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Game Theory Hardcover

ISBN-13: 978-0262061414 ISBN-10: 0262061414

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Product Details

  • Hardcover: 603 pages
  • Publisher: The MIT Press (August 29, 1991)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0262061414
  • ISBN-13: 978-0262061414
  • Product Dimensions: 10.2 x 7.2 x 1.5 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 3.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #121,670 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be." Charles Wilson , Professor of Economics, New York University

About the Author

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

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Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

4.6 out of 5 stars
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See all 11 customer reviews
I recommend it for anyone who is serious about learning game theory.
Ivan Duran
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf.
ktrmes
As such a background in game theory is an absolute necessity if one is to deal with problems in these areas.
Dr. Lee D. Carlson

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

64 of 68 people found the following review helpful By Yaumo Gaucho on July 3, 2000
Format: Hardcover
This is a definitive reference text. It is not a self-study course in game theory, nor even a useful introduction. It functions best as a brush-up source, or a reference on equilibrium refinements, for those who already know the basics, and can work with a fairly technical presentation. It's very good especially on screening games and Bayesian-type information games.
For a more intuitive introduction to game theory, try a short little book by David Kreps called "Game Theory and Economic Modeling.".
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16 of 19 people found the following review helpful By A Customer on October 4, 1999
Format: Hardcover
The book does a pretty good job of covering Bayesian issues, but one would think that a big book would be better organized and would cover more topics.
I found it difficult to master the issues of equilibrium refinement and of mechanism design using this book and had to turn to outside sources at the time. Many of the problems would be helped by more "mechanical" examples on how to solve them, since the tools needed to solve many of these problems are probably new to a lot of students. The Tirole IO book contains some solved problems...I wish this book did, too.
Overall, it is a fine book...more than adequate. But it could be better.
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10 of 11 people found the following review helpful By A Customer on August 5, 1997
Format: Hardcover
If you are a Matematical Economist, and you like to study Game Theory or/and Adverse Selection, then this book is a must. It is wery precise when it comes to references, and it includes almost all significant contributions in the field. Sadley the book comes short on Moral Hazard, but that can be found elseware. Likewise if you look for Cooperative Game Theory, you wont find it here. The book is the best contribution I have found on Baysian topics
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34 of 46 people found the following review helpful By Dr. Lee D. Carlson HALL OF FAMEVINE VOICE on July 13, 2001
Format: Hardcover
The theory of games is now pervasive in the fields of economics, financial modeling, logistics, operations research, network engineering, and population biology. As such a background in game theory is an absolute necessity if one is to deal with problems in these areas. This book is an advanced treatment of game theory, and presupposes the reader already has had some exposure to the subject. There is an excellent set of exercises at the end of each chapter, and so the book can be used as a textbook or for self-study.
After an elementary example of a game in the introduction to motivate the subject, the authors begin in Part I of the book with the subject of static games with complete information. Strategic-form games are defined, along with dominated strategies, and the important concept of Nash equilibrium, the latter being introduced to deal with games that are not solvable by iterated strict dominance. For those with a background in elementary functional analysis, the authors prove that finite strategic-form game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium and prove that the Nash-Equilibrium has a closed graph. The concept of Nash equilibrium is extended to the concept of a correlated equilibrium, wherein each player can send another a private signal before they choose their strategy.
In Part II, the authors discuss dynamic games with complete information. Examples of these kinds of games include a sequential version of the battle of the sexes game, and a sequential version of matching pennies. The authors discuss subgame-perfect equilibria, wherein an n-tuple of strategies constitute Nash equilibria in every subgame. The Stackelberg model of duopoly is discussed along with the repeated Prisoner"s dilemna, the latter being an example of backward induction in finitely repeated games.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful By ktrmes on June 17, 2004
Format: Hardcover
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf. It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to. I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural. Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. But at some stage, if you do enogh game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful By ktrmes on June 17, 2004
Format: Hardcover
If you are going to do Micro at more than an undergraduate level, you are going to have this book on your shelf. It is quite comprehensive, although the notation is not always what one might be used to. I do share some of the misgivings voiced in other reviews -- topics sometimes don't appear in the order one might expect and the flow often may not seem natural. Also, the format of the presentation is unlike a mathematics text in that defibnitions, etc. may not always appear in nice blocks, etc. and occassionaly I have found myself wishing for a bit more technical detail, for example on Bayesian Games. But at some stage, if you do enough game theory, you will find yourself looking at it and then buying it.
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