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A virtual research paper on Custer's alleged fatal errors, July 22, 2000
This review is from: General Custer's Final Hours: Correcting a Century of Misconceived History (Paperback)
This is a virtual 40 page mini-thesis on the mistakes Custer made from the Crows Nest to his final rest. Darling raises good points that Custer's continuous fractionalizing of his force; leaving the pack train, sending Benteen to a left scout at the divide, sending Reno forward at Lone Teepee, Custer's turn to the north all led to his demise in the face of a concentrated enemy. The main premise is that Custer did a wonderful job of proceeding cautiously and professionally in his search for the Sioux until he got within 15 miles. The most damaging charge against Custer is that Darling states that Custer never fully believed his scouts that a large village actually existed on the LBH. The other charge is that Custer ordered Reno to attack only the small village refugees at Lone Teepee (Reno Creek) which was a small collection of 70 - 90 indians with families. And the most serious charge, Custer turned north perhaps only guessing that Reno would go north to chase the Lone Teepee village escapees.
Issues that could be argued against these theories, Custer's Chief of Scouts saw the smoke from the large village at the Crow's nest and the Crow scouts said they could see a large pony herd on the LBH. In effect, it would be hard to argue that Custer totally disregarded the village being on the LBH and that his turn to the right along the bluffs was a calculated guess. Benteen was told to scout on the left but not go indefinitely in that direction to infinity as Benteen later charged. Darling fails to mention that Custer sent Benteen two messengers to keep abreast of Benteen's progress and he was expected to rejoin the main column after his scout. Reno's alledged order to only attack just the Lone Teepee village seems hard to swallow since Custer said he would support Reno with the whole outfit which would be a greater need than chasing 70 - 90 Indians. Besides Scout Gerard, riding with Reno, came back to Custer's adjutant Cook to report the LBH village size and that the Sioux and Cheyene stopped running and were fighting. Custer certianly knew this after Cook reported. Also, Darling fails to mention that Boston Custer, the civilian younger brother, passed Benteen watering his horses on his liesurely pursuit of Custer's trail and that Boston reported and died with Custer . Thinking that Benteen would soon catch up with his battalion, most likely impactd Custer's decisions perhaps causing a delay. Finally, Custer had four Crow Scouts and Mitch Boyer with him that knew the territory and most of which were at the Crows Nest. They knew the terrian and probably offered alternatives to attack the Sioux and Cheyenne using the geography of the land. In Darlings great book "A Terrible and Sad Blunder" Darling offers that Reno strayed from his ordered reconnaissance to determine the direction of the Sioux but also because the scout Mitch Boyer offered an alternative trail to follow. Why isn't it reasonable to presume that Boyer did the same for Custer? If Boyer did the same for Custer providing an alternative attack approach and Reno held and Benteen rejoined the command perhaps the outcome would have been different, perhaps not a Custer victory but survival of much more of his command. Darling invokes a good argument but leaves out some critical points but it is a good read and at times a relatively reasonable argument. Perhaps if Custer had the advantage of hindsight, he wouldn't have made the decisions that he had but in the midst of fast moving action he did so with the information and history that he had at present.
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