Customer Reviews

General James Longstreet in the West: A Monumental Failure (Civil War Campaigns and Commander Series)

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Contrary to the report on the cover of the book stating that the author is objective, there is nothing objective about the author's views of James Longstreet. She is obviously a victim of the gross distortion of fact concerning Longstreet beginning in 1872 when Jubal Early launched his Lee Deification campaign. The book has left out half of the facts in order to conclude the author's interpretation of "truth". The most annoying thing about this book is that there are no sources of reference or notes. Where is she getting her facts? Please let her share her sources with the rest of us. Also, where is the bibliography? The back of the book has a list of "other suggested reading", but no bibliography which makes me highly question the resources "researched" by the author.

Like the other reviewers, after reading this hatchet job on Longstreet, I felt the need to get on Amazon and let Civil War enthusiasts know this is not a responsible piece of historical writing. I cannot understand how somone with a PhD can write such innacurate and partisan nonsense, and that publisher picked it up! Don't waste your time on this book.

I sure wasted seventy four cents of next semester's book money buying this garbage. In the annals of incorrect titles and thesis, does a first place belong to this poor attempt at a book? The product description says: An objective and realistic look at a Confederate commander by a respected historian. Are you kidding! Of all the vitriolic nonsense ever written about a Civil War figure, this has to be the worst! There is almost nothing in this partisan mess that is correct. Respected historian? I don't see it. Hallock really overlooks quite a few events, and twists this history into something bizarre.
Hallock misses the simple fact that General Longstreet showed up at Chickamauga, after a grueling 1,100 miles trip by train from Virginia, arrived around 11.00pm, was not greeted or led to general Bragg's HQ, but found it himself in strange surroundings, and then after the meeting planned and executed the next morning a masterful breakthrough that was the greatest victory in the Western Theater during the Civil War. That accomplishment in itself makes Longstreet the one Monumental Success in the West. Bragg was the monumental failure in the West and Judith Lee Hallock is a Monumental failure as a historian. Reading this worthless book, is like reading an angry, cranky, editorial in a 19th Century newspaper, by some Lost Causer eternally angry about losing the war, who could not stand that Longstreet stood for reunification. A lady who lives in the 20th Century, so angry about Bragg's failure at Chattanooga and blaming it on Longstreet; it is bizarre to say the least. (I wonder why she does not mention anything about Nathan Bedford Forrest, who so correctly told Bragg along with Longstreet to get the army moving after Chickamauga and attack again before it was too late? Probably because Forrest is one of the most respected Confederate generals for his exploits, and probably because he told Bragg off in his tent, and then left the army.
Bragg could never make up his mind. Longstreet attempted to get him on the right path of looking at key areas and places that they needed to attack or seize to prevent the forces in Chattanooga from being relieved. That was a concept Bragg could not understand, but for Longstreet it was common sense, and what he was used to working under Robert E. Lee. After Chickamauga, Longstreet was hamstrung like all the other Confederate generals who worked for Bragg. Longstreet can take a little blame for not showing any sensitivity when speaking to Bragg, but then who has ever heard of a sensitive general that gets things done. For speaking his mind when and the way he did, he should receive praise. He was right to ask the authorities in Richmond to send for Robert E. Lee so he could straighten out the problems Bragg had so pervasively created. Robert E. Lee would have won at Chattanooga, and that probably irritates Hallock to death!
One has to wonder from what sort of degree mill did this author get her PhD? What an irresponsible bunch of propaganda. If you want to read a great book on Longstreet read the one by Col. Knudson or Jeffry Wert.

It is difficult to believe, after reading Halleck's book, that she has a Ph.D. in history. I have not read a more venomous, undocumented diatribe anywhere else that compares to her commentary on one of the best generals of the Civil War. While Gen. Longstreet was certainly controversial, he was none of the things Halleck would have us believe.
Further, in an effort to divert critism of her poorly done and totally undocumented research concerning Gen. Longstreet, the editors have resorted to candy-coating her poor scholarship with references to her institutional credentials. How lame.
There has never been a more unobjective, unrealistic and unscholarly look at a Confederate commander by a respected historian. If this is an example of how you teach and conduct your classrooms, shame on you, Halleck.

Don't waste your time with this little book. It appears to be one of a series written by some pickup author without any subject matter knowledge. Mosr every page is taken up with a photo and biography of an officer the sole purpose of which is to take up space and eliminate the need for writing the text. The author also seems to have an agenda.

Some books on historical subjects take a certain amount of license to interpret events to perhaps fit popular lore or remain loyal to accepted "history standards," to use that term of the 1990s. But then there are a few that are completely out of bounds irresponsible propaganda. This is one of them. It is angry, vindictive, and not based upon any sound military analysis. The author clearly has a seething hatred for those officers who recommended General Bragg's removal during the Chattanooga campaign in 1863. Hallock's opinion that a large number of professional officers were wrong about Bragg is hard to buy into, and easy to dismiss. Hallock's complete misunderstanding of basic tactics, the operational level of war, the strategic level and where those misunderstandings show up in this paper need correcting.

The first chapter starts with inaccuracies that set the tone of this book. The first is the false notion Longstreet was to definitely take over for Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee. There is no solid primary source proof prior to Longstreet's departure from Virginia that Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, other key politicians, and Longstreet himself, that a decision was made to replace Bragg with Longstreet. His mission was to add the weight of his First Corps to the Army of the Tennessee and to help create a period of advantage over the Union Army of the Cumberland. "To beat those people in the West," as Lee put it, and then come back to Virginia when the mission was complete. The second is the falsehood that Longstreet performed poorly at Gettysburg. Actually, Longstreet performed as ably as possible. All the actions he presided over on the second and third day were in the best hands they could have been, and Robert E. Lee underscores this truth by selecting Longstreet to command the assault on the Union center with troops mostly not of his corps, and then taking the responsibility himself for the failure of the attack.

The Chickamauga chapter is a strange one. It gives no credit to Longstreet for winning the battle. To set the record straight on this distortion, it was Longstreet who won the battle of Chickamauga for the South. Bragg can be credited as presiding over the win in the sense he was the commanding general, but the facts are so clear that the victory was not the result of Bragg's plan or anything he did personally. Bragg's plan, which was sound, was to roll the Union left and interpose his army between Rosecrans and their escape routed to Chattanooga. It did not work, because Polk started too late, because of a courier not getting the word to a division commander. Longstreet acted on his own initiative, broke through on the left, and collapsed the Union line. The battle was a total route for the Union forces opposite Longstreet, and they were fortunate to escape intact to Chattanooga. The chapter ends on a confused complaint that Longstreet had written that Bragg had left the battlefield, and argues Bragg's reports had the leading "in the field," she seems to think refutes Longstreet's observation. Well, as a professional soldier, I also use the term in the field, a euphemism to describe pretty much anything outside or away from a garrison. Bragg was mostly with Polk's wing, and then at his headquarters (some distance away from the action) during and after Longstreet's breakthrough. What Longstreet describes in his writings (that Bragg was away from the field), means he was not at the key place the commanding general should have been, therefore he was unable to see and understand the progress on left. The bottom line on Chickamauga is Bragg did not comprehend what Longstreet's wing had accomplished, because he was consumed by anger over the late start of his right wing.
The last paragraph has a strange question that someone with training in tactics can answer. Hallock asks: why did Longstreet condemn Bragg for requesting reinforcements, and not use his own reserve division? The answer is: because he asked for reinforcements so his wing was trying to exploit success, and since the right wing was not able to force the union flank, and had units that were not engaged, it made good tactical sense to flex those units to the left and exploit the success there. This was Bragg's one mistake at Chickamauga. Longstreet's own reserve division was deployed as a rear security element right after the breakthrough, a tactic consistent with modern doctrine after a breakthrough, and was later committed by Longstreet once Bragg denied reinforcements in the late afternoon to try to break through Snodgrass Hill. This division alone was not enough to exploit the success, which is why he asked for reinforcements.

The Chattanooga campaign chapter also contains misunderstandings in the operational level. First Hallock thinks Bragg's missed opportunity to follow up the victory on the 20th with rapid pursuit on the 21st was somehow sound, by "taking three days to reestablish order, and cautiously closing on the Federal's who were firmly entrenched in Chattanooga." Huh?? In all my years of professional training, instruction, and wartime experience, I have never seen a situation when it is a good idea not to exploit tactical success in as timely a manner as possible, in order to create operational possibilities. Hallock's distortion that the federals were firmly entrenched on the 21st is false. They were not firmly entrenched until several days later, but they became firmly entrenched because Bragg left them alone with his caution. (See Nathan Bedford Forrest's dispatch recommending attack on the 21st.) The next part, about Bragg's purge, Hallock seems to think Polk, Longstreet, D.H. Hill, Buckner, Cleburne, and Preston were all wrong in writing a petition to President Davis recommending Bragg be removed. I don't think they were wrong. And neither does anyone else with basic military understanding of military leadership, the importance of harmony in operations, timing and tempo of operations, and common sense. I don't think these officers were wrong in their opinion that Bragg should be removed, anymore than Eisenhower was wrong in his judgment to relieve Major General Lloyd Fredendall in North Africa. While I do not believe Bragg was an incompetent soldier, he was not mentally suited and clear minded enough for army level command, nor did he have an understanding of the operational level needed to command an army in the Civil War. AND, AND, AND.........where is the episode with Nathan Bedford Forrest??? The one where he told Bragg if he ever saw him again it would be to his great peril. Translation: If I see you again, I'm going to kill you. If Hallock is going to call out every general officer that had a conflict with Bragg, why leave out Forrest?? He had the most colorful one! (Forrest is off limits right? Because Forrest having the same problem with Bragg adds credibility to Longstreet's views.)

The chapter on Wauhatchie contains a complete falsehood, where Hallock states Longstreet did not make a reconnaissance of the Bridgeport, Alabama. Longstreet did indeed make a recon of the area by sending his artillery coordinator Porter Alexander 10th - 12th of September. From this recon he planned a strike against Bridgeport, which was approved by President Davis, but not carried out by Bragg - another key error not mentioned in this book. Next she says Longstreet utilized only 4,000 troops to attack 12,000 Federals. No he didn't. Those troops that made it into Wauhatchie were ordered to attack the trains in front of Sunset Rock, not lock horns with the main body of Federal troops that outnumbered them. Bragg and Longstreet agreed upon the size of the force to attack that night, and the limited objective.

The key in understanding Wauhatchie, and Bragg's focus in tactical actions in Lookout Valley, is that they were irrelevant because of what was happening in the operational level. The problem was Union troops were allowed to come into Bridgeport unchallenged by Bragg. That is what caused the failure of the campaign; Bragg allowed himself to eventually become overmatched by Grant before the partial siege could starve the Union pocket in Chattanooga.

The first sentence of the Knoxville chapter Hallock states: "Longstreet's failure to hold the left of the Confederate line resulted in his separation from the Army of Tennessee." Wrong on both counts. It was Bragg's disregarding President Davis' wishes to follow Longstreet's plan to interdict Union forces coming into Bridgeport that caused the initiative to go to the Union. The idea to send Longstreet to Knoxville was an attempt to draw off some of Grant's combat power to reinforce Knoxville, so he could not begin offensive operations against Bragg. Grant didn't go for it.

Longstreet, his subordinates and his troops had to face many difficulties on their way up to Knoxville, and were unable to penetrate the fortress city. When Longstreet closed on the Union troops at Campbell's Station they came close to turning a flank, but Burnside handled his troops superbly, and did not allow his position to be compromised before he could disengage and get back behind the defenses of the city. The reason the attack on Ft. Sanders failed to get over the wall, is because Longstreet saw a Union soldier walking over the ground in front of the spot he wanted to attack from a distance, and the soldier appeared to be walking on the ground which put the height the troops had to scale the same as he had scaled successfully in a similar attack in the Mexican War. He did not know the Union soldier had walked across the base of the fort on a wooden plank another six feet above the bottom of a dry moat he could not see. Thus Longstreet thought the wall could be scaled, but it couldn't. When his troops got stuck in the moat, he called it off, with the unfortunate sacrifice of nearly 200 soldiers in the process.

Longstreet did hit a low point in his career in confidence, as he watched a great victory squandered by Bragg who did not see the same operational possibilities that he did. But no one can deny he brought the greatest victory the South ever enjoyed in the western theater. He deserves credit for Chickamauga, for identifying the more far ranging actions the Confederate's needed to take at Chattanooga. He deserves credit for the strategic vision he proposed in early 1863 that became the great movement of a corps from Virginia to Georgia that created a good chance for the Confederates to steal the strategic initiative in that theater. The title and what is written in this book is far from correct.

"The first law of the historian is that he shall never dare utter an untruth. The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true. Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice." Cicero (106-43 B.C.)

It appears as early as 106 B. C. historians already recognized the obligation and responsibility in writing honest and objective works. In this 84-page booklet, Judith Hallock shows that she never received the creed. This booklet is an excellent example of how not to write books purported as history. It is full of subjective half-truths and ridiculous conjecture from an obviously untrained writer.

The most important issue readers should note is that there are no citations or bibliography in the booklet. Hallock repeatedly shows obvious disdain for the subject with statements like, "Sadly, he did not possess the ability to accomplish what he expected..." (17), "...his sorry record of veracity on other occasions..." (38), "...one has to wonder if Lee seriously believed Longstreet capable of commanding the Army of Tennessee," (47) "blundered his way through East Tennessee," (84) and "an inability to reason out and foresee the consequences of his own laziness and disobedience of orders." (84) Nowhere does Hallock offer any evidence whatsoever to back her opinion of characterization or events. One cannot imagine what sort of military training the writer has received to give credibility to the interpretation of tactics and strategy. Hallock goes so far as to criticize Gen. Robert E. Lee's handpicked second-in-command, questioning Lee's ability to manage his army properly. Was Lee a genius, or a fool? He could not be both, and it seems as though most students of history lean toward the side of genius.

Another serious failing of this booklet is the absence of the vast amount of contradicting evidence found in correspondence and reports of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. There one will find Grant's acute anxiety about Longstreet's presence in East Tennessee. When the War Department tried to reinstate Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Lee told the department not to send him back to the Army of Northern Virginia. When studied with any vigor, it appears that the identifiable material used against Longstreet was purported by those who did not do well in the war or were disgruntled subordinates. Jefferson Davis and James Seddon, along with Bragg, must hold some responsibility for significantly contributing to Longstreet's problems. Hallock conveniently fails to recognize Bragg's lies to the War Department regarding Longstreet's whereabouts, easy to spot in the Official Records. Also missing is the fact that Longstreet arrived without supply wagons or other logistics, they were to be provided by Bragg. On page 40 Hallock states, "...he [Bragg] immediately began purging the army of those he believed, with good cause, to be incompetent." But when Longstreet relieves his subordinates Hallock states, "Longstreet displayed his lack of moral courage by trying to blame others..."

Hallock uses space within the booklet to highlight those whom one may suppose she considers major players involved. To illustrate, she covers "diarist" Mary Chesnut with one of the largest of these highlights, praising Chesnut's post-war publication. (82-83) The truth is that Chesnut wrote the manuscript well after the war. Exposed by noted historian C. Vann Woodward in his introduction of a reprint (published 1981), he titled the work "Mary Chesnut's Civil War" because calling it a diary is a fraud. If Hallock's book (published 1995) depends on this type of source, the material cannot be taken seriously. Perhaps if Chesnut was reviewing party and dress etiquette of War capital Richmond, but surely not in any military matters.

Hallock holds some sort of grudge against the subject, who died well before she was born. The tone of this book screams a pain that begs the question; what did James Longstreet do to her to make her lash out to this degree? I could not recommend this booklet to anyone, unless as I said, the work acts as an example of how not to write a legitimate history book.

This book is not worth the paper it is written on. Nothing objective about the author's views of James Longstreet in her diatribe. She is obviously a victim of the gross distortions of the Lost Cause, the anti-Eastern bloc, and her own lack of qualifications to judge military figures. James Longstreet delivered the greatest victory in the west; I have to wonder why that is not considered in this completely inaccurate titled piece of garbage.
Don't waste your time on this!

This is by far the worst Civil War book I have ever read. Luckily it was a short read.

I was so surprised how angry and vitriolic this author - Hallock seems to be over Longstreet. I mean really? No footnotes, no credible expertise to support some of the things this author alledges. How did a publisher agree to put this in print and publish it. If Hallock was a student of mine, and turned this in, it would get a D or even an F.

Horrible book. Don't waste you time and money.

I wish I had read the reviews before I bought this book. The other people have said it better than I could.