Customer Reviews

Game Theory and the Law

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book popularizes and extends a new approach (non-cooperative game theory) to the economic analysis of law. Readable and concise, this book is a must for students and scholars wishing to understand the ways in which legal rules can be usefully modeled as non-cooperative games. As a professor in the discipline, I am awed by the important and brilliant scholarship presented in this book with superb skill.

This is a great example of how the rigor of game theory can give startling insights into outcomes of common situations. Although I'm no mathematician or economist, all business people are at some point required to base their decisions on how they think others will behave. This book provides some great frameworks for structuring that thought process.

The problem I had with this book is the manner with which it was written.
It was written in a very assuming way, as if the authors believed you know
what they are talking about; this was awfully pretentious, since it's meant
to be an introduction as opposed to an improvement on prior knowledge.
Also, there were VERY confusing transitions. For instance, they would mention
something they were going to talk about, deviate and go off tangent for a
few pages, then start again on the topic with no clean modulation.
Varian has a few chapters in his Microeconomics book that makes many (but not
all) of the same points as this book, only he does it in a more illustrative,
easy to follow, and even exciting manner.

Altough it's often just theory, is a unique book, rxpressing the Chicago school's view on law. Do not expect something you can use practically.