From Library Journal
In the tradition of referring to Vietnam as Johnson's war or Nixon's war, Smith, who questions whether the Gulf War was necessary, places the responsibility for Desert Storm on Bush. Expressing constant misgivings about presidential warmaking, he provides a virtual day-by-day chronicle of the decisions of 1990 that led to war. Unlike Stephen R. Graubard's more polemic Mr. Bush's War ( LJ 1/92), Smith tries to chart the evolution of U.S. policy towards Iraq from disinterest through concern to outright hostility. Smith examines the role of public opinion, Congress, and the press in the evolution of Desert Shield into Desert Storm. He notes Bush's sense of personal mission as a factor affecting the decision to go all out, and he intimates that Bush may well have believed in the royal prerogatives with his constant use of the first person pronoun (singular). While Smith does not provide information on Bush's rise in the Reagan years as Graubard does, he is nonetheless highly critical of "loose" decision structures, though he commends Bush for brilliant coalition building. Highly recommended.
- Frank Kessler, Missouri Western State Coll., St. Joseph
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
- Frank Kessler, Missouri Western State Coll., St. Joseph
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Kirkus Reviews
According to Smith (Political Science/Univ. of Toronto; Lucius D. Clay, 1990, etc.) in this volatile study, America's adventure in the Persian Gulf War was not a crusade for freedom but a checkpoint on the personal agenda of George Bush, who disregarded constitutional restrictions on presidential power and cynically manipulated the public, the press, Congress, and even the military. Quoting contemporary media accounts, books, and academic and law journals, Smith chronicles Bush's personalization of the crisis and details the resulting twists and turns of public perception, policy, and action. By Smith's account, Bush showed little interest in the Iraq situation until he met with Margaret Thatcher, who ``performed a successful backbone transplant'' and convinced him that Saddam Hussein posed a Hitler-like threat to the entire Middle East. According to Smith, this resonated with Bush's penchant for heroism and led him to adopt a ``crusading'' posture against Iraq. This personalizing of world affairs resulted in rapid, short-term success, but Smith spells out its possible dangers for democracy: Bush's alleged disregarding of expert advice, particularly from the State Department and the military, could have led to disaster, Smith says; and the crumbling of congressional caution during the crisis, he adds, undermined the separation of powers, making the President a virtual dictator of foreign policy. Particularly damning is Smith's abundant evidence of the Administration's policy of ``minimum candor'': even Generals Powell and Schwartzkopf apparently learned of Bush's decision to switch from defensive to offensive operations through TV news reports. Balancing criticism of the President with praise for military professionalism (especially in resisting adventurous campaigns), this study gives a better sense of the complexities of the situation, and sticks closer to the reported facts, than Stephen Graubard's similar (and similarly titled) Mr. Bush's War (to be published next month). -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
