This book is 3 chapters: an intro chapter, a chapter on free will & neurobiology, and a chapter on political power. The book was previously just two lectures Searle gave in 2001 at Sorbonne. Eventually, Searle's editor published these two lectures in France without Searle's involvement leading Searle to end a quaint story saying, "It is the first time in my life that I published a book I did not know that I had written" (pg. 2). Searle added the intro chapter for his edition. Although the first essay on free will is meager progress on what Searle says elsewhere (see Searle's
Rationality in Action (Jean Nicod Lectures)), the 2nd chapter on political power is a promising addition to what Searle has already hinted at in
The Construction of Social Reality and
Mind, Language, and Society : Philosophy in the Real World (he admits this fact, see pg. 33).
SEARLE ON FREE WILL & NEUROBIOLOGY
Searle puts in the title "Reflections" because he admits to not giving answers, especially to the problem of free will. Instead Searle wants to muse: "I cannot give you a solution to the problem of free will, but I hope to be at least able to state the problem in a precise enough form so that we can see what possible solutions would look like (pg. 31).
Searle is frustrated by free will and neurobiology because free will seems to be a phenomenological experience that is irreducible to epiphenomena, yet how can we be free to will when conscious states are realized in neurological states which are "completely deterministic"? (pg. 38 see all 40). But the notion of the freedom of the will does not go away, according to Searle, "if you say to the waiter `Look, I am a determinist - che sará sará, I'll just wait and see what I order,' that refusal to exercise free will is only intelligible to you as one of your actions if you take it to be an exercise of your free will" (pg. 43).
At this point Searle offers 2 hypotheses: (1) free will is an illusion and the deterministic physical laws which govern our neurons also govern consciousness i.e. epiphenomenalism; (2) "we have to suppose that the logical features of volitional consciousness of the entire system have effects on the elements on the system. This is true even though the system is composed entirely of the elements" (pg. 63). Thus, "the passage from one state to the next is explained by the rational thought processes of the initial state of neurons/consciousness. At any instant the total state of consciousness is fixed by the behavior of the neurons, but from on instant to the next the total state of the system is not causally sufficient to determine the next state. Free will, if it exists at all, is a phenomenon in time" (pg. 65). Searle's struggle to make free will somehow a feature (is "feature the right word, Searle sometimes says "realized" but we might want to ask for clarity) of neurophysiology has been on difficult grounds since at least Thomas Nagel wrote that we can know everything about a bat except what it is like to be a bat (see "What is it like to be a bat?" in Nagel's book
Mortal Questions (Canto)). Searle wants "Hypothesis 2" to be correct but he concludes that it is currently "a mess" (pg. 77).
SEARLE ON DEONTIC POWER
Before this essay, Searle never had anything to say about politics (this is not completely true: see little-known book "The campus war; a sympathetic look at the university in agony). Searle says, "When I was an undergraduate, it was widely believed that political philosophy was dead" (pg. 13). However, after writing about institutional reality as collective intentionality in "The Construction of Social Reality" he decided that this chapter "Social Ontology and Political Power" would apply his linguistic account of institutional reality to the "special problem of political power" (pg. 33).
Searle begins by saying that "our tradition of political philosophy" has been "unsatisfying" because it doesn't ask the proper questions first: instead of "What is a just society" we should ask "What is a society in the first place?" (pg. 80) Searle describes a group of numbered and ordered propositions which develop through his essay; I will quote them here in truncated form (hopefully without losing meaningfulness).
(1) All political power is a matter of social functions, and for that reason all political power is deontic power (2) Because all political power is a matter of status functions, all political power, though exercised from above, comes from below (3) Even though the individual is the source of all political power, by his or her ability to engage in collective intentionality; all the same, the individual, typically, feels powerless (4) The system of political status functions works at least in part because recognized deontic powers provide desire-independent reasons for action (5) It is a consequence...that there is a distinction between political power and political leadership (6) Because political powers are matters of status functions they are, in large part, linguistically constituted (7) In order for a society to have a political reality it needs several other distinguishing features:...a distinction between the public and the private sphere with the political as part of the public sphere,...the existence of nonviolent group conflicts, and...group conflicts must be over social goods within a structure of deontology (8) A monopoly on armed violence is an essential presupposition of government.
Anyone serious about studying the extensions of Searle's thought must buy this book primarily for the brief essay on political philosophy. His essay on free will, Searle admits, is largely conceptually at an impasse.
