MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION (The Garland library of war and peace) [Hardcover]

Nock (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 1, 1972 | Series: The Garland library of war and peace

This book is a facsimile reprint and may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages.

--This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 114 pages
• Publisher: Dissertations-G; 1 edition (May 1, 1972)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0824002725
• ISBN-13: 978-0824002725
• Product Dimensions: 10 x 8 x 2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #6,413,969 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Clear Thinking through the Hysteria, October 27, 2001

By 

Chris Planer (Columbus, OH) - See all my reviews

This review is from: MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION (The Garland library of war and peace) (Hardcover)

Albert Jay Nock's The Myth of a Guilty Nation is a double-barreled, no-holds-barred attack on the Treaty of Versailles. Nock viewed the war-guilt clause of the treaty (which placed total blame for WWI upon the Germans) as a piece of moralistic buncombe which would get the United States and her allies in trouble down the road. His predictions in this matter were more correct than most people writing during the time. Nock was one of the critics of our war policy who remained true to his cause throughout the war and refused to be silenced. Never one to jump on any band-wagon, Nock rips into Wilsonian idealism as well as French and British diplomatic duplicity. A must read for any understanding of the Versailles Treaty, its presuppositions and its consequences.

8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Not a "chose jugée" at all, March 10, 2008

By 

Andrew S. Rogers (Houston, Texas) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: MYTH OF A GUILTY NATION (The Garland library of war and peace) (Hardcover)

Published in 1922 by the great individualist-anarchist Albert Jay Nock, "The Myth of a Guilty Nation" is one of the first great works of the first world war "revisionism." In it, Nock challenges the idea -- already entrenched by the terms of the Versailles Treaty -- that Germany was solely responsible for the onset of the war. Nock does not argue, as he takes pains to point out, that Germany bears *no* responsibility. He does say, however, that Germany's responsibility is certainly no greater than that of other nations, and that it may even be less.

By 1921, British premier David Lloyd George had already declared German guilt a "chose jugée" -- a "judged thing" or settled matter, a phrase Nock repeats many times in these pages. Nock however brings together a number of suppressed or forgotten facts, from the relative size of pre-war defense budgets to statements of politicians like Lloyd George himself, to argue that to the extent the question has been "settled," it has been done so on the basis of lies that can only come back to bite the US and its allies in the future.

Nock's book is a short one, and other writers (notably Harry Elmer Barnes) would cover the topic in far greater depth and detail. But Nock's early effort is still worth revisiting. As the causes and consequences of the first world war become ever more lost in the mists of history, the facts Nock brings out -- as well as the example of one of the great men of America's pro-freedom tradition -- are even more worthy of remembering by the Remnant.

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent debunking of what everyone knew, July 22, 2011

By 

Anders D. Mikkelsen (New York, NY) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The myth of a guilty nation (Paperback)

Albert Jay Nock wrote one of the first American books of WWI Revisionism - revising the received story of why WWI began. As a lover of history, what is particularly fascinating about his book The Myth of a Guilty Nation is not whether this is the best explanation for WWI. What is fascinating is the great contrast Nock makes between two wholly different views of origin of the war. What `everyone knew' about the origins of The Great War at the time are quite different from what `everyone knows' now.

The common American notion was that Germany was responsible for the war. No less a personage than David Lloyd George declared "What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely planned in every detail, with ruthless, cynical determination."

By reading the book we start to see just how differently people viewed the origin of the war at the time, especially in the U.S. Since WWI the revisionists won many of the battles, WWI is usually viewed today more as a tragedy, a pointless disaster, the effect of secret diplomacy, general militarism, etc. The reader today is therefore unaware of how many Americans understood the war as the sole outcome of a German conspiracy for plunder. While today we know Europe was an armed camp, the pro-allied propaganda claimed that Europe was unprepared for war. Nock makes the reader aware of the great extent to which the allied politicians continually lied to blame Germany and justify the war, or at least told stories with no regard for the truth. No wonder Hitler found British propaganda so inspiring. In fact the story at the time made it sound like Germany was trying over-run Europe the way Hitler temporarily did a few decades later.

What Nock brings to the fore is the extent to which WWI may be viewed as the opposite of a conspiracy by Germany. If there was a conspiracy it would have been by the allied Entente powers. To a large degree it was blundered in to by state officials. whose desire for peace was fatally undermined by their imperialist ambitions.

We should first note that he also touches on how many powerful parties simply wanted peace. However small powerful parties in France, Britain, and Russia all pushed for war and created secret treaties among each other. As Ralph Raico pointed out English foreign policy was dominated by a small secret clique no more answerable to Parliament and the people than a dictatorship like Nazi Germany. Those who knew of England secret obligations lied to Parliament and denied their existence.

As Nock shows English, French and Russian foreign policy was directed against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and military spending was quite large and much greater than Germany and Austria-Hungary's. All three had powerful cliques who were aggressive towards the Central Powers. They were bound by secret treaties, though this alliance was not publicly acknowledged.

In Nock's book this is roughly what happened to start WWI. Serbia and the Balkans had a foreign policy dominated by Russia. The assassins of Archduke Ferdinand were linked to the Russian pro-war clique. Russia had been 'test' mobilizing since the spring of 1914, and its army alone was equal to Germany and Austria-Hungary combined. Russia had a secret treaty with France calling for France to support Russia if Russia mobilized and went to war. The UK had a secret treaty with France calling for it to support France during war, and to a much lesser but important degree Russia. Bound by secret treaties all three powers found themselves thrust in to war. Germany saw itself encircled by superior numbers. (Therefore it had to defeat the France and Russia in decisive battles before it succumbed in a war of attrition. Similar to Israel's situation when faced with a land war against three neighbors.)

The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, conveniently for the Pro-War Entente cliques, set off the train of powder to the powder keg of a general European war of France, Russia and England against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

For sources Nock makes great use of Belgian diplomatic correspondence, which noted little evidence of German aggression. The Soviet Union also released many embarrassing secret documents from the Tsarist archives. Nock highly recommends English Liberals Francis Neilson's and E. D. Morel's works of WWI revisionism. (Neilson's How Diplomats Make War is hard to read, while Nock's is a breeze. Neilson focuses more on the English diplomacy and other created uncertainty.) It should be noted too that Nock shows evidence that Belgian Neutrality was a fig leaf to justify unpopular UK involvement.

Having documentation of a push for war by cliques in Russia, France, and England, Nock shows how German war guilt is a myth and if anything pro-war cliques in Russia, France, and England were successful in conspiring for war.

What makes this book worth reading is not whether this is the best explanation for WWI. It is worth seeing how small groups of state officials engaged in secret actions that lead to a catastrophic war, and continually lied throughout the whole process to provide themselves ideological cover. What is fascinating is the great contrast Nock makes between two wholly different views of origin of the war. While history and reality seems settled and known, people at different times have radically different understandings of the exact same events.