George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence [Paperback]

George F. Kennan (Author), John Lukacs (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 31, 1997

In 1945 the United States saw the Soviet Union as its principal ally. By 1947, it saw the Soviet Union as its principal opponent. How did this happen? Historian John Lukacs has provided an answer to this question through an exchange of letters with George F. Kennan. Their correspondence deals with the antecedents of containment between 1944 and 1946, during most of which time Kennan was at the American embassy in Moscow.

Kennan had strong opinions about America's appropriate role during and after World War II and is perhaps best known as the architect of America's containment policy. Much has been written about Kennan and containment, but relatively little is known about the events that made him compose and send the Long Telegram in 1946 that ultimately became the draft for foreign policy dealing with the Soviets in the following forty years.

These letters show Kennan's fear of the extent to which the United States misunderstood the Soviet regime. Especially in 1944, at the time of the Russians' betrayal of the Warsaw Uprising, it became evident that the Soviets were interested in establishing their rigid domination of Eastern and Central Europe and dividing the continent.

Kennan's letters to Lukacs are thorough and detailed, suggesting that the Truman administration was not in the least premature in opposing the Soviet Union. Indeed, both correspondents suggest that these decisions should have been made earlier. This series of letters will add greatly to our understanding of what preceded containment and the Cold War in 1947.

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

In this slim but hard-hitting volume, diplomat Kennan (At a Century's Ending, LJ 10/15/95) and historian Lukacs (Destinations Past, LJ 6/15/94) rebut the revisionist argument that the United States, by overhasty action during the waning days of World War II, provoked the subsequent Cold War. Drawn from their exchange of correspondence in 1994-95, it offers insight into the process of transition from wartime cooperation to bitter competition between former allies. The book centers on the evolution of Kennan's thinking from 1944 to 1946, the period preceding the famous Long Telegram and the "X" article in Foreign Affairs outlining his vision of "containment" policy. Kennan argues that, far from acting rashly, Roosevelt and his advisers sacrificed the postwar European order for the sake of wartime alliance cohesion. He also reiterates his long-standing view that containment should not have been carried out primarily through the military. This work illuminates the subtle thinking of one of this century's most influential statesmen. Strongly recommended for academic libraries.?James Holmes, Tufts-Harvard Univs., Medford, Mass.
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews

By distinguished diplomat and Cold War policy architect Kennan (At the Century's Ending, 1996, etc.) with some input from historian Lukacs (The End of the Twentieth Century, 1993), some brief ruminations on the evolution of America's containment policy in the early years of the Cold War. Americans regarded the Soviet Union in 1945 as the principal ally of the US, by 1947 as its principal opponent. In this correspondence from 1994 and 1995, Kennan, theorist of the policy of containment of Soviet Communism that marked the foreign policies of nine US presidents from 1945 to 1989, explains how US reaction to its erstwhile ally evolved rapidly from unease to active opposition. In February 1946 Kennan, then a subordinate diplomat in the American embassy in Moscow, received a routine request from the Treasury Department for an opinion on Soviet intransigence about the World Bank. His response was the Long Telegram, an historic 8,000-word document that offered a coherent explication of the ``Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs'' and advocated the use of the ``logic of force'' in response to Soviet aggression. Sixteen months later, Kennan published a seminal article in Foreign Affairs magazine that laid out his simple philosophy of containment: Soviet aggression should be opposed whenever encountered. Kennan explains how his thinking behind the Long Telegram and the article developed from a wartime study of the ruthless, paranoid Stalin regime. And he argues here that if the true nature of life in Russia, and the pragmatic necessity of Soviet-American cooperation during the war, had been explained properly to the American people, many misunderstandings and distortions in that relationship could have been avoided. In particular, Kennan contends, there might have been less of the unjustified tendency of each side to ascribe to the other a desire to dominate Europe through military means. A simple but illuminating exposition. -- Copyright ©1997, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

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Product Details

• Reading level: Ages 18 and up
  
• Paperback: 96 pages
• Publisher: University of Missouri (March 31, 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0826211097
• ISBN-13: 978-0826211095
• Product Dimensions: 7.8 x 4.8 x 0.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 3.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #906,606 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Kennan: The War Years, August 2, 2005

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Neil Bhatiya "nbhistorystudent" (Washington, D.C.) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence (Paperback)

This is not the typical work of diplomatic history, as it comprises a series of letters between George Kennan and historian John Lukacs in the mid-1990s. In his well-written and informative introduction Lucaks lays out his aim in writings the books, which is to chart Kennans's views on the Soviet Union prior to his writing of the Long Telegram and the Foreign Affairs article "Sources of Soviet Conduct."

They counter the New Left/revisionist thesis that the U.S. pushed the Soviet Union into the confrontation that would eventually become the Cold War. Rather, they believe that the U.S.'s response to Stalin was too little too late. Kennan criticizes the FDR Administration for playing up the cordial alliance with the Soviet Union, which had clearly being fighting for its own security and couldn't have cared a lick about democracy or friendly relations with the Western nations. Rather, as early as the middle of 1945 it was apparent that Stalin would not rest until the whole of Eastern Europe was led by people who were personally loyal to him, a loyalty that was enforced with violence and intimidation.

He then follows this thread discussing the difficulties of public sentiment, and how we transitioned--not very smoothly--from "friendship" with the USSR to being their rivals. While insisting that we should have taken a tougher line, however, Kennan also takes to task conservatives who turned containment into a domestic battle against supposed Communist infiltration. One of the reasons he wrote "Sources of Soviet Conduct", he states, was to "assure these people that even though it was impossible to collaborate extensively with Moscow, this did not mean that it was impossible to live without catastrophe in the same world with the Soviet Union" (56). Kennan then goes on to outline his view that negotiations should, at the very least, been attempted to hash out the future of Europe. He believed that Stalin was never in a position to risk his leadership of the Soviet Union by sending Russian and Warsaw Pact forces into Western Europe, and that this made a discussion of political issues a possibility.

All-in-all a very well organized and revealing look at the thinking of one of this country's superior diplomatic minds, especially in a time period that is not often the focus of Kennan studies. It is a very short work, and thus left me wanting to read more, which I suppose is a double-edged sword (more buying books I can't afford). A helpful and comprehensive bibliography of sources on the end of the Second World War and the origins of the Cold War is provided.

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Two great minds, May 4, 2008

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James W. Hipp (Columbia, SC USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946: The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence (Paperback)

Two great minds share their thoughts on the rise of the main strategy used by the U.S. in the Cold War. Lukacs is arguably the only "conservative" historian worth reading. Well worth the cheap price.