Customer Reviews

The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (Modern War Studies)

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Mansoor has written a strong rebuttal to those who have been critical of the performance of the U.S. Army in the Second World War. It appears to be directly aimed at relatively recent historical analysis which unfavourably compares it with the Germany army. (At the forefront of such opinion is Martin van Crevald's academic monograph "Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army performance 1939-1945", but it is a view subscribed to by numerous other more "popular" writers such as the best-selling John Keegan.)

Lieutenant Colonel Mansoor limits his discussion to the Infantry Division, which after all formed the great majority of the eigthty-nine divisions fielded by the U.S. Army in World War II. He describes in detail the formation and subsequent training of these formations in the United States prior to being shipped overseas. The emphasis is on the importance of continuous effective leadership and uninterupted preparation for combat; he understandably again and again remarks on the deleterious effects of frequent command change and especially the stripping of older units to provide the core personnel of newer divisions. While these may have been unavoidable consequences of rapid mobilization, they inevitably resulted in trouble when the more experienced German Army was first encountered. By itself this segment of his book is worth reading since it provides a good summary of an important area that is often little commented on.

The bulk of the book, however, deals with the operational histories of the divisions once they were deployed in North Africa, Italy and Northwest Europe. By illustrating his points with numerous detailed examples, he wishes to convey the way in which units matured and grew in effectiveness as combat experience was gained and adaptations were made to new and often unexpected circumstances. He particularly pays attention to the role of superlative artillery, tank, air and logistical support, constantly reiterating the importance of a "combined arms" approach to prosecuting land war. Against this background, he further dwells on the extremely critical issue of personnel replacement and the problems and advantages of the approach adopted by the U.S. Army in Europe.

The final (and shortest) segment deals with a synopsis of his thesis that the fighting power of American Infantry Divisions was ultimately unparalleled and certainly second to none. It is here that perhaps his analysis does not quite match the depth of his preceeding much more lengthy build-up. No one can doubt the the final success of the American Army in its contest with Germany; and this by itself is compelling evidence of the effectiveness of its Infantry arm when combined with support from other branches and service. But somehow his discussion is perhaps not always as clearly convincing as one might expect. Nonetheless this book represents an important counterbalance to those on the other side who have often been unnecessarily and unjustifiably critical of U.S. Army fighting power.

(Incidentally, readers may find Mansoor's discussion of S.L.A. Marshall's contentious views on American infantry performance very interesting and informative. In his last chapter he provides some keen insights into the significance of Marshall's now largely refuted statement that only about a quarter of all combat infantrymen fired their weapons. He places this questionable idea in the context of Marshall's much more significant contribution in other areas.)

This is a rather comprehensive survey of the performance of American infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) in World War II, by a military professional still on Active Duty. His thesis is that the American Army (i.e., the Army of the United States) became better than the German Wehrmacht and defeated the Wehrmacht on those terms. Not taking away anything from the quality of the American GI and the American Army in general, or of the overall quality of his book, LTC Mansoor does not really make his case.
He refutes conventional wisdom, arising from a series of post-War interviews of senior German officers, that the American Army relied on the weight of materiel more than, in their view, the relatively poor fighting quality of the American GI to win the war. He discounts the materiel argument, but not convincingly. For example, see pages 214 and 237 for references, among others, to the dwindling quality of the Wehrmacht in the latter stages of the war. And while he acknowledges the improving quality and techniques and the USAAF ground support, he is virtually silent on the impact to Wehrmacht operations of Allied air supremacy after D-Day.
I think it's clear that the Wehrmacht (along with the Waffen SS, the Luftwaffe, etc.) were worn to a frazzle by the time of D-Day. Combine that with Ultra, and I think it's a tribute to the quality of the German soldier and the German military machine that they were able to carry on effectively at all until May 1945. The Wehrmacht of 1944-1945 was not the Wehrmacht of 1940-1941. There had been too many materiel and human losses, too many fronts, too much battering from the sky.
This is not to discount the positive attributes of the American fighting man and woman that he brings out. The American GI is the equal of the best this planet has to offer - always has been. Rather, the reason for the American Army's victory in Europe is a combination of both of these arguments.
I enjoyed his description of how General Marshall arrived at the decision for a 90-division Army. I also liked his description of the Mobilization Training Program, although I would have preferred more detail. The description of the many problems of scale (e.g., stripping divisions still in training of officers and men to be used as cadre for new divisions, problems encountered during POM (preparation for overseas movement), while not a new argument, are covered well. Discussion of these issues provide the beginning of understanding of the magnitude of the task facing the small, pre-1940 professional Army - the task of preparing to wage world war and achieve a victory as rapidly as possible. This was a humongous undertaking, to say the least. Despite the Monday morning quarterbacking, our senior military leadership on balance did an excellent job.
Now, he is critical of the "90-division gamble," particularly in the ETO, believing that it led to excessive casualties in battle since it left an insufficient number of divisions to rotate them out of the line for rest, refit, and effective introduction of replacements. This was exacerbated by our not adhering to the "Germany first" strategy. I thought we had, but he looks at the operations in the China-Burma-India Theater, and the Southwest and Central Pacific Theaters as demonstrating otherwise. Add to this the large number of men in the Army's service establishments, and, he argues, the American GI in ETO came up short.
This book is a gold mine of information, especially when read in conjunction with The Unsinkable Fleet. He has excellent coverage of the Army Mobilization Program (with which he has problems): its plans, constraints, problems, errors, and chaos. He discusses the stateside training program (individual and unit), and the constant turnover of personnel due to having to provide cadre for new divisions and replacements for divisions already deployed in combat. There was a common weeding out of ineffective commanders and staff at all levels during training (which unfortunately continued in every division in the early stages of combat). The replacement system was virtually counterproductive early on, with soldiers losing their training edge as they languished in replacement depots en route to their divisions. This improved as time went on, and he touts the end result of keeping divisions at full strength throughout the war. "The individual replacement system had its flaws, but these flaws stemmed from poor administration of the system rather than an inherent flaw in the concept." (pg. 255) (I'm not not sure Stephen Ambrose would agree with this.)
He paints a picture of arrogance and confusion at the highest levels of command in the planning for D-Day. He reminds us that when all is said and done, no matter the extent and quality of planning, fire support, and logistics, success on the battlefield rests with individual soldiers, small units (platoons and squads), and, most importantly, their leadership. He also reminded me of how D-Day was a close-run thing, with victory wrested from the Wehrmacht by American infantrymen (with some fortuitous help from a few US Navy destroyer captains).
In fact, he is not very flattering of the Army's senior leadership at all. He feels they were not proficient at the operational level and too conservative at the strategic level. He uses as examples Montgomery's failure to open Antwerp earlier as a critical failure second only to the Allies' failure to close the Falaise Gap earlier. He also points to the Huertgen Forest debacle and the ensuing campaign to take Aachen, Eisenhower ordering Devers' Sixth Army Group to turn north when it closed to the Rhine rather than proceeding across it, and Eisenhower's and Bradley's failure to destroy more of the Wehrmacht forces in the Ardennes after they had stopped the German offensive. His criticisms certainly are valid up to a point, but I think it's easy to criticize these decisions after the fact. (The Huertgen Forest campaign, however, does deserve all the criticism that can be heaped upon it.)
The end of the book brought an interesting surprise, as well. He debunks S.L.A. Marshall's Men Against Fire and Marshall's conclusion that only about 10% of American riflemen actually fired their weapons at the enemy. I wasn't aware of this controversy, but apparently it's been building for a decade or so. He provides compelling arguments against Marshall.
Without question, this is an outstanding book, chock full of well-researched detail. A good read. Dock him one star for not supporting his thesis better.

This book is an extremely thoroughly researched study of the legendary American GI in the European Theater of World War II. Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, a Battalion Commander in the US Army and former professor of history at the United States Military Academy, offers a fascinating and a quasi-reformist look at the way in which the army's basic fighting unit was recruited, trained, mobilized, , deployed and commanded throughout the long four years that America fought in Europe. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 is not only a beautifully crafted book, but more importantly it is a perpetuating addition to the latest revisionist rave where historians have claimed that the GI in World War II was better trained, equipped, and, most importantly, better led than their foe; Hitler's vaunted and often overly hailed Wermarcht. Mansoor's premise is that the American soldiers proved their capabilities in battle, which he correctly claims is the ultimate test for an army and a nation. "A fashionable argument in the past two decades has been that the Allies won World War II only through the sheer weight of material they threw at the Wermarcht in a relatively unskilled manner." Mansoor refutes this argument in this book first by dissecting the variables encompassed in the "combat effectiveness" formula and then quantifies the human, organizational, and technical capabilities of the opposing forces that fought in Europe. In the end Mansoor concludes that one of the most critical factors attributed to the American GI was his high level of endurance once engaged in combat. Referring to works by the likes of Bonn, Dupuy, van Crevald, and SLAM Marshall, Mansoor accomplishes where most of these great thinkers have marginally succeed; proving that the American GI in World War II was indeed superior to his foe. Mansoor achieves proving this thesis with an analysis that will most likely be used for years to come as THE single source to refer to when searching for a balanced comparison of the Allied GI and Wermarcht soldier. Dense with details and statistics, the book is written in an academic style, but in the same light, highly readable. He brings the reader comprehensively through each stage of the war, from mobilization through pre-combat training, and then to the beaches of Normandy and beyond. He leaves no stone unturned in this complete analysis. This book was no doubt a major undertaking and Mansoor's hard work and focussed approach will undoubtedly " provide fodder for historians of the war for years to come." The GI Offensive in Europe should be shelved alongside the best historians of World War II. Academician's and military leaders must read this book for it proves that the superior training, organization, and execution of doctrine by the American Military units is what accounted for the unprecedented success of the US in 1945 and will continue to do so in the future.

For the serious student, this book should be read along with [similuar book]Both deal with the same topic, but there is surprisingly little overlap.

I agree with most in the review ...but I think that he and other reviewers exagerate the degree of degeneration of the German army that the US faced in France. The Germans were unsurpassed trainers of soldiers and industry was still turning out sufficient quantities of weapons of all sorts. It was only after D-Day in France that tatical airpower began to make itself felt. Until then the main contribution of strategic air was the "transportation plan" which was designed to knockout the French transporation network in order to limit the ability of the Germans to bring reinforcements to the invasion site. It was quite successful.

The soldiers that the U.S. Army faced were as good as any the Germans produced in most cases. (There were some "ground-holding" divisions of overage or semi-invalid men.) Equipment had improved since 1941 and many tactical lessons had been learned.

But there was no doubt that the western allies could produce overwhelming force, and if properly applied, victory was certain. The catch is: if properly applied. It was by no means inevitable that force would be properly applied. The British outnumbered Rommel in tanks in the North Afican desert on many occasions but managed to lose. Rommel said to one captured British officer that it did not matter if he was outnumbered 2 to 1 in tanks overall if at the point of attack he outnumbered the British 2 to 1. If we had fought as badly as the British did before Montgomery took over, we would have lost.

To win required learning from our mistakes, a willingness to improvise, inititive at all levels down to private and, of course, great courage. Our soldiers had what it took.

"The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945" by Peter Mansoor is an extremely solid, thoroughly researched and balanced examination of American infantry combat prowess in WWII. Mansoor's book is based on the thesis that, contrary to what has become almost dogmatic wisdom in WWII historiography, the American citizen soldier defeated the vaunted German soldier (the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS being lumped together here) not by means of superior numbers and overwhelming logistical resources, but rather through ultimately superior combat performance. Few historian authors have so effectively tackled this topic to dispel the commonly and misplaced belief that the Germans were combat superior. What makes Mansoor's arguments especially compelling is the fact that he does not simply 'throw the baby out with the bathwater': Mansoor does not toss aside the obvious tactical prowess and oft baffling resilience of German combat units in the Second World War as so many authors have done previously when trying to demonstrate that the American soldier was an effective tool of war. Rather Mansoor rightly points out these strengths of the German war machine, while at the same time demonstrating, through detailed analysis of combat engagements from the invasion of Fortress Europa to the battles for the Ruhr and Saar, that the American soldier outfought the German soldier in the final analysis.

Mansoor presents ample comparative evidence that in most cases the Americans fought the Germans on equal, if not disadvantaged, footing when all appropriate combat modifiers are examined, such as terrain, weather, quality of arms, quality of tactics, effectiveness of casualty replacement, unit resilience, ability to learn lessons from combat experiences, and influence of offensive vs defensive postures. It becomes clear from these analyses that the Germans were typically superior in tactics, ability to act quickly and exhibit amazing resilience, use of terrain (mainly because they were so often fighting in the defensive), and arms quality (which usually offset any superiority the Americans might have in quantity), but that the Americans were superior in use of supporting arms (notably arty and air power), replacement of casualties (despite the deficiencies levied against the American replacement system), and in their ability to 'grow' from experience. Mansoor argues that if German vs American engagements took place in the absence of superiority of numbers (both soldier and weapon), which they usually did, American victories must have come through superior fighting abilities. His arguments are extremely well made and supported.

"The GI Offensive in Europe" is a book all students of Second World War history should read. Those who suffer from "Wehrmacht [P****] Envy" (blind love of all things German) should definitely read Mansoor's book since they might actually see through clear glasses and rethink their devotion to the fallacy that the Germans were the superior force in WWII. Five stars.

Peter Mansoor's "The GI Offensive in Europe" is a fascinating reexamination of the performance of American infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during 1941-1945. Contrary to a commonly-held theme that the US won in Europe through sheer weight of material advantage, Mansoor's thesis is that American infantry was in fact better than its vaunted German counterpart.

Early in the book, Mansoor addresses the mobilization and training of a mass army that simply did not exist prior to 1939. The urgent need to deploy forces beginning in 1942 meant that some infantry divisions entered combat indifferently trained and paid the price. Readiness was further undercut by the gutting of later deploying divisions for trained personnel to provide infantry replacements to divisions already in combat.

Mansoor is of two minds about the individual replacement system in use in the ETO. On the one hand, the system succeeded over time in keeping US infantry divisions at close to required strength. On the other hand, integrating individual replacements into units in contact usually led to high casualty rate among the newcomers.

A concurrent theme of the book is the impact of the strategic decision to limit the size of the US Army to just 90 divisions. The demands of the Pacific War meant the ETO lacked a rotation base for its infantry divisions, which tended to remain in contact for extended periods of time. The cap on the number of divisions contributed to a chronic shortage of infantrymen, addressed by the above mentioned individual replacement system.

It will be left to the reader to decide whether Mansoor carries his point that US infantry divisions were better than their German counterparts. Mansoor spends the bulk of the book discussing the actual performance of US infantry divisions in the ETO. He has harsh things to say about operational level leadership, but there seems no doubt that many infantry divisions had good tactical leadership and performed well. Final victory is indeed a good metric. However, Mansoor rather glides over the implications of the fact that German units were losing effectiveness due to prolonged combat and a lack of replacements at something like the same rate as American units were gaining experience and lethality while maintaining their overall strength. American losses during 1944-1945 were horrific; German losses were catastrophic. By 1945, the German Army was a shambles.

"The GI Offensive in Europe" is highly recommended as a thought-provoking read for the military professional and for the student of the Second World War. This edition contains a useful selection of photographs, maps, and charts.

Peter Mansoor's book is a well written and well researched statement on how the US Army achieved ultimate victory in the European Theater. The volume is expensive as are most university press publications, however, worth the price as it pulls together numerous primary and secondary sources to make its argument (the book is most likely based upon Mansoor's PhD thesis). And that argument is that the victory of the US Army in the ETO suffers from a number of misconceptions, misstatements, and outright fabrications of the evidence (the latter case in point being the refutation of S.L.A. Marshall's statement that the GI infantryman only fired his weapon 25% of the time in combat). Mansoor attacks the myth that American infantrymen were less effective than their German adversaries, that the replacement system was a disaster (per Stephen Ambrose), and that the US Army won the war on the basis of an overwhelming amount of material resources or airpower which the Germans lacked, thereby beating the superior Wehrmacht through attrition of resources rather than superior fighting capability (one need only look at the American Army's greatest challenge, the Battle of the Bulge, wherein it had neither superior resources or airpower, to find evidence of the fighting capability of the GI). Mansoor proves that once American infantry divisions gained combat experience, they were an effective fighting force. Superior fire support from artillery battalions, attached armor support, superior communications and logistical support all worked to mold the infantry division into an winning fighting unit. As Mansoor so aptly demonstrates, it was at the Corps level and above that strategic decision making was wanting (the debacle at Anzio, the failure to trap the German army at Falaise, and the idiocy of the Huertgen Forest). If one is looking for a well-grounded study of the American army in Europe, detailing both the faults and successes of the US Army, this book cannot be surpassed.

Tom Hanks' movie will seem tame after you've digested Colonel Mansoor's detailed illustration of how normal everyday young men advanced across the ETO in the early 1940's against what most thought was a far better trained army under NAZI control. Read this book and dispel many of the myths you've probably grown used to from watching the screen - that German soldiers were unreliable; American GI's had an unlimited supply of material and replacements; and finally, that the Allied general staff were frequently on the same page in their estimation on how the war should be conducted.

If you have read all of the Army Green books on WW2 (and I come close) you will not find all that much new here, but for those of you that haven't... and you know who you are, this is a great book. I consider it a very detailed primer on the US Army in WW2, and it will certainly be one I recommend to those that seriously want to learn more about how this democratic, draftee group of guys beat the all powerful German Army. I found it darn near impossible to find in a bookstore! Which is a shame as more people should read it... LIKE YOU!.

Peter Mansoor treaded some ground that many have ignored or bypassed, and he successfully highlighted US Army Operations not portrayed by Hollywood hits like "Patton" and "Saving Private Ryan." He painted a fascinating picture about just how good the greatest generation was at adapting to harsh environments, a determined foe, and an impersonal military system. The book's greatest weakness is that it failed to exploit a provacative angle: that of GI military effectiveness. The definition offered in the introduction really sounds more like military efficiency, and Mansoor convincingly stated his case that the US Army was certainly more efficient than the tired out German Army. And that is the point. The GIs took on the already exhausted if not still tactically potent Wehrmacht. Although there were some tense moments, the end result was assured, it was only a matter of time. The Americans knew their business, and they exploited every advantage over the Germans.