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General James Longstreet: the Confederacy's Most Modern General

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In a letter to a friend in the 1890s James Longstreet wrote that he was prepared to leave this world but felt that he'd like to have some errors about his record corrected first. He passed away in 1904 without achieving his goal. Sadly, in 2007, Longstreet's reputation must still endure the slander of writers who mistakenly claim to be historians. Lt. Col. Knudsen's book General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Modern Soldier, is a clear step in the right direction. Lt. Col. Knudsen, is an army artillery officer with 20 years experience that includes several schools such as the Command General Staff College. His area of expertise is in integrating fire support into the maneuver plan and fire control/artillery computation in cannon units. He has also been an evaluator and instructor of artillery operations, fire support, and maneuver planning and execution responsible for National Guard units in the Western half of the United States. Additionally he has taught ROTC at Claremont McKenna College, CA, and saw combat during Desert Storm performing extensive artillery fire planning and execution in support of U.S. forces for the length of the war. He has a Masters degree in Liberal Arts from Georgetown University.

With this expertise, Lt. Col. Knudsen sheds significant light on the achievements of Longstreet during the Civil War. Knudsen objectively analyzes Longstreet's performances in the battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chickamauga and the siege in Petersburg, and uses them to demonstrate the tactical and strategic abilities Longstreet developed during the course of the war. The first two chapters explain how Longstreet's reputation was slanderously depicted and how professional officers from both armies viewed tactics and strategy as the war commenced. Chapter two concludes that "The next battle [Fredericksburg] would not only bring the South a major victory, but Longstreet would give the world a glimpse of twentieth century warfare." A thorough review of these battles identifies the tactics used and how Longstreet and several of his peers reacted to them. Knudsen compares the strategy of both Longstreet and Lee and presents a compelling case for the former.

Considering the level of expertise of the author, this book is very readable and interesting, even for those with little military experience. It should be mandatory reading for all students of the war and military evolution, and especially important for those with aspirations of writing Civil War military history. Perhaps now Lt. Gen. Longstreet may rest in greater peace as his proper reputation as a military leader is being restored.

I'm a novice when it comes to Civil War history. I get lost in the details of the major military campaigns of the war, much less the smaller skirmishes, and even the geography at times. My interest in the Confederacy relates to my ancestry and my interest in Confederate currency. I had three great grandfathers and three great uncles who served in the war. During a recent meeting of our Sons of Confederate Veterans Camp, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Harold Knudsen of the US Army was our guest speaker. LTC Knudsen is the author of the book, "General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Modern General." I had no idea of who General Longstreet was and, at the time, really didn't care all that much. After all, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson were my heroes. However, Knudsen quickly captured my attention as it became apparent that the legacy of James Longstreet had been swept under the rug by the philosophy of political correctness. I was so enthralled by Knudsen's lecture; I was the first person at his book table to purchase a hardbound copy of his book.

LTC Knudsen's book is small and is less than one hundred pages. It is tiny in comparison to the monolithic volumes that exist on Lee and Jackson and other figures. I have in times past started to read some of those exhaustive works on the Civil War and its heroes, but have rarely completed any. It seems I would get bogged down in what would seem to be the endless battles and forever lost in the explanations of force movements, placement of batteries, flanking maneuvers and all the minutiae of military speak. Even though Knudsen is militaryesque in his writing, he is succinct and keeps the reader's attention. At one point I asked myself, where are the maps? However, I soon realized his descriptions do not require maps. Actually, I believe maps would have been a distraction.

Knudsen makes the case that General Longstreet has not only been misjudged by history, but actually was one of the most successful generals of the war. He subtitles his book "The Confederacy's Most Modern General" and indeed it appeares Longstreet was. Longstreet broke with the Napoleonic practices of warfare and introduced innovations that had not been seen in nineteenth century warfare. Not until recently has Longstreet's reputation begun a slow re-examination. In fact, it wasn't until 1998 that the first monument to honor him was erected at Gettysburg.

James Longstreet was a South Carolina-born West Point graduate who was raised on a Georgia plantation. He received his first combat experience at age twenty four as the US began its war with Mexico. At age forty, he accepted a commission as a Confederate colonel with the Army of Northern Virginia at the start of the Civil War in 1861. Biographers of the post war era stated Longstreet was smart and ambitious but also a "know it all." They turned against him for rejecting the ideology of the "Lost Cause." Indeed, Longstreet was not a politically correct person, and according to the author, considered political correctness a form of dishonesty. Longstreet wasn't interested in political debate and didn't engage on the causes of the war, but instead excelled in the art of war. His view was simple: once war was decided to be the course of action; his goal was to win it.

It was at the Battle of Fredericksburg in 1862 that Longstreet carried out an effective and deadly approach to stopping a Union frontal assault. He merged firearm advancements with field modifications that Knudsen claims were fifty years ahead of its time. Longstreet combined discipline, low aiming, and clear lanes of fire, with one to two rifle loaders for each shooter. This produced an increased rate of fire equivalent to a machine gun in World War I.

Knudsen offers a chapter on the "defensive offense" and a chapter on the vindication of Longstreet's strategic vision. It was the Battle of Chickamauga that gave Longstreet the opportunity to attack and set conditions for decisive victories. It was here that Knudsen believes Longstreet introduced a tactic similar to what the Germans used in their tank warfare in World War II, i.e., the Blitzkrieg theory. Knudsen leaves the reader with the notion that if Longstreet had been in charge of the forces at the Battle of Chickamauga instead of General Braxton Bragg, the Union Army would have been soundly defeated.

Knudsen does not discuss Longstreet's post military career, other than mentioning his involvement with the passage of military reconstruction bills in Congress. However, that only fueled my curiosity in wanting to do more research on the general. My research uncovered that Longstreet enjoyed a career working for the U.S. Government and he was a convert to the Republican Party. Combining this with his support for reconstruction and some critical comments he wrote about General Robert E. Lee, he inflamed his detractors and distanced himself from his Confederate colleagues.

Portions of Knudsen's conclusion were steeped with a good bit of military strategic lingo which required me to read it twice to obtain a good comprehension. Knudsen's background in military command structure and control is very evident as he knows his stuff. However, parts of the final chapter sometimes leave the reader with a feeling he is at a military academy receiving a briefing on military policy and doctrine. All in all, I believe his book is long overdue and it deserves a place on your bookshelf. You won't be disappointed.

This is the first book produced which attempts to objectively analyze James Longstreet's ability and skill as a professional soldier and his strategic vision in the Civil War. Although in need of some editorial trimming and grammatical tweaking, this paperback volume is still a very good read. The author devotes the introduction to an analysis of the "Lost Cause" mentality which has dominated the South's historical writings until recent times and how it effected the disappearance of Longstreet's innovative lessons in modern warfare from the tomes of later military strategists and student reading lists. The rest of the book is a rather astute discussion of why Longstreet was actually the best combat soldier of the Civil War. Simple said, Longstreet's use of staff, his use of "blitzrieg movements" and "in depth" attack, his innovations in trench warfare and centralized indirect fire, his "Western theatre" strategy and use of interior lines, his use of large strategic movements of troops and materials, as well as a host of other innovations helped make obsolete the use of Napoleonic and Jominian Theory in Civil War combat and facilitated the movement towards the twentieth century trench warfare of WWI and the Blitzkrieg of WWII. Of secondary note, it is interesting and satisfying to see the inexorable approaching destruction of the "anti-Longstreet" cabal which has for so many years been able to hide the greater talents of this Civil War general in a blanket of "Lost Cause" hate. Do you ever wonder why Lee wanted Longstreet as second in command and had his commission as a Lt. Gen. dated one day before that of Stonewall Jackson's. There should be no doubt about why Longstreet represented the "crème de la crème" of Civil War generals after reading this book.

This little book is exemplary! I have always been skeptical of how Longstreet has been portrayed, and finally someone comes along and says it like it really is. Although I was surprised there was no chapter on Gettysburg, reading about Longstreets abilities made it more abundant to me that Longstreet was not at fault for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg. Lee was, and Lee said so. (I seem to remember Shelby Foote in the Ken Burns series saying Gettysburg was the price the South paid for having Lee as a commander). But then that is not the purpose of this book. It is a professional soldiers assessment of Longstreet without all the Lost Cause cobwebs hanging all over the discussion. I reread the long introduction to review what Knudsen said about how Gettysburg was spun into the Lost Cause
after I finished the entire book. The author hammers the Lost Cause and says what needed to be said up front on Gettysburg. Some of his points will undoubtedly be uncomfortable for those who grew up on the many myths about James Longstreet.

I liked how this book took a few major battles that best show a modern approach to tactics by Longstreet, such as some of the things he did with artillery at Fredericksburg, and the setting up a German WWII style tactical attack formation at Chickamauga that was truly forward thinking for 1863.

Longstreet was certainly impolitic, but I'm glad this author left overstating that characteristic for others, and got down to sharp as a knife tactics and techniques Longstreet employed. The examples were convincing, and leave no doubt Longstreet was a modern general in the Civil War. I agree with the other positive reviews, and I did not see the problems with the book the negative review claims. Only
a few editorial letter errors, which are the responsibility of the publisher's editor, not an author.

I think the research is good, but the real substance is how the author applies his experience. At points his military language can slow comprehension, but I felt the author took pains to try and write for an audience that is not military, and it worked. There is a uniqueness about Col Knudsen's method. Definately a book the Civil War buff should have on his or her shelf. I have seen the paperback version,
but the new harbound is nicer and worth the price.

General Longstreet has largely been depicted as an ambitious general who failed the south at Gettysburg. Nothing could be further from the truth. Longstreet was an extremely competent, forward thinking general that had many more significant successes than most historians have been willing to say. Two of his show-case battles covered in this book; Fredericksburg for his best defense, and Chickamauga for his best offense, epitomize the true James Longstreet.

Army officer LTC Knudsen concisely highlights some of Longstreet's best battle performances comparatively and as forerunner to aspects of future war. This book is a unique approach to studying a historical military figure; using this approach LTC Knudsen describes Longstreet in a way no one has to date. By taking the standard research of records and other accounts, holding it up to known methods of later wars, and even some current military doctrine, this officer has meshed these together to find Longstreet's way of thinking and his want of improving upon his last technique. Although this is not a comprehensive study of James Longstreet the person, nor does it discuss all the battles he participated in, this book is a must read for anyone interested in Longstreet the tactician and strategist. For all of the author's praise of Longstreet, and the fact this book touches his best performances, not his worst, it reads as remarkably objective.

LTC Harold M. Knudsen, an active military artillery officer,gives the reader a realistic view of General James Longstreet from the perspective of a professional military officer.He brings to the reader a greater understanding of high command and the overall view of a battlefield that most arm chair historians can not achieve or visualize.Through his military knowledge and experiences he understands the amount of confusion and chaos on a modern day battlefield as well as a civil war battlefield ;and he relates this extremely well in his manuscript. His artillery comparisons give the reader a wonderful insight as to how modern day artillery and civil war artillery relate to each other in similarities and differences. I highly recommend this book to any General James Longstreet enthusiast and most definitely to artillery officianodoes.

I have always been fascinated how recent wars settle into their respective
form. I did not choose to read this book because I am particularly interested in the Civil War; but I was attracted to the premise of the title.

This book met my expectations of it's thesis. If you are as interested in
World War I and II as I am, this is a great book to get some better
understanding of the foundations to the World Wars. According to Lt Col
Knudson, many 19th century origins of trench warfare came from the American
Civil War. General James Longstreet helped pioneer the solidifying of the "tactical defense" as Lt. Col Knudson points out, at the battle of Fredericksburg.

Longstreet also pioneered how to break through a defense with the WWII style
attack he did at the battle of Chickamauga. Longstreet's attack was a
blueprint of how to break the deadlock of the trenches by his change in
tactics and operations similar to the movement of tank warfare in
WWII. Other details about Longstreet's use of artillery in a more modern fashion are really interesting.

I learned quite a bit about General James Longstreet, and his modern and
progressive thinking from this book. Longstreet was definitely correct that the Confederacy had to use their interior lines if they had any chance of equalizing the contest, and do so by moving forces by rail faster than the Union. I also like how this book contrasts the Napoleonic thinking of Robert E. Lee to the 20th century thinking of James Longstreet. Although they differed in approach at points during the war, they were still a great command team. This book is an astute historical study of how warfare changed from the late 1700's to the 1930's, which highlights General Longstreet's contributions to the changes most convincingly.

As Douglass Southall Freeman said toward the end of his life, after a career of trying to deify Lee and erroneously blame Longstreet for Gettysburg; he really missed the boat on Longstreet and what a great commander and general he really was. Freeman was not a trained military man though, and that is where he missed in understanding what accomplishments Longstreet really had to his record. If one wants a true professional military study of two of Longstreet's greatest victories, how his "modern" thinking evolved through the war and a few of his techniques, this book delivers. Lieutenant Colonel Knudsen has a few solid professional observations, even `discoveries' about Longstreet. Discoveries in the sense that all the other books on Longstreet written by academics that have come before this one cannot address military tactics and techniques the way a professional soldier can. This book is not a biography (as the confused reviewer Mr. Nicholas seems to think); it has a lengthy introduction that talks through some of the trouble Longstreet got into after the war because of his Republican Party involvement. The introduction is really a quick survey to support the author's point that politics was the reason his "modern" methods have been lost to history. Basically, he was buried by the Lost Cause, and with that his military achievements went unnoticed within a few decades after the war.

Longstreet's work at Marye's Heights has generally been understood for what it was: the most painful repulse the Union army ever suffered in the Civil War. In addition to this, Lieutenant Colonel Knudsen explains how that preparation was nearly identical to the setting up of a 20th century "kill zone," to use the military term he introduces in the chapter. Another interesting aspect explained is the modern artillery doctrine Longstreet put into use at Fredericksburg, and that "fire support" as Knudsen (an artillery officer himself) puts it, added a tremendous fire power against infantry walking in the open, at a much more lethal level than before. His explanation of the difference between direct support and centralized artillery was really well done, and explains a lot about how artillery is employed today, and that Longstreet actually did this at Fredericksburg.

After Fredericksburg the book goes on to discuss Longstreet as a strategic thinker, which flies in the face of what academic historians have said about him. A few have said Longstreet was not a strategic thinker, this case for the contrary is correct. I agree. Longstreet noticed before Robert E. Lee did, that shoring up the western theater was something they needed to do. Knudsen does not say the Civil War was lost for the South in the west; rather he explains for the South to win they had to mount successful defenses (or offenses) across the South, and win those key battles to make it painful, and thus politically untenable for the Lincoln administration. Colonel Knudsen labels this strategy the "Offensive-Defense" for how Longstreet envisioned this counter strategy to work. The author uses a hypothetical movement (based on what Longstreet was advocating) of Longstreet's corps to attack Grant during the Vicksburg campaign to better explain how the overall strategy would work. (This discussion reminded me of staff war gaming a World War II veteran once told me about for how plans are developed; it goes to show some methods are never obsolete, as Knudsen, a currently serving soldier must still be doing the same in the Army today.) This discussion is lively for a military history book.

From this point the story moves on to Chickamauga, and Longstreet's "Schwerpunkt." I have to wonder why so many historians have not put adequate importance on this breakthrough as a true blueprint for what was to come in the 20th Century. It is actually simple to see Longstreet fashioned a real German style Schwerpunkt like the Panzer leaders decades in the future would use in their tactics in World War II. It has to be the anti-Longstreet crowd of historians who either did not pick up on it, because they do not have military training, or they just want to keep Longstreet cast as a scapegoat. As Knudsen states: his breakthrough gave the South their best chance to reverse events in their favor in the west, and was a masterpiece that should have become a classic in the study of modern military history. Hopefully Longstreet's work at Chickamauga will gain in notoriety now that it has been better identified as a modern type of attack in the middle of the 19th Century. (2nd Manassas would have been a great example for this author to tackle as well.)

I was rapt by this book in its angle, tone, and most of all the professional qualifications of the author. At times Knudsen comes across as very empathetic to Longstreet. Yet he proves entirely capable of explaining this underlying tone and position, from his military "lens," how these observations hold true. Lord knows Longstreet deserves one guy to come over to his corner, and it fits it is a real soldier. It is about time! If one is well read on Longstreet, and used to the criticism in nearly every piece of writing about him, this book will slap you in the face! I have personally been neutral on Longstreet, and try to understand that it was politics that cost him his reputation. Even if you don't like Longstreet this may still be for you. Knudsen's points are well made, and are professional, so that is why I say this book may be an important turning point on Longstreet's history. While this was relatively short book, I would like see this author take on Longstreet at Gettysburg, Chattanooga, Second Manassas, Williamsburg, Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Wilderness. Knudsen's method may bring more `discoveries' to Lee's War Horse. A five star story of the hardest hitting corps commander in the Confederate army.

This is not a review of my own book, which is not my place as the author. That is the prerogative of everyone and anyone except me.

This is a retort and equalizing comment to the defamatory and ignorant comment by "Pennsylvania Cajun" about the publisher (who seems to be the same person who signed his name as John C. Nicholas a few weeks earlier, probably because he did not want to appear as the lone one star comment complaining about this book).

I resisted responding to PA Cajun about the publisher until I had hard facts, following my visit to Word Association Publishers last week. Word Association Press is not a vanity press. PA Cajun's claim that this book would not be publishers by someone that not have a self publishing option, or that this publisher is not reputable is false. Dr. Tom Costello, the owner and president of Word Association Publishers in Tarentum, PA see's dozens of manuscripts every year, and selects only a few for publication. His standards are quite high, and anyone can verify this by contacting him at Word Association Publisher's website via e-mail directly to him or calling the publisher's 1-800 number. I encourage Cajun to do so, and find out for himself. PA Cajun - you should be careful when calling someone unreputable in writing on the internet, when you have no idea who and what you are talking about.

Word Association Publishers has many excellent and high demand works, across many different genres of books. This is a serious company that deftly safeguards its reputation in the manuscripts it selects.

An important and interesting addition to the spectrum of Civil War military history. Written by a currently serving career military professional, this book examines the activities, skills, and thought process of General Longstreet, one of General Lee's most important subordinates, outside of the "Lost Cause" ideology that largely came to define his image, as well as much of the historical perspective of the South, for many years after the Civil War. In the book, Longstreet is shown to be an important military innovator, whose most successful strategies were precursors to such later techniques as trench warfare in WWI, the Schwerpunkt from the Blitzkrieg era, and 20th century notions of campaign planning, versus the Napeolonic and Jomini approaches to warfare that prevailed at the inception of the Civil War. Also examined are Longstreet's intelligence gathering, staff management, and logistical talents, as well as his relative indifference to politics that was a likely reason for his subsequently tarnished image in post-war remembrance. Overall, a worthy and different perspective on an important military figure, competent but ultimately unlucky, and a useful addition to the library of any student of military history.