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Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Ancient Society and History)

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This is an overview of the Roman Empire Frontiers from the 1st century B.C. through the 5th Century A.D. Whittaker opens with a discussion of just what were the frontiers and how they were considered by both the Romans and the "barbarians". From the beginning he argues several points which were interesting to someone with a limited knowledge of the Roman Empire, such as myself. First he states that there is nothing in Roman policy that indicates they had anything approaching a Frontier "system" - a strategic plan for managing the frontier. Second he argues that evidence indicates that Roman frontier defenses weren't defenses at all - that they were either; staging areas for continued conquests beyond areas controlled by Rome; points from which Rome could maintain their influence over peoples not considered subjects of the Empire; strategic strongholds from which Rome could keep roads and rivers open for reasons of supplying the military or; points by which Rome could control traffic, particularly for the purposes of trade, into and out of the Empire.

The final two chapters are entitled; "The Collapse of the Frontiers" and "Warlords and Landlords in the Later Empire." As I am more familiar with this period, I will concentrate my comments here.

Whittaker continues a familiar discussion by relating how barbarians, particularly in Western Europe, advanced into the Empire. Aspects of this will be familiar to anyone with an interest in the Late Roman/Early Medieval Period (Late Antiquity). By dividing his discussion by geographic region he is able to depict how various areas of the Empire were lost to Rome. Several concepts were new to me.

One was that the influx of outsiders was not a mass migration of entire peoples, but rather an infiltration by small, usually armed, groups of no more than a few thousand. He writes; "We have to break away from the stereotypes of "tribal" history and mass movements of tribal migrations, which, when we can trace them archaeologically (as we can in the case of the Goths), seem to be slow movements of infiltration by small groups of warriors. Aetius's glorious victory over the Salian Franks at vicus Helena, enthusiastically hailed by Sidonius (Carm. 5.219-29) as a great victory, turns out to be no more than a "minor skirmish" when the Romans broke up a wedding party." p212

Whittaker also discusses how late Roman writers such as Sidonius and Ammianus exaggerated the incursions by the barbarians to strike terror into the hearts of Romans and inspire them to resist more strongly.

According to this work, the same writers exaggerated the savage nature of the barbarians. Whittaker argues strongly that while the frontiers collapsed, Roman society did not change greatly in areas that were lost. Earlier he discusses how the frontiers were actually rather heavily populated. With the number of soldiers serving on the military frontier, shops, farms, and industry sprang up, on both the Roman and barbarian side, to supply them. The barbarian elite closely resembled the Roman elite, while the lower classes of the barbarians closely resembled the lower classes of the Romans - much moreso than, say, the lower class barbarians resembled their elite. As these barbarians moved into regions formerly controlled by Rome, they brought their society with them - which happened to be largely Roman in nature. Whittaker justifies this view by citing archaeological finds, such as from Fedderson Werde.

Of particular interest to me is Whittaker's contention that the barbarian incursion, particularly into Gaul, was nowhere near as violent and as bloody as many believe. He states that the early medieval warlord and late Roman Landholder were highly similar. Many Roman soldiers serving on the frontier were landholders - either in Rome or beyond it. Others, on retiring, were given grants of land. In either case they would find people to help them work it. And, if need be, they would revert to their military background to serve as the leader of an armed band. These groups were less violent and disruptive than has been believed. Whittaker says, "The problem about conceptualizing this change is, as we have been reminded recently, that Gregory of Tours in the sixth century, followed by many historians since, could conceive of the Franks' entry into Gual only as a violent barbarian invasion, culminating at Soissons, where Syagrius fell fighting symbolically as the last defender of _Romania_. In fact, the fifth century in Gaul was the culmination of a less dramatic process of integration of Germanic chiefs with their _Gefolgsleute_ in the burgeoning demimonde of estate owners surrounded by their fighting retinues." p266

While focussing on these points of interest I want to note that Whittaker does discuss many other aspects of the frontier such as trade, fortifications, the movement of peoples and traders across the frontier, etc. He covers the entire frontier, including Britain, Africa, and the frontier with Persia, and discusses the various interactions in each area.

I felt this was a good work which helped to discuss an area I was not very familiar with. I was somewhat disappointed however, at the broadness with which Whittaker covered it. This work is largely thematic in nature and while he does give some examples, I would have enjoyed more specifics such as on intricacies of trade on the frontier, and some aspects of daily life in this region. I am also not in complete agreement with his thesis regarding the pattern of migrations of Germanic peoples. Still, it was an enjoyable book. It is fairly well written, informative, and well footnoted (endnoted actually).

Much of this book is the quest for a coherent Roman frontier policy; the book concludes that there wasn't one. Most of the information in the book is based upon academic speculation ("educated" guesses), because source materials from this period don't tend to focus on the frontier (or even to acknowledge its existence, beyond stating proximities to the mostly meaningless "limes" [boundary markers] of the Empire), and most of the barbarian peoples who crossed the border were illiterate, what we are left with are a few references buried deep in the Roman and late Hellenistic literature of the day, a few official Roman imperial documents, a couple of treaties and scant records of commercial transactions. The archeological evidence cited in the book, showing the extent of distribution of Roman coins and pottery in what were previously conceived to be "barbarian" areas, shows the very fluidity and indistinction of this so-called frontier. All of the archeology included was new to me, and the included maps and figures were interesting and enlightening. If you are interested in late Roman history, you wish to better understand the edges of the Roman world and the movements of barbarians into and among the provinces of the Empire, or you are interested in the formation of "creole" cultures (and the Roman "frontier" in the 3rd-6th centuries was characterized by a forcible merging of Roman and "barbarian" [mostly German] cultures), this is a good book. Heavy on facts and figures, this book is light on answers, but only due to lack of evidence. A darn good attempt at defining the indefinable.

In his book, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study, C.R.
Whittaker takes the reader along an historic journey documenting life along the Roman frontier. This study focuses on the role of the Roman military, society and economy and the impact they had on the frontier peoples from 100 B.C. to 400 A.D. He discusses the role of trade and how it influenced the establishment of permanent frontier zones along Roman Britain, and the interaction between the British people and the Roman invaders.
Whittaker begins his study with a detailed description of the extent of the frontiers and the people whom the Romans encountered, believed to be barbarians. Some of the points he makes is that there was not a Roman frontier policy which determined how they were to maintain the frontier. He claims that the Roman frontier was not a militarily defensive system to guard against the "barbarians", rather he asserts that the military posts along the frontier were only temporary strategic defensive positions where the Romans established control with the intent of pushing further northwards. This is an intriguing paradigm as the various schools of thought surrounding the Roman frontier have maintained that the frontier zone marked the extent of the Roman Empire.
Another intriguing aspect of this study is that Whittaker claims that Roman society impacted and influenced barbarian society along the frontier in that the social class stratification which was evident in Roman society was also appearing in the "barbarian" societies as well. There were upper and lower classes developing among the native peoples. When Roman provinces began to fall to the "barbarians" the social class structure that was implemented while those areas were under Roman control was retained when conquered by the "barbarians".
Towards the end of this study, Whittaker examines the role of "barbarians" infiltration into the Roman Empire. He asserts that parts of the Empire were able to fall into the hands of the "barbarian" tribes by small decisive attacks
rather than battles involving tens of thousands of warrior tribes. In addition, he claims that Roman writers such as Sidonius wrote about the "barbarians" in a propagandistic way, in order to frighten the Roman people living along the frontiers to resist them with more force.
Utilizing propaganda to make the "barbarians" appear more savage and threatening, ancient writers helped create a stereotype regarding these "barbarians" which has lasted centuries even after the Empire fell. It is only with recent scholarly examination that modern historians have been able to discern fact from fiction. The barbarians were not in fact as uncivilized as they appeared to be. Graham Webster acknowledges this fact in his studies on Roman Britain, in which he pays particular attention to what society and life were like in Britain before the Roman conquest.
Webster maintains, as does Whittaker that there was a thriving, flourishing civilization, albeit not as modern but organized, before the Romans invaded the British Isles. Whittaker maintains his thesis throughout this study, that the Roman frontier was not stagnant, but rather that the frontier was a permeable border along which societies and economies grew.

The thesis of this book is that the Roman frontiers were not boundary lines but broad regions, and that the purpose of frontier fortifications was not to mark the boundaries of Roman power but to control the movement of peoples. The first part in particular is really important to him as is the focus of several attacks on what he sees as backwards thinking amongst ancient historians. "It is almost universally agreed, except perhaps among ancient historians, that the ideal of the `scientific frontier' is an unattainable objective." Most of these ideas are not new. The American frontier has been studied for over a century, ever since Frederick Jackson Turner in the late 19th Century. Many of the ideas which he discussed are argued against in this book. Most of the other frontier ideas come from nationalistic tracts written by European writers during the early part of the 20th Century. If studies of the Roman frontiers are as backwards as Dr. Whittaker says then it is very surprising given the amount of work done on both subjects over the years. Either he is overstating the importance of a few backwards-looking individuals or this is a reflection of how isolated the field of Ancient History is from other sections of History.

The sections on the way in which the Romans perceived their world were very interesting. The decreasing accuracy of maps is an extremely useful factor to keep in mind. Reading Tacitus one is reminded of how poor Roman geography really was, with references to Thule, an inaccurate shape for Britain, an inaccurate location for Britain, and the description of Scotland as unusually flat. This chapter helps put that in context and shows how different the Roman view of the world was to ours. It does raise questions however. How for example did the Romans know where Britain was at its narrowest? The position of Hadrian's Wall is at the narrowest spot in England while the succeeding Antonine Wall was built at the narrowest spot in Scotland. They must have had some geographical knowledge or else they could never have succeeded in such ambitious endeavors. Having to base Roman views of the world entirely off of literary descriptions is undoubtedly leading to a distorted depiction of Roman cosmology. Some of the vague descriptions may be improved on maps or they may indicate an even more distorted view than expected. After all, geographers interpreting Roman descriptions know what these places look like and may well be translating their statements in a way that makes more sense. Certainly the Romans must have been aware that the world was not composed of such neat geometrical shapes as their geographers describe.

The one point that he kept emphasizing was the rivers were not natural barriers but supply and communication lines. He stated this multiple times throughout the book, practically every time a river frontier was mentioned. While he is no doubt correct it seems that this argument can be carried too far. Ancient historians certainly considered certain features to mark their territory. Enemies are outside Rome's Empire when they are on the other side of the Rhine or the Euphrates and are within Rome's borders when they pass them. While not implying that these rivers marked the absolute limits of Rome it does suggest that these rivers were seen as being boundary zones. Some authors certainly considered these boundaries to mark the point beyond which people were barbarians even if they were in the minority.

Another matter he raises is that of the grand plan of the Roman Empire. He argues that they never had one, only stopping their expansion when the population density was too low to make future conquests worthwhile. As part of that idea he reasons that the Empire never transformed from an offensive policy to a defense in depth during the third and fourth centuries but continued its aggressive policies. While his arguments for the lack of a general Roman strategy do seem solid he does ignore the question of why Roman fortifications changed so dramatically during this time. Hadrian built his walls during the second century but the biggest increase in fortifications came in the 3rd Century. Before that most fortifications were made of wood. In fact, large sections of Hadrian's Wall were originally just earth pits and wooden forts, similar to the Antonine Wall built only twenty years later. The last sections were not changed to stone until after the Antonine Wall had been abandoned. That is but one example of changing frontier fortifications and it is a shame that this question should be left unexplored. Instead, when he deals with the frontier fortifications he is more concerned with the general purpose of such works than the changes in them.

A related question that rises from this is the purpose of such defenses. His conclusion is that they were primarily for controlling traffic and not eliminating it. Although valid his conclusions do seem to avoid the obvious defensive value of such fortifications. Indeed, if they served solely to control traffic then they were massively overmanned. There were at least 32 forts located on or near the Wall, not including the turrets every mile. The majority of the Roman forces in Britain were located on the Wall which seems unnecessary if it was solely for control of commerce. Given the number of gates along the Wall that must have been one of the main functions but its defensive and prestige value should not be underestimated. An example of the effectiveness of Hadrian's Wall as a defense comes from the "barbarian conspiracy" of 367. As he himself points out, the archaeological evidence suggests that the main attack came from the Saxons in the south along the Saxon Shore since there is little evidence of attacks along the Wall (Whittaker 155). Any Pict attacks probably came by sea. This would seem to suggest that the Wall served its purpose of keeping the Picts out. While it could instead be argued that the Picts merely posed no threat due either to their low population density or disorganized nature (as he seems to imply) the fact is that the Picts show up in almost all the sources dealing with Sub-Roman Britain. From Constantius to Gildas to Nennius the Picts are seen as a major threat leading deadly raids into British territory. Even the epic poem Y Goddodin features a group of Britons from Edinburgh north of the Wall fighting a battle with the Saxons south of the Wall. Clearly it is not possible to dismiss the lack of Pict attacks during the majority of years in which the Wall operated as being due merely to a low population density.

His section on the changing frontiers of the late Roman period was thus somewhat unconvincing. He explains that the frontiers inverted and Roman territory now became the expanding frontier but isn't that the same thing as the Roman frontier shrinking? To the Romans the frontiers must have seemed to vanish. Passing over to the barbarian kingdoms and their frontiers as if they are essentially the same thing just didn't fit. Apart from that there is very little to argue about with Whittaker. There are a few minor points that one may take exception to such as his statement that Gaiseric was invited into Africa by Boniface and his statement that Aegidius was made king of the Franks, but these are minor points and do not really detract from his main argument.