Most Helpful Customer Reviews
|
|
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Decent Book with Flaws, May 6, 2005
There are several excellent points made in the other reviews which I won't rehash here, but I'll attempt to present another view of the book.
The book reads easily, and Cooper has a certain elegance to his language. He does not get bogged down in technical jargon that would not be accessible to the non-expert. He has done considerable research utilizing primary sources. His major themes are the German officer corps and its principles of Duty, Honor, Country, and how those principles affected the Wehrmacht's dealings with Hitler and its strategic approach to the subsequent war. A secondary theme is the strategic course of the Wehrmacht and the influence of the Generals and Hitler on that course. An interesting thesis in which he makes eloquent arguments but one that to some reveals a neglect of strategic factors outside of Germany. As Cooper himself states, however, in his introduction, "I deal solely with the themes outlined above," hence presenting a narrow field of view.
Cooper believes that the Officer Corps' abrogation of responsibility and acceptance of Hitler's orders led to Germany losing the war. The book relies heavily on post war memoirs and collections, notably those of Kesselring, von Manstein, Guderian, and Keitel, and their hindsight opinions affect Cooper's conclusions. This is why other reveiewers have mentioned a "pro-german" bias. Cooper makes no deliberate attempt to discuss in detail the influence and effectiveness of Allied armies, mainly because he intended to stay focused on the one topic.
For the everyman, its an interesting look at the German Army during the pre-war years, the internal politics of its Officer Corps and General Staff, and how those interactions affected the course of the war. For the historian or gifted amatuer it lacks impact. It would be well suited as a general read, but it would behoove the reader to contrast this book with one that focuses on the Soviet side of the Front and then make one's own assessment.
|
|
|
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent, July 25, 2004
Amazon's new "real name" policy means that my older review is no longer associated with my profile - so I will reiterate my comments earlier plus a couple of new observations.
I have no idea why anyone would suggest that Cooper's book is flawed because it doesn't mention the Holocaust - it is simply not about that.
What this book does do is examine in detail the myth of Blitzkrieg and the inner workings of the command structures and way of waging war. Cooper lays out very clearly how the old myths were started, and describes very clinically how the German Army was a victim of its own traditions - both in its way of making war (modern "Blitzkrieg" actually can be dated back to at least 1866, as Cooper points out) and in its subversion by Hitler - obedience to a man (emperor or Fuehrer) was the tradition by which the German Army ensured its own destruction.
Rivetting reading. I can't offer any deeper insight into the accuracy of some of the discussion - the earlier reviewers may have valid points about Enigma and the Russian Archives - but certainly this is the way to open one's mind to the idea that the German Army really wasn't all that revolutionary in its warmaking concepts.
Many of the conclusions do seem to be supported by statistical "facts" such as the continuing theme of shortage of supplies, basic equipments, etc. How much this information has changed since Cooper wrote the book is open to interpretation - but it seems unlikely that the Russian archives would shed much light on German logistical requirements.
I kept looking for Cooper to lay blame for the war on the Generals, or to absolve them completely - he does neither, as far as I can tell, though a book this dense needs to be read more than once for its full impact to make itself felt.
|
|
|
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
the German Army 1933-1945 a review by joe schmo, February 25, 2000
By A Customer
The German Army 1933-1945 is a book that is essential to understanding the great conflict of world war II. Much of the information which has been documented thousands of times over the last fifty years has been compiled in a refreshing new manner, reversing many outdated concepts of the German war machine held by the world today. Particularly analitical in terms of the effect of Hitler in the years of conquest and equally so in the two years of Germany's disasterous collapse. Perhaps one of the more entertaining, unbiased reports of the six year war and the entire era for Germany.
|
|
|
Most Recent Customer Reviews
|
by Max Hastings
by Gordon W. Prange
See all 13 books citing this book
