Customer Reviews

The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Amazon's new "real name" policy means that my older review is no longer associated with my profile - so I will reiterate my comments earlier plus a couple of new observations.

I have no idea why anyone would suggest that Cooper's book is flawed because it doesn't mention the Holocaust - it is simply not about that.

What this book does do is examine in detail the myth of Blitzkrieg and the inner workings of the command structures and way of waging war. Cooper lays out very clearly how the old myths were started, and describes very clinically how the German Army was a victim of its own traditions - both in its way of making war (modern "Blitzkrieg" actually can be dated back to at least 1866, as Cooper points out) and in its subversion by Hitler - obedience to a man (emperor or Fuehrer) was the tradition by which the German Army ensured its own destruction.

Rivetting reading. I can't offer any deeper insight into the accuracy of some of the discussion - the earlier reviewers may have valid points about Enigma and the Russian Archives - but certainly this is the way to open one's mind to the idea that the German Army really wasn't all that revolutionary in its warmaking concepts.

Many of the conclusions do seem to be supported by statistical "facts" such as the continuing theme of shortage of supplies, basic equipments, etc. How much this information has changed since Cooper wrote the book is open to interpretation - but it seems unlikely that the Russian archives would shed much light on German logistical requirements.

I kept looking for Cooper to lay blame for the war on the Generals, or to absolve them completely - he does neither, as far as I can tell, though a book this dense needs to be read more than once for its full impact to make itself felt.

I found this to be a great book, it covers everything someone intrested in the German army of WW2 would want to know. I personally found the chapters dealing with the pre-war German army to be very illuminating. I havent found another book that covers the birth of the WW2 Wermhact in such detail. The absolute weakness and unreadiness of the German army is coverd very well, and it will suprise those who have the usal misconceptions about the mighty German war machine.

My only gripe is that I agree with other posters who say that the book relied to much on senior German officers memoirs who sought to project thier own failures on to Hitler. But for those who say this book dosen't cover the holocaust I say there are tons of other books that do that. Don't critisize this book because it dosen't cover something outside of it's own subject. And people who are mad that the book occasionely complaments the German soldier in the field aren't worth even listening to because their own bias is to much to be objective.

There are several excellent points made in the other reviews which I won't rehash here, but I'll attempt to present another view of the book.

The book reads easily, and Cooper has a certain elegance to his language. He does not get bogged down in technical jargon that would not be accessible to the non-expert. He has done considerable research utilizing primary sources. His major themes are the German officer corps and its principles of Duty, Honor, Country, and how those principles affected the Wehrmacht's dealings with Hitler and its strategic approach to the subsequent war. A secondary theme is the strategic course of the Wehrmacht and the influence of the Generals and Hitler on that course. An interesting thesis in which he makes eloquent arguments but one that to some reveals a neglect of strategic factors outside of Germany. As Cooper himself states, however, in his introduction, "I deal solely with the themes outlined above," hence presenting a narrow field of view.

Cooper believes that the Officer Corps' abrogation of responsibility and acceptance of Hitler's orders led to Germany losing the war. The book relies heavily on post war memoirs and collections, notably those of Kesselring, von Manstein, Guderian, and Keitel, and their hindsight opinions affect Cooper's conclusions. This is why other reveiewers have mentioned a "pro-german" bias. Cooper makes no deliberate attempt to discuss in detail the influence and effectiveness of Allied armies, mainly because he intended to stay focused on the one topic.

For the everyman, its an interesting look at the German Army during the pre-war years, the internal politics of its Officer Corps and General Staff, and how those interactions affected the course of the war. For the historian or gifted amatuer it lacks impact. It would be well suited as a general read, but it would behoove the reader to contrast this book with one that focuses on the Soviet side of the Front and then make one's own assessment.

This is one of those books that rely on German sources and has not had the benefit of looking at Soviet material. It thus has a good deal of trouble understanding the real balance of forces for most of the war. The only mention of the Soviet strength is a discussion at the start of Barbarossa. This leads to a number of errors which repeat those made by German Generals in their memoirs and discussions of the conflict. For instance at the battle of Kursk the population available to the Germans (more accurately the German led alliance which invaded the Soviet Union) was in excess of those available to the Soviets.In the book the author goes on at some length at the hoards of troops available to the Soviets. By the battle of Kursk the Soviets were using armour as a substitute for infantry. This beinforced on them by huge losses that they had suffered.

The book follows the line of the German Generals in suggesting that Hitler made a number of decisions which led to a loss of the war. These decisions are the failure to entrap the British Army at Dunkirk, the Failure to order a retreat from Stalingrad, and the tendency to go over to a war of attrition after 1942. In reality the failure was due more to the failure to increase the production of war material prior to 1944. Further there was no attempt to make important weapons such as anti tank guns available to the allied forces. The inability of the Romanians and Italians was due largely to their poor equipment.

The book also make a large number of errors. In much of it the author describes at length how the German Army depended on horse drawn transport. Something which was true. However he suggests that it would have been more sensible for the Germans to equip their panzer and motorised divisions with large numbers of trucks. More recent books have shown clearly that the available amount of petrol produced by the synthetic oil process and the Romanian Oil fields barely produced enough to keep the largely horse drawn army going. In discussing the siege of Stalingrad the author suggests that it was illogical of Hitler to not allow a break out of the garrison. Stalingrad was only supported by one railway. Prior to the Soviet attacks the Germans has been expending what supplies came in. If they had tried to break out they would have had no fuel for their armoured vehicles and no ammunition. If they had have broken out they could have been hunted down on the Russian steppe. This would have led to their speedy end and the loss of the armies in the Caucus.

The book sadly is very outdated.

I lost faith in Cooper's book before I even got to 1933. If you want the German Army's self-portrait, look here & in Barnett's "Hitler's Generals." Otherwise, read elsewhere.

An example from memory: discussing WW1, Cooper trots out as if they were true the platitudes about the army's remaining steadfastly non-political. This works if you forget that Ludendorff was *running the country* in 1917-18, having arrogated dictatorial powers to himself, cowed the Kaiser, run off Bethmann-Hollweg, etc., etc.

Needless to say, the "non-political" bit is nonsense, in WW1, during Weimar, and after Hitler's accession.

I have no idea why anyone would suggest that Cooper's book is flawed because it doesn't mention the Holocaust - it is simply not about that.

What this book does do is examine in detail the myth of Blitzkrieg and the inner workings of the command structures and way of waging war. Cooper lays out very clearly how the old myths were started, and describes very clinically how the German Army was a victim of its own traditions - both in its way of making war (modern "Blitzkrieg" actually can be dated back to at least 1866, as Cooper points out) and in its subversion by Hitler - obedience to a man (emperor of Führer) was the tradition by which the German Army ensured its own destruction.

Rivetting reading. I can't offer any deeper insight into the accuracy of some of the discussion - the earlier reviewers may have valid points about Engigma and the Russian Archives - but certainly this is the way to open one's mind to the idea that the German Army really wasn't all that revolutionary in its warmaking concepts.

I kept looking for Cooper to lay blame for the war on the Generals, or to absolve them completely - he does neither, as far as I can tell, though a book this dense needs to be read more than once for its full impact to make itself felt.

This was a great book outlining the Germany army from its conception in 1933 to its end in 1945. Cooper explains in great detail the relationship between Hitler and his Generals. It also details battle throughout the war and Cooper makes great use of German General's journals. It is a great read and a must for anyone with interest in World War II.

The German Army 1933-1945 is a book that is essential to understanding the great conflict of world war II.

Much of the information which has been documented thousands of times over the last fifty years has been compiled in a refreshing new manner, reversing many outdated concepts of the German war machine held by the world today.

Particularly analitical in terms of the effect of Hitler in the years of conquest and equally so in the two years of Germany's disasterous collapse.

Perhaps one of the more entertaining, unbiased reports of the six year war and the entire era for Germany.

In "The German Army 1933-1945," author Matthew Cooper has compiled a historical treatise covering the early years of Wermacht formation under the Third Reich, the subsequent victories, the ensuing withdrawals, rear guard actions, and finally defeats that marked the end of the era.

At over >560 pages, the author treats the reader to an easy to read and understand historical recount & interpretation of the Wermacht's successes and defeats under the leadership of officers who had to answer to their ultimate "commander-in-chief," Adolph Hitler.

This is one of the few books that makes a case for all of the flaws and shortcomings in men, material, and most of all, leadership (or lack thereof), as being responsible for the fall of the Third Reich.

This is a very good book which will illustrate to the reader, in minutiae, the personalities involved in the Third Reich Wermacht and the relationships that were forged. This book does much to dipsel the image that the Wermacht was a "well oiled" machine and all of her soldiers acted in concert and under well coordinated circumstances. Well done. I rate this book at five stars.

I am relativly late in reviewing this book in that many have reviewed it before me. The previous reviews run from Wonderful to Awful. I am in the wonderful camp. I found it extremely illumimating although, as others have pointed out there are flaws. I definitely found out things I did not know before and I am somewhat of a WWII buff.

Mr Cooper probably did rely heavily on memoirs but they can be useful to the historian as well as to the writer of those memoirs.

For example, discussions of particular battles may have some use but they may sugarcoat discussions about things for which they could be punished, such as the Wehrmacht's participation in the extermination of the jews. Mr Cooper doesn't even mention that. I can understand his not covering the holocaust, but the Wehrmacht had a definite role in rounding up Jews and at times, participating in their extermination.

Also, my impression is that the book wasn't about the army so much as it was about its Generals and their relations with Hitler. I saw very little on the German soldier except for broad generalities. That said, his description of what the Russian weather did to the german soldiers when they were outside Moscow in the winter of 1941 was graphic.

Usually in a book or manual, order of battle information is presented in a table. Mr Cooper put this information into prose and sometimes it got a little tedious wading through all that information.

On the positive side, it is a very detailed examination of how the Wehrmacht fared during the war. Their trials and tribulations as well as their successes. And it does, generally, read well.

It also filled in many gaps in my knowledge. Others may know these things. I didn't. For example, The Germans invaded Russia on June 22, 1941. By July they were already having second thoughts about the wisdom of that decision and in August, he quotes one General as saying they have greatly underestimated their Soviet enemy.

It is well known that it was Hitler who ordered "no retreat" at Stalingrad but Mr. Cooper documents just how often Hitler interfered with his Generals with the "no retreat" order. In fact, you get the impression that it was Hitler's amateurish meddling with strategy and tactics that was the primary cause of the Germans losing the war. I believe it.

Overall, I found this book to be both interesting and readable and that puts me in the "wonderful" column. I would recommend that anyone interested in WWII read it. It does have some flaws but so does virtually every book one would read.