics utilized, another major flaw. Howard utilizes the top-down approach to military history to great affect. The strength lies in the compare and contrasting of preliminary preparations of both countries and the political/military leadership that implemented policy. Although Howard makes the French deficiencies obvious and outlines the command faults on both sides, he does it with a sympathetic approach for the realities of the nature of war. This objective style is a major strength of the book. For the Franco-Prussian War, Michael Howard's book remains the top-dog!

Howard's The Franco-Prussian War details the conflict of 1870-71 wherein Prussia defeated France in the last of the three wars of German unification spanning the time from 1864-1871. The development of the modern Prussian general staff, started in the wake of Napoleon's crushing victory at Jena, here reaches its culmination both in the person of Moltke and the crowning victory over the Second French Empire. What few mistakes were made against Austria in 1866 had been corrected, and as Howard writes, "By 1870, the machine was perfected."

The swift and decisive Prussian victory, Howard concludes, actually portended disaster for the unified Germany. It brought the Germans of that era to believe that since their nation had been unified as a result of military action, that it would be through military action that the nation would be preserved. This was to bear significant consequences over the next seventy-five years.

Howard's survey of the war and its context within the sphere of European politics before WWI is exactly what a succint war history should be--except that it is sorely lacking in maps of troop deployment and maneuvering. Considering the level of detail that Howard's text delves into in this regard, this deficiency is both surprising and disappointing. (Note that maps that feature towns and prominent geographical features are themselves present, but--trust me--you will miss having the battle maps.)

Other than this weakness, I couldn't have asked for more from the book. I recommend it as the best I've seen on the subject.