Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy [Hardcover]

Joseph E. Stiglitz (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 18, 2010

An incisive look at the global economic crisis, our flawed response, and the implications for the world’s future prosperity.

The Great Recession, as it has come to be called, has impacted more people worldwide than any crisis since the Great Depression. Flawed government policy and unscrupulous personal and corporate behavior in the United States created the current financial meltdown, which was exported across the globe with devastating consequences. The crisis has sparked an essential debate about America’s economic missteps, the soundness of this country’s economy, and even the appropriate shape of a capitalist system.

Few are more qualified to comment during this turbulent time than Joseph E. Stiglitz. Winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, Stiglitz is “an insanely great economist, in ways you can’t really appreciate unless you’re deep into the field” (Paul Krugman, New York Times). In Freefall, Stiglitz traces the origins of the Great Recession, eschewing easy answers and demolishing the contention that America needs more billion-dollar bailouts and free passes to those “too big to fail,” while also outlining the alternatives and revealing that even now there are choices ahead that can make a difference. The system is broken, and we can only fix it by examining the underlying theories that have led us into this new “bubble capitalism.”

Ranging across a host of topics that bear on the crisis, Stiglitz argues convincingly for a restoration of the balance between government and markets. America as a nation faces huge challenges—in health care, energy, the environment, education, and manufacturing—and Stiglitz penetratingly addresses each in light of the newly emerging global economic order. An ongoing war of ideas over the most effective type of capitalist system, as well as a rebalancing of global economic power, is shaping that order. The battle may finally give the lie to theories of a “rational” market or to the view that America’s global economic dominance is inevitable and unassailable.

For anyone watching with indignation while a reckless Wall Street destroyed homes, educations, and jobs; while the government took half-steps hoping for a “just-enough” recovery; and while bankers fell all over themselves claiming not to have seen what was coming, then sought government bailouts while resisting regulation that would make future crises less likely, Freefall offers a clear accounting of why so many Americans feel disillusioned today and how we can realize a prosperous economy and a moral society for the future.

Editorial Reviews

From Booklist

Written by a Nobel Prize recipient, a graduate of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors, and a stout advocate of Keynesian economics, this inquest into the recession of 2007–09 lashes many designated villains, banks above all. Writing in a spirit Andrew Jackson would have loved, Stiglitz assails financial institutions’ size, their executive compensation, the complexity of their financial instruments, and the taxpayer money that has been poured into them. But unlike Jackson, who didn’t understand a thing about economics, Stiglitz is a little more analytical. He dwells on incentives—perverse, in his argument—for risky financial legerdemain in housing mortgages. The temptations stemmed from deregulation of the financial industry, a Reaganesque policy Stiglitz rebukes: he favors re-regulation and more government involvement in the economy. In fact, Stiglitz waxes unhappily about the Obama administration’s interventions, which thus far have been inadequate in his view. Zinging the Federal Reserve for good measure, Stiglitz insistently and intelligently presses positions that challenge those of rightward-leaning economists upholding the virtues of markets. Amid animated contemporary economic debate, Stiglitz’s book will attract popular and professional attention. --Gilbert Taylor

Review

“Stiglitz is the world's leading scholarly expert on market failure, and this crisis vindicates his life's work. There have been other broad-spectrum books on the genesis and dynamics of the collapse, but Freefall is the most comprehensive to date, grounded in both theory and factual detail…. the definitive critique to date of how the Summers-Geithner strategy fails, both as economics and as politics…. The tone of this book is good-humored and public-minded.” (Robert Kuttner - The American Prospect )

“Asks some basic and provocative questions… Freefall is a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the roots of the financial crisis. Stiglitz brilliantly analyzes the economic reasons behind the banking collapse, but he goes much further, digging down to the wrongheaded national faith in the power of free markets to regulate themselves and provide wealth for all.” (Chuck Leddy - Boston Globe )

“Mr. Stiglitz uses his experience teaching to give the lay reader a lucid account of how overleveraged banks, a shoddy mortgage industry, predatory lending and unregulated trading contributed to the meltdown, and how, in his opinion, ill-conceived rescue efforts may have halted the freefall but have failed to grapple with more fundamental problems…. His prescience lends credibility to his trenchant analysis of the causes of the fiscal meltdown.” (Michiko Kakutani - The New York Times )

“As a Nobel Prize winner, member of the cabinet under former President Bill Clinton and chairman of his Council of Economic Advisers, Joseph E. Stiglitz has some practical ideas on how to ease the pain of the Great Recession and maybe help prevent the next one.” (Carl Hartman - Associated Press )

“Freefall is a spirited attack on Wall Street, the free market and the Washington consensus.” (David Smith - The Times [London] )

“Stiglitz offers a powerful account of the financial meltdown and criticizes the Obama Administration for 'muddling through' rather than pushing aggressively for change…. An excellent overview from a Nobel prize-winning economist of what caused the crisis and what reforms should be enacted…. I can only hope Obama makes room for it on his nightstand.” (James Pressley - BusinessWeek )

“[W]hat brings this book to life is his formidable grasp of economic policy and strong sense of conviction about the blunders that have been made, especially with respect to the bank bailouts.” (Jim Zarroli, NPR business reporter - NPR )

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 361 pages
• Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company; 1 edition (January 18, 2010)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0393075966
• ISBN-13: 978-0393075960
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6.5 x 1.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (82 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #73,633 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Joseph E. Stiglitz is a professor of economics at Columbia University and the recipient of a John Bates Clark Medal and a Nobel Prize. He is also the former senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank. His books include Globalization and Its Discontents, The Three Trillion Dollar War, and Making Globalization Work. He lives in New York City.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

433 of 458 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent and Credible Insights!, January 5, 2010

By 

Loyd E. Eskildson "Pragmatist" (Phoenix, AZ.) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (Hardcover)

Stiglitz believes that markets lie at the heart of every successful economy, but do not work well without government regulation. In "Freefall" he explains how flawed perspectives and incentives lead to the 'Great Recession' of 2008, and brought mistakes that will prolong the downturn.

Between 1996-2006, Americans used over $2 trillion in home equity (HELOC) to pay for home improvements, cars, medical bills, etc., largely because real income had been stagnant since the early 1990s. Economic recovery requires that we repay the remainder of these amounts, overcome stock market losses (10% between 2000-2009), the loss of some 10 million jobs, and reductions in credit card balances, and find an equivalent amount to the former home-equity sourced financing ($975 billion in 2006 alone - about 7% of GDP) to finance another consumer-driven GDP upturn - without the prior boom in housing and commercial building. Stiglitz also points out that the Great Depression coincided with the decline of U.S. agriculture (crop prices were falling before the 1929 crash), and economic growth resumed only after the New Deal and WWII. Similarly, today's recovery from the Great Recession is also hampered by the concomitant shift from manufacturing to services, continued automation and globalization, taxes that have become less progressive (shifting money from those who would spend to those who haven't), and new accounting regulations that discourage mortgage renegotiation.

Stiglitz is particularly critical of the U.S. finance industry - its size (41% of corporate profits in 2007), avarice (maximizing revenues through repeated high fees generated by over-eager and over-sold homeowners needing to refinance adjustable-rate mortgages that repeatedly reset), and 'sophisticated ignorance' (using complex computer models to evaluate risk that failed to account for high correlation within and between housing markets; 'eliminating risk' through buying credit default swaps from AIG - blind to the likelihood AIG could not make good in a housing downturn), and excessive risk (banks leveraged up to 40:1 with increasingly risky mortgage assets - 'liar's loans,' 2nd mortgages, ARMs, no-down-payments; taking advantage of the 'too-big-to-fail' and 'Greenspan/Bernanke put' phenomena). Much of this behavior was driven by lopsided personal financial incentives (bonuses) - if bankers win, they walk off with the proceeds, and if they lose, taxpayers pick up the tab. However, to be fair, any firm that failed to take advantage of every opportunity to boost its earnings and stock price faced the threat of a hostile takeover.

The impact of mortgage defaults is greater than one would otherwise expect because financial wizards found that the highest tranches of securitized mortgages would still earn a AAA rating if some income was provided to the lowest tranches in the 'highly unlikely' event of eg. a 50% overall default, thus boosting the ratings and saleability of lower tranches. (Fortunately for the U.S., many of these mortgages ended up overseas, spreading the disaster.) Another problem is that mortgage speculators make more profit from foreclosure than partial settlements. Meanwhile, investors worried that mortgage servicers might be too soft on borrowers required restrictions that make renegotiation more difficult and lead to more foreclosures. Similarly, those with 2nd-mortgages often found that those holding the second were unwilling to accept a principal write-down as their share of assets would be wiped out. Finally, new government regulations aimed at making banks seem healthier than otherwise allowed changing from 'mark-to-market' valuation of mortgages to long-term 'mark-to-hope' valuation - thus, writing down assets in a renegotiation would generate the very mortgage write-downs the new regulations avoided, and thus increased bank reluctance to do so.

"Freefall" also does an excellent job refuting many of the simple explanations, alibis, and remedies for the 2008 Great Recession. For example, Greenspan's 'nothing he could do' alibi is countered by Stiglitz's 'require higher down payments or margin requirements' (or increase interest rates). To those blaming Community Reinvestment Act requirements for increased mortgages to those with low incomes, Stiglitz says the default rates on those loans was less than in other areas; as for Fannie and Freddie being responsible, they came late into the sub-prime game. Responding to claims that increased regulation would stifle innovation and its role in economic growth, Stiglitz asserts that it is impossible to trace any sustained economic growth to those 'innovative' mortgages. (A 'real' contribution could have been made by less profitable innovative mortgages that helped homeowners stay in their homes.) On the other hand, he also admits that just giving more regulatory power to the Federal Reserve is not a solution - the Federal Reserve didn't use what it did have prior to late 2008; similarly, the SEC boosted leverage limits from 12:1 to 30:1 and higher in 2004 - exactly the wrong move. Banks suggest banning short sales in the future as a preventive measure - Stiglitz, however, points out that the incentive provided short-sellers to discover fraud and reckless lending may actually play a more important role in curbing bad bank behavior than government regulators have.

Other factors, especially government actions, also receive attention from the author. Overall, global supply exceeds demand - thus, the recovery focus needs to be on boosting demand. Stiglitz points out that growing inequality shifts money from those who would have spent it to those who didn't - weakening overall consumer demand. High oil prices have also impacted most those with low incomes, and probably encouraged Greenspan to hold down interest rates to counteract the negative impact. On a broader level, Stiglitz contends that IMF encouragement of national self-discipline and 'rainy-day' funds also weaken consumer demand. As for recommendations for more tax cuts and rebates, Stiglitz says these won't have much impact on consumers saddled with debt and anxiety, and as long as there's excess capacity, businesses will be reluctant to invest (Laffer's supply-curve tax-curve is an irrelevant theory, at best). Stiglitz even suggests elsewhere that the failure of Bush's 2001 tax cuts to stimulate the economy may have also influenced Greenspan to hold down interest rates for too long.

AIG, once bailed out, paid off billions to Goldman Sachs at 100% (Secretary Paulson's former firm), while defunct credit-default-swaps elsewhere were settled at only 13 cents on the dollar, says Stiglitz. Overall, he is very negative on the financial-sector bailout (TARP), believing that the money would much better have been used to capitalize new banks at 12:1 leverage, or not spent at all. The resulting bank subsidies were unfair to taxpayers (Treasury put up most of the money and got short-changed on potential benefits), and implementation was inconsistent - some institutions and stockholders were bailed out, others were not. (The reason lending 'froze up' is that banks didn't know whether they or their peers ere underwater.) The stimulus package, on the other hand, was too small (aimed at 3.6 million jobs, vs. 10 million lost plus 1.5 million new workers/year needing jobs), and was delegated to Congress without clear guidance. The result was a failure to provide mortgage insurance for those losing jobs, while instead creating the 'cash-for-clunkers' (mostly just moved sales from one period to another - [...] estimated only 18% were added sales, costing taxpayers $24,000 apiece; eight of the top ten purchases came from Asian manufacturers), ineffectual tax cuts, putting money into a failing auto industry, and increased road construction (greater global warming) instead of giving even more money to high-speed rail. The stimulus emphasis should have been on fast implementation, high-multiplier impact, and addressing long-term problems (eg. global warming). The employment situation now is worse than just the unemployment rate suggests - there are a record 6 applicants for every opening, the average work week is at 34 hours - the lowest since data was first collected in 1964, many have turned to disability instead of unemployment and are not counted.

Overall, Stiglitz believes there is far too much short-term thinking driving decision-makers, that business lobbies are too strong, and that markets are not naturally efficient. (Other inefficient market areas besides finance include health care, energy, manufacturing.) Meanwhile, we have done nothing to correct the underlying problems (big banks are even bigger) and Stiglitz also fears (reported elsewhere) the U.S. economy faces a "significant chance" of contracting again.

Interesting side-notes: 1)Stiglitz suggests that banks 'too-big-to-fail' should pay higher rates of deposit insurance, and incur restraints on executive incentives. In 1995 our five largest banks' market share was 11%, 40% now. Regardless, the world's largest three banks are now Chinese - #5 is American. (Not to worry - scale economics are no longer a factor for any of those banks, says Stiglitz.) 2)President Reagan made a major mistake in removing Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and appointing Alan Greenspan in his place. Volcker had brought down inflation from more than 11 percent to under 4 percent, which should have assured his reappointment. But Volcker believed financial markets need to be regulated, and Reagan wanted someone who did not. Thus, Stiglitz believes regulations must be mandated, and enforced by a neutral, not political, source. 3)Repealing the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 changed the culture of banking from conservative to high-risk, and also encouraged even larger institutions. 4)It is ironic that the... Read more ›

54 of 60 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Economics 101, February 2, 2010

By 

W. P. Strange "Bill's shelf" (Williamstown, MA United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (Hardcover)

I admit that economics confuses me, so when I read a book written in lucid easy to understand language I can begin to understand a compound-complex idea a little more clearly. Nothing in economics is as it seems because politics can often obfuscate with ideological explanations that are neither simple or even partially true when based on politics. Stiglitz doesn't say that the free market can't work, but that it isn't the entire answer. Regulations, as the banking meltdown of 2009 demonstrates, are necessary to prevent greed from becoming the dominating motivation for Wall Street and big banks, especially investment banks that measure success only in terms of how big their next bonus will be.

"Freefall" doesn't give us all the answers, and again I admit that I still have questions, but for a basic understanding of the markets as they played out in the past couple of years and how deregulation merely increased the problems for most of Main sreet this is a very good place to start. Some critics have already panned this book as a call to socialism, but those critics obviously lack even a basic understanding of what socialism really is and are only looking for a buzz word to sustain the belief that a totally "Free Market" system is the only good thing, when in fact it increases the chances of boom and bust cycles coming even closer together in the future. To begin, modest regulations are all that might be needed, and if bankers once again act trustworthy and preform ethically it could be enough. If greed continues unabated, then the middle class will disappear and only the wealthiest will profit.

149 of 190 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Why only three stars?, February 11, 2010

By 

Dan Heath (Los Altos, CA United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (Hardcover)

Professor Stiglitz's account of the causes of the financial crisis is lucid, and his advice regarding the need for regulation of banks and other financial institutions is sound. Stiglitz is an unapologetic man of the left, but his book is more balanced than many which have addressed this issue from the right. (E.g., Thomas Sowell's "The Housing Boom and Bust".)

Moreover, he grounds his book in a clear exposition of why advocacy for unfettered free markets does not duly consider imperfect competition (monopolies), externalities, irrationality, and asymmetric information, the subject for which he earned the 2001 Nobel Prize for economics.

So why do I give this book only three stars?

When I was an economics student in the 1960's, we learned our Keynes, and then we learned our Keynes, and then we learned our Keynes again. Over the next forty-odd years, as my knowledge of economics became antiquated, new problems arose and new theories were advanced to grapple with them, but I didn't have the time to study them. In the months after September, 2008, I devoted myself to relearning macroeconomics, which for me meant revisiting Keynes. With that basis, I couldn't fathom the ideas of the Chicago school...Lucas, Cochrane, Barro (although he is at Harvard), and others. Still, I came to some understanding of, if not agreement with, their ideas.

Stiglitz is harshly critical of their work, pointing out that their elegant mathematical models are highly constrained by assumptions that most of us would find unrealistic, and that they reach conclusions (such as that unemployment can't exist) that are absurd.

He further asserts that his own equally elegant mathematical models show the fallacies in the Chicago school's arguments. For example, he states that while they would grant that asymmetric information exists, they claim their models are "close enough", while his work shows that even small doses of imperfect information are sufficient to distort the operation of free markets to such a degree that efficient outcomes can hardly be assured. Thus, government intervention is required to produce better results.

The problem is that Siglitz does not offer the reader proof. It is true that this is because most readers (including myself) could not follow the mathematics involved, but based on the scanty evidence he provides, one cannot help being a bit skeptical. To wit:

1. He belittles the ideas of his opponents, but what arguments would they offer in rebuttal?

2. All economic models are approximations of reality. Are his opponents' actual policy recommendations as far out as he claims, or is he merely using their models as straw men?

3. Are we to believe that government policy makers are any more capable of producing economically efficient outcomes? As human beings, are they not also subject to the perils of externalities, irrationality, asymmetric information, and even (in the case of government enterprises) monopoly exploitation?

4. When Stiglitz broadens his recommendations beyond the nuts and bolts of banking reforms, he seems to launch into yet another vain sermon advocating the perfectibility of humankind. Is that sound economic analysis or merely an expression of his hopes and dreams?

After reading the book, I don't know the answers to such questions. It may well be that Professor Stiglitz has an irrefutable case for both his diagnosis and his cures, but he asks the reader to accept too much based solely on his claims to wisdom.