Customer Reviews

Free Will: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

I read this book because I wanted a concise and thorough refresher on the problem of free will and because I thought it might shed some helpful new light on the subject. The book was disappointing in both regards, unfortunately, and thus I cannot recommend it, either to the beginning or the advanced student.

Let me mention that my disappointment is not due to any lack of sympathy for the author's project. Like Dr. Pink, I affirm libertarian freedom and I reject attempts to naturalize human agency. I am glad that the author wishes to defend a traditional, robust conception of free will, but I found his exposition repetitive and confusing and his arguments almost wholly unpersuasive.

It should also be said that the book is not without insights. For example, it succeeds in showing how, thanks to the naturalist program of Thomas Hobbes, the modern problem of free will differs importantly from the problem as treated in the medieval period. The book frames the free will problem in terms of action theory, a somewhat interesting approach, and it contains a pretty good critique of agent causation.

Nevertheless, in my judgment, the book's negative qualities outweigh the positive. A constant source of irritation is Pink's appeals to "what we ordinarily believe" to answer determinist and compatibilist objections. It is as if he thinks that folk ontology includes a worked-out libertarian theory of agency, and that compatibilism and determinism enjoy absolutely no support from our everyday intuitions.

A more serious problem is the author's failure to define his terms clearly or to give a precise map of the terrain he is covering. For example, he never clearly distinguishes, and in some places seems to conflate, freedom as ultimate responsibility and freedom as alternative possibilities (cf. Robet Kane, The Significance of Free Will). And he makes no mention of, among other things, the consequence argument, the distinction between agent causation and event causation, reactive attitudes, or Frankfurt examples. Such omissions are surprising in a book purporting to introduce the subject of free will.

Worse yet, while the author discusses compatibilism at some length, if only as a foil for his own view, he does not consider incompatibilist determinism in any detail and he does not mention semi-compatibilism at all. This book is really an introduction to libertarianism, not free will, and an unclear one at that. There is nothing wrong with defending one's point of view, of course, but the reader does not come away with a clear understanding of alternative theories, let alone the arguments for them.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the book is its obscurity. Not only is the author's writing muddled, as already mentioned, but I find his theory, well, bizarre. Pink's thesis is something like the following: Freedom is a sui generis non-causal power to form goals exercised through the medium of action. Perhaps this speaks to my shortcomings more than the author's, but I am still puzzling over what this amounts to. I think Pink would need to develop his view in much more detail, including a careful excursus on causation, before it became clear. In the present book, his attempt to lay out his view competes with his aim of providing a "very short introduction" to free will, and consequently he succeeds in neither.

I don't know whether this book is biased or I am (or both), but I think it's the first. Pink exhorts notions of freedom and action while constantly mentioning the awful THREAT to his cherished libertarian freedom that the Hobbesian style determinism poses. I admit with shame (which isn't necessary because I don't have free will) to not having read the entire leaflet. That's why I will give it 3 stars and not just two. I don't want to be unfair to the author. But why did I not read the entire book? I'll tell you why. I had enough by the time that Pink says (paraphrased) "there had better be a solution to this threat to libertarian freedom because it is our everyday feeling that we have this kind of freedom", then proceeding to say something that IMO amounts to claiming decisions spring into existence by themselves!
The book is nevertheless quite a good (and handy sized) introduction to the topic in terms of providing a general overview and introduction to the topic, as far as I as a layman can judge. I think he fights for his libertarianism as if his very life was at stake. In a sense that's probably how he sees it, as the free will debate is also related to concepts of the self. I'd say this book is definitely fine for everybody who clings as fiercely to the notion of free agency as Pink does. Everybody else should, like I will, look elsewhere for a good book on free will/determinism.

First let me say that the book lives up to its name. It gives an introduction that is very short. Unfortunately, the introduction is made even shorter by Pink's "original contribution to the field of philosophy", which barges it's way into the final two chapters, chortling at the plausibility of a deterministic existence.

One expects to find this sort of chauvinistic approach in a work by a religious or political proponent, but to see it in what is supposed to be a philosophical tract is shameful. The author clearly finds the prospect of a deterministic existence unbearable, constantly referring to the `threat' to our freedom, and at one point derisively describing Hobbes' compatibilist desire-based take on the subject as leading us "marionette-like, successfully to do only what [it] motivates us to do". In fact the author's refutation of Hobbes' compatibilism is horribly flawed. His argument is summed up on page 111: "Freedom, our power over our own action, cannot plausibly be identified as a causal power of prior desires or other passive motivations to determine how we act. And that is because we can deliberately use our own action, the very action through which we exercise our freedom, to frustrate our desires." Or could it be that one desire (perhaps oriented toward a larger goal) is overpowering a weaker one? Whoops!

Then there is deterministic incompatibilism, which Pink glosses over or outright dismisses, but perhaps we can forgive him for this, since the book purports to be an introduction to free will and not determinism. All the same I found its superficial treatment a bit disappointing.

A few sentences in the book caused me to laugh out loud, such as: "Goal-directed action can perfectly well take a form that need not be caused by desires or indeed by any other prior motivation." OK then...sure. Although the size of the book may have impeded Pink's ability to exonerate this seemingly insane statement (or perhaps the breadth of the English lexicon, as evidenced by his use of `words' like `up-to-us-ness'), as I read on I became increasingly certain it had more to do with deficiencies in the author's logistics. In the end his argument basically amounts to "although other physical events can be completely attributed to prior and/or currents causes, human actions cannot." Has anyone heard of a physical event occurring without a cause? No? Neither have I. I suppose if the causes leading to an action do not contribute 100% to that action happening, you could make up an imaginary force that contributes the rest, call it freedom, then say "Ha! We DO have free will." Just don't do that and pretend you're making an original contribution to philosophy.

I have read a large number of the Very Short Introduction series and am on the whole very impressed with them. Reading this particular book, however, I felt I was reading a very bad exam paper. The text is replete with the type of flawed argumentation one would expect from a keen but unpromising high school pupil. It was so bad that I was able to find at least one major flaw per page, often more. Some of the worst flaws include:

* Pink frequently assumes that because something need not be the case that it therefore is not the case.
* Pink fails to present a theory for freedom, relying instead on very poor attempts to undermine the counter-arguments to the case for freedom of the will, arguments he is either willfully distorting or has not understood.
* Pink makes the flawed assumption that theories of causal determinism are necessarily reductive.
* Pink's arguments against determinism, garrulous as they are, are not more sophisticated than 'we have free will because we perceive that we have it'.
* Pink's book is, as another reviewer has highlighted, highly repetitive. In fact, this is an understatement. It could not be more repetitive if it tried. This could easily have fitted onto 30 pages.
* Pink takes certain key terms for granted (e.g. 'we', 'self', 'free agent'), perhaps realising that their definition may undermine his rambling hypotheses.
* At times, Pink seems to assume that prior causation must mean that things are mapped out for the individual since before birth, rather than acknowledging the chaos and flux which is at play in causal relationships. This in itself is an example of the reductionism he readily criticizes elsewhere.
* Pink argues against the Hobbesian view that action is driven by prior desires with the awful counter-example of 'if I am out walking, and decide to take a break on a bench, then decide to get up and continue my walk, that decision is not driven by prior desires'. His notion of temporality is skewed here, for 'man wishes to get up and continue walk, gets up, continues walk' is sufficient to undermine his argument. Immediately prior is still prior.
* In trying to undermine the role of desires in action, he replaces this term with `motivation'. However, he fails to define `motivation' and fails to show how it is any different or any more amenable to freedom than `desire'.
* Et cetera ad nauseum...

All in all, Pink has produced something that is an embarassment to philosophy. He shouldn't be teaching at a university, let alone publishing books. I suggest he goes back to school to learn the very basics of philosophy. Whether you come from the determinist, compatibilist or libertarian camp, this book has only one thing to offer: an example of how not to argue a case for the freedom of the will.

This book mainly advocates the Libertarian view of free will (not to be confused with its political namesake). Proponents of this view consider it to be essential for moral behavior, and justifiably so. But there is also a centuries-long list of critics who claim, also with considerable justification, that libertarianism simply cannot be reconciled with basic logic and a scientific view of cause-and-effect. David Hume criticized this view in the 1700's, but there have been many others. Pink is embarking on a very difficult task of defending Libertarianism against centuries of past and present critics while simultaneously introducing the entire field to a lay audience. It would take a very talented writer to accomplish this, and Pink's efforts fall short, though I do give him credit for attempting a very difficult project.

Pink's book is admirable in its avoidance of jargon, use of everyday examples, and broad historical scope. However, both its content and style leave a lot to be desired. His main interest is obviously in defending the libertarian view, and he repeatedly warns the reader of the dangers and moral horrors that await us if libertarianism isn't true. I'm sorry, but that simply isn't an argument. There are plenty of truths that are inconvenient, and just because one likes the alternative doesn't mean it is actually true. I read through the whole book hoping Pink would eventually make his case. Toward the end, he tries feebly to convince the reader that decisions get made, somehow by some elusive mental substance, that does not obey the same naturalistic laws as ordinary matter. This reminds me a lot of the arguments for intelligent design, which asserts that complex life arose, somehow, by some elusive process that does not obey naturalistic laws. Whether Pink is right or wrong, this argument will be immensely frustrating to any critically thinking reader.

It might be assumed that the book lacks clarity due to the need to fit a lot of material into a short format and small page size. However, this book is actually 120 pages long, and set in a small font, making the word count longer than expected. Furthermore, the author often repeats himself, wasting space that he could have used to sharpen and clarify his arguments.

Although the Libertarian position is, in my opinion, incoherent, there are other authors who manage to write intelligently on this subject. I highly recommend Robert Kane's introduction to the field, found in the opening chapter of "The Oxford Handbook of Free Will". Kane also defends Libertarianism, like Pink, and even though I disagree with Kane, his chapter reviews a wide range of viewpoints with remarkable precision, coherence, and equanimity. Kane's chapter (at 37 pages long) is even shorter than this "very short introduction", despite providing more information and insight. While Pink certainly feels passionately about libertarian free will (or at least feels threatened by the alternatives), his book is basically "comfort food" for those already persuaded to the libertarian position.

If you are interested in Free Will from the naturalist/scientific point of view, you'll find that Pink largely ignores this topic, and you would be better off turning to works by Daniel Wegner, Daniel Dennett, Derek Pereboom, and many others.

For an interesting "third way" that is neither wholly libertarian nor naturalistic, you might also try Saul Smilansky's "Free Will and Illusion". Like the naturalists, he regards Libertarianism as an illusion. But interestingly, Smilansky also agrees with the Libertarians that the naturalist view can at times undermine human dignity. Smilansky ends up concluding that some illusions (like Free Will) are essential for our well being and should not be discarded too hastily. Smilansky also reviews the many other positions on Free Will, albeit using many more pages than Pink or Kane.

OK, for me this was a supremely difficult piece of reading. It was ultimately worth the effort--difficult but very satisfying. The work is more an argument in favor of Prof. Pink's philosophy than a dispassionate summation of this field of inquiry. It is recommended not for the value of Prof. Pink's argument but as a compelling introduction to the subject itself. Frankly, I have tried and abandoned several works in philosophy. Recognizing that my difficulty arose from a lack of familiarity with the basic concepts and vocabulary of the discipline, I resolved to attempt the very short introduction and was pleased to find that it has primed me with concepts, ideas and an interest in pursuing further reading on the topic.

Personally, I enjoy the philosopher's talent in finding hitherto unexplored depths in the most common of ideas; of focusing us on questions that have been glossed over. While others will quibble about the particulars of the various doctrines presented in this work, it surpasses many other "overview" books in its painstaking introductions to the difficult ideas at issue and strikes an excellent introductory balance between detail and summary. Herein lies its value; any introduction that leaves the reader with a desire to delve further into the discipline must be considered a success, "Free Will" accomplishes just that.

This was probably the worst VSI I've read (and, given that I love the series, I've read quite a few). It does very little in the way of an introduction to the subject, or even in the way of a lucid exposition. Pink treats the free will problem as a sort of constant problem throughout the ages, paying very little regard to profound historical differences in treatment (excepting, perhaps, his short discussion of the Middle Ages). The lack of the kind of sensitivity needed by a historian of ideas becomes apparent when the author again and again writes off Hobbes's theory as "wrong," in light of what we now know (or Pink now knows) about the subject (or when he talks about "reversing" some intellectual changes occurred since the Middle Ages). Common sense becomes too often the main judge and the sole source of evidence in the author's arguments. From the beginning, Pink frames the terms of the debate, in the way that best suits his purposes, and then purports to resolve the free will problem in a way consistent with freedom. The last section of the book is called "In defence of libertarian freedom." That should be the name of the book, even if the defense the author accomplishes is markedly capricious (frequently omitting, for instance, the names and arguments of his opponents). The book may be useful in a class setting aimed at presenting Pink's "solution" to the free will problem, but as a VSI on the subject it was very unsatisfying.

I own several books from Oxford's Very Short Introduction Series and Thomas Pink's FREE WILL is another good one. This book serves as a fine primer. In a little more than one-hundred pages the major thinking from ancient to modern times is presented. Professor Pink does have his point of view on the subject, and he lets you know it, but he is in no way heavy-handed, giving opposing thoughts full consideration. There is also a good list for further reading in case one is inspired to dig deeper into this age-old question.

Thomas Pink, the author, is a lecturer at King's College, London. In the discussion, pros and cons about Free Will, the author demonstrates that how learning about Free Will is just a matter of broadening and deepening one's own mind and understanding. I sincerely suggest reading this book to all intellectuals.