What are the conditions for a threat to be effective? How can the credibility of a threat made by one state against another be ensured? What is the role of commitments in international bargaining? How can compliance with international treaties be explained? Can treaties be designed to ensure compliance? Organized in three parts, and using modern game theory as an analytical tool, this examines the difficult art of commitment in international relations. The first part discusses the use of threats in interstate relations, the second commitments in international bargaining, and the third compliance with international agreements. Throughout, theoretical exposition is combined with illustrations from world politics.
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