Customer Reviews

Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam

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This book is a fact-packed but highly accessible must-read for those who wish to get a better understanding of the political turmoil throughout the history of modern Pakistan. In particular, this book emphasizes the current struggle with militant Islam and provides plenty of historical context to help Westerners better understand the struggle. A few things you can expect to learn from reading this book include the following:

* The ideological differences between several of the recent Pakistani leadership including General Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

* The history of the struggle with India for the Kashmir region.

* How General Zia radicalized the previously secular Pakistani military.

* The various major Islamic terrorist groups in Pakistan (e.g., LeT, HuT and JeM) and their ideological differences.

* The infamous General Hamid Gul, his role in training the Muhadijeen to combat the Soviets in the recent Soviet-Afghan war, his heading of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence and his support of the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden.

* Pakistan's role in the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

* Abdul Qadeer Khan, the unscrupulous Pakistani scientist and his role in global nuclear proliferation to rogue nations such as Iran, Libya and North Korea.

This is a must read for anyone wanting to read about another significant facet of the war against Islamic terrorism.

This is an excellent book; well researched, well written, and a compelling read!

Author Zahid Hussain, Pakistani correspondent for the "Times of London", "The Wall Street Journal", and "Newsweek" exposes Pakistan's close ties with the Taleban and al Qaeda. Pakistan's Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) is literally the founder of the modern-day Taleban.

Having lost control of both al Qaeda and the Taleban, Pakistan, which is under the control of President Pervez Musharraf (who has pledged his full support to the United States in the War on Terror) is running out of time.

"Despite the backing of the army and America, Musharraf is living on borrowed time,' writes Hussain. "He has spawned a system that is a hybrid of military and civilian rule. It is not a democracy."

And here lies the problem: "The war against militancy Islamic extremism can be best fought - and won - in a liberal democracy. Musharraf's authoritarian rule has blocked any hopes of a democratic process taking root."

Yet the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is not an American priority, because a leader in uniform is perceived as being capable of delivering far more than one who is democractically elected. "An army general ruling Pakistan does not trouble the West, so long as he happens to be an effective ally in the war against terror," observes the author.

Musharraf and Pakistan have been an effective ally, killing and capturing hundreds of key Taleban and al Qaeda leaders and fighters.

But Musharraf's support for the US-led war on terror, his tactical cooperation with various militant groups, and his refusal to embed a culture of democracy and accountability have intensified social, ethnic and religious differences in Pakistani society.

"These are the faultlines from which a geo-political earthquake could at some point erupt," warns Hussain, "an earthquake which would make the current reegional security situation look positively calm by comparison. Pakistan's battle with itself is far from over."

Let us hope someone with the intelligence, ability and authority to make the right things happen is listening to Hussain's warning.

This is a first serious effort by someone to expose the ground realities in Pakistan. I was expecting it to be a dry book but was pleasantly surprised at the content - it was hard to put it down! Zahid Hussain has done an excellent job at presenting the facts (a lot of it) and still maintain the readers interest. He provides an excellent insight on the state of affairs in Pakistan since it's creation in 1947 - the nexus of Government and terrorist organizations, and Pakistan's efforts to keep alive the Kashmir issue per its own personal agenda.

This book is a very good primer for anyone looking to learn more about this very pivotal nation in the "War on Terror". The book is basically a short history of Pakistan with a detailed accounting of that history from 2001 to 2006. This is a great work for readers to introduce themselves to this country and how it relates to the rise of radical militancy. The author does a great job hitting the major points, and giving readers a nice window into this very complex nation.

What the author does well is explaining the dichotomous society that is Pakistan, and he details the difficulties that Pakistan's leadership face in trying to bridge the gap and unite this nation of very disparate groups of people. Pakistan is a nation of stark contrasts; large modern cities with a vibrant middle class looking for a more democratic and secular state that will be more accommodating to their needs against this backdrop lies the Northwest frontier with its lawless regions full of radical madrassas funded by Sunni extremists catering to the rural poor, while the army attempts to placate both sides which ends up alienating everyone, this is the setting for one of the worlds most important battles. Pakistan has become a very important bellwether state that may determine how successful we have been in combating extremism because of the very dichotomy that threatens to rip this nation apart.

Another important element this book details is how there are no easy explanations for this extremism because the violence and extremism that emanates from Pakistan has many roots. It isn't just extreme religious violence, but instead has many causes along with focal points as well. The violence is also nationalistic, ethnic, local and foreign along with the religious components. This makes the violence and extremism much more difficult to combat because it is a many headed beast. Kashmir is a part of it, but so to is the Pashtuns fierce independence and complete refusal to be governed, but there is also the religious aspect with the funding for radical madrassas from states like Saudi Arabia and the call to rid Afghanistan of its "foreign" invaders once again. It is due to this extremely complex relationship between all of these causes and the ideas that help drive them that makes Pakistan such a seemingly intractable problem. This book does a great job in laying out all these different issues.

The author suggests that in the end true democracy may be the only prescription for what ails this nation. I agree with this assertion, but the question is will the army ever take a back seat when they are basically a state within a state, but also will the Western world (especially the US) accept the good with what will be a very real bad that comes with true democracy? Pakistan has been a failure over the last decade. Part of the reason is the West's insistence on treating the symptoms rather than the much more difficult and long term solution of dealing with the cause. Kashmir and Indian Pakistani relations will have to find a solution both sides can live with. Instead of supplying Pakistan with billions in aid for military equipment the West needs to supply building materials, textbooks and training for teachers who can prepare the next generation of Pakistanis for a positive productive future rather than a future fighting in Afghanistan or Indian controlled Kashmir, or even worse inside of Pakistan's own borders.

The West and the world cannot afford for Pakistan to become a failed state. As time has past Pakistan has become more important to the "War on Terror" than Afghanistan. Books like this one will help readers understand the problems we face here, and the importance of our continued attention and focus on this problem. As this work suggests the problems are manifold and the solutions complex and dangerous, but the price of failure here demands we remain focused and vigilant.

There's no option to choose four and a half stars. The missing half star comes from a lacking of a review of Pakistan's history around (before and little after 1947) and the ethnic composytion of the country. Maybe I'm demanding too much. The book gives a good account of recent developments, regarding the diverse islamists groups, islamic parties, and the role of the army and ISI in arming and steering them. Filled a void of information I had about this important player in the regional chess.

While I would recommend this book to anyone with a desire to learn about the region, what keeps this good book from being a great book is its organization. In the preface, Hussain tells his audience that the book is divided into three parts: "the first part looks at how Musharraf came to throw in his lot with the Americans after 9/11 and why this was such a momentous decision. The second part uncovers the forces ranged against him: the jihadists and their allies. The third part looks at the battle between them - how it is being fought and who is winning. It seems like a straightforward enough intro, but this isn't actually what Hussein does. The book isn't divided into sections, it just goes from one chapter to the next without telling the reader what 'part' of the book you're on. The first two chapters which comprise the first part covers a lot more than just Musharraf's decision-making after 9/11. This is a good thing. He talks about Pakistan during the Bhutto and Zia days, which is absolutely vital in order to understanding Pakistan today. The next three chapters, or second part, are poorly organized. The first deals with more recent events inside the country and then the next chapter deals with events going further back. What this means is that you might not understand something in the first chapter until you read the second. This may seem like splitting hairs, but I couldn't help but think the chapters were out of order. The next chapter is devoted mostly to the Sunni/Shi'a split, which again seems out of context within this second part of the book. The next chapter covers Kashmir in what appears to be the final part of the book. And from there, Hussein talks about al-Qaeda in Pakistan and he also devotes a chapter to nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan.

As far as overall content goes, this is a very good book and I wouldn't discourage anyone from reading it. Hussein presents the information inside the individual chapters in a straightforward and easy-to-follow way. What I will do is warn future readers that it's not always easy to figure out what Hussein is doing and where he's going. You have to be patient and stick it out to the end. I felt upon finishing the book that it seemed more like a collection of separate essays rather than a coherent book with a beginning, middle, and end.

An excellent book. Hussain packs in quite a few historical, religious, and political details in this book on the history, pulse, politics, and Islamic culture of Pakistan. Readers who know nothing about Pakistan may feel a bit overwhelmed, as there is quite a bit of historical (and present day!) review. But, having read this book, you will be brought considerably up to speed on the events of Pakistan, particularly since the Presidency of Zia al-Haq. Hussain does not spend much time with the Bhuttos, but does a fine job critically examining the leadership and the burdens faced by Perves Musharraf. A very good book.

I'm a USMC infantry / civil affairs officer who is anticipating a possible tour to Afghanistan as Iraq becomes less all encompassing. Given the importance of Pakistan to the Afghan fight / situation I'm working on building my understanding of the country and its militants. FRONTLINE PAKISTAN is a very readable, clearly laid out book which does a good job of laying out the role of militants in Pakistan, ISI's linkages and describing the various groups. A strong recommendation for someone looking for a good, practical book which is easy to understand and not overly academic. It remains very timely.

Zahid Hussain touches on an important topic: Pakistan's ongoing and impending war with its own self and the tough choices ahead of President Musharraf.

The support from Public Opinion in Pakistan for terrorism as a tool to further beloved causes is worrying. The ease with which sundry pet agendas could be converted into beloved causes is twice worrying.

In order to contain global terrorism emanating from Pakistan or having a safe haven in Pakistan two things need to be done:

(a) Public opinion will have to undergo a change in Pakistan. Public opinion is useful only when it derives from the "wisdom of the crowd". This benefit would not arise unless opposing thoughts and beliefs can "co-exist peacefully". Good leaders "discredit" public opinion if it denies room for such peaceful co-existence. Mahtma Gandhi did. Bad leaders, on the other hand, whip up public opinioin to radically extreme positions using intolerance. Adolf Hitler did. Military rulers in Pakistan are guilty of whipping up public opinion to take a self righteous radical form that destroys opposing thoughts, reasons and emotions.

(b) Defending one's religion is one's right. Giving one's life for one's religion, one's country or one's society is a noble deed. This is true for Americans dying for the Flag and Muslims dying for their holy causes. However, immature leadership is quick to provide its pet agenda a higher purpose to merit the label of a "noble cause". In Pakistan this seems to be too easy. Military, whether in rule or not, has used religious leadership to provide the "emotional ammunition" to enlist support for every thing including a proxy fight against Soviet Union on behalf of USA, a proxy fight against the perceived foreign policy of USA, a proxy fight against one faction of freedom fighters in Afghanistan in favour of another, a proxy fight on behalf of Pakistan's army itself in various engagements in/with India.

As a result, the postal address for global terrorism is somewhere within Pakistan.

President Musharraf is now forced to:
(a) appear to the outside World to be firm in dealing with relgion based terrorism and
(b) appear to Pakistanis to not succumb to international pressure and to support the radical public opinion in Pakistan.

Quite a funambulation even for the skillful Musharraf. Musharraf does appear sincere in attempting to weed out terrorism; but does not appear sincere in having a go at modifying public opinion in Pakistan. His challenges in doing so cannot be underestimated.

Zahid Hussain is the Pakistani correspondent of The Times, The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek. His dispassionate insightful analysis of Pakistan's struggle with militant Islam is excellent. As with most books about Pakistan, there is excellent analysis of the present but no thought from anyone in Pakistan on how to solve the problem. The absence of an alternative thought or the unwillingness of such thought to express itself is hardly Zahid Hussain's fault.