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German Generals Talk

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Liddell Hart's interviews with German generals immediately after WW II ended provides the reader with a essential perspective from inside the defeated military command. The author candidly calls Hitler "too brilliant" a strategist when criticizing the traditional Allied view that all Germany's mistakes were Hitler's and all her success were due to the German generals. Hart points out the political ineptitude of the German generals when assessing their military prowess. Politics are not divorced from military affairs in this study. The superb blend of Eisenhower's political skills and solid military judgement is contrasted with the utter failure of the German military to address political issues in the Reich. Hart lets the vanquished foes tell their own stories in an easy to read narrative form. He allows the German perspective to point out strengths and weaknesses in the British, American, and Russian militarys. An example is the German disregard of any threat of allied invasion along the French Bay of Biscay coastline because they correctly judged the Allied invasion of the European continent would never be carried out outside of the range of air cover. After Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio the Germans were able to use allied predictability against them. Hart uses this example to champion his "strategy of the indirect approach" that has become his hallmark, and surmise about what might have been if bolder leadership had prevailed in England in 1944. An easy read with some of the great minds that opposed the allies in World War II. Never pretentious or overloaded with unit designations or historical snobbery. A straight forward view from the "other side of the hill" that is presented to help the allied military and the lay reader learn from history.

B.H. Liddell Hart was one of the foremost military historians and theoreticians of the 20th Century. His interwar writings on the future of armored warfare were read down to the last period by Heinz Guderian, who used them (and others) as the basis of Germany's "armored idea" well before Adolf Hitler assumed the chancellorship in 1933. Ironically, Hart's conclusions -- that tanks should be deployed en masse rather than distributed evenly among infantry formations to give them "backbone" -- were ignored by his own side, and it was not until 1940 that he could point to the crushing Allied defeat in France and say, "I told you so!"

Shortly after the war, Hart was granted access to many of the seniormost German generals in Western captivity: his interviews with these gentlemen constitute the basis for "The German Generals Talk", a terse, easily readable and absolutely fascinating must-have for historians, history buffs, professional soldiers and armchair generals.

Hart starts with a brief overview of the German army's officer corps pre-Hitler, its relationship to the NS state and the development of the armored concept. He follows with a history of the war through the eyes of the particular field marshals and generals he was interviewing -- Blumentritt, Rundstedt, Thoma, Kleist, Heinrici, Manteuffel, Student, etc. Interspersed with this are his own analyses and conclusions on such matters as Hitler's leadership, the quality of the Red Army, and so on.

Hart unmistakably had a sizable ego, no doubt stroked thoroughly by the admiration with which he was regarded, and I can't disagree with those who feel his interviews with the officers in question, as well as his conclusions, tended to be conducted in such a way as to validate his prewar writings and ideas. He unsparing with self-praise and occasionally breaks up the narraitive to show how his prognostications were always "proven" right. This is a bit annoying but it doesn't detract much from the enjoyability of the book.

The book is a bit shallow in some of its analyses and there are chapters which are not much more than bloated paragraphs. Sometimes I felt he was making conclusions based on very limited data and other times I felt he was holding back too much of what he had learned in the name of word-economy. At barely 300 pages, I can sympathize with readers who felt that it was simply bones without flesh, but I believe Hart presupposed a fairly advanced knowledge of the subject among his readers.

It goes without saying that some of what the Germans had to say must be taken with a grain of salt. FM v. Kleist, for example, seems to have either been disingenuous or befuddled about dates, times, places, etc. when speaking to Hart about the German summer offensive of 1942, and he is not alone in his errors. It must also be remembered that a few of these gentelmen were on the legal hot seat and others were settling old scores, protecting their reputations and likewise engaging in the type of glossing-over that is rampant after every war, most notably a lost one.

Having said that, the honesty of some of the men is refreshing. Manteuffel was direct in his admiration for Model, and Heinrici, who disliked Hitler and whose nickname in the German army was "our tough little bastard", admitted frankly that "the troops confidence in Hitler was the dominant factor (in the remarkable performance of the German army), whether one liked it or not." You may not like or agree with Hart's methods or his conclusions, but it would be a mistake to at not least give "The German Generals Talk" a full and fair hearing.

Nazi generals confess, recollect, and explain hundreds of their key decisions in the campaigns of World War Two. Fascinating accounts of battles fought with one eye on the enemy and another on Der Fuhrer. Speaking to their pre-war mentor, B.H. Liddell-Hart, these men seem to bear all. Their unbounded admiration of Liddell-Hart's pre-war theories of armored warfare induce them to a degree of candor and specificity that military historians rarely obtain. Were we only able to have such accounts from Antony or old Parmenio. Alas, the ancients are long dead. But this book yeilds a bumper crop for those desiring to learn specifics about German Strategy in the Second World War. Explicit technical accounts delivered with German detail. For example, receive eye-opening glimpses of strategies abandoned and aborted on heart-breaking orders from Hitler himself. Monteuffel's expliots in Southern Russia particularly gripping.

I found German Generals Talks to be extremely interesting and candid collective sets of interviews which was done immediately after World War II. The interviews are useful because they were done so close to the war, before politics, biased memories and self-justification really kicks in by these surviving German commanders who would write their own memoirs years later.

The author uses these interviews to help justified his positions and theories of "indirect approach" concept which he have been harping on for a long time. Personally speaking, I see nothing really wrong with that since I enjoyed Liddell Hart's writing and see merits in them. The Germans who talked with Liddell Hart also seem to expressed that they too enjoyed his writing which may explained some of the openness they displayed.

Overall, a pretty interesting reading material, probably considered as a mandatory reading for anyone interested in World War II.

B.H. Liddell Hart was one of most renowned military historians of the 20th century. Before John Keegan there was Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart was also a respected military strategist and was known to many of the German generals and seems to have developed a comfortable rapport with at least some of them. Liddell Hart writes with a clarity and a crispness that is just a pleasure to read. The book's opening chapter of 'The German Generals Talk' is especially well done. This remarkable material in the hands of a gifted writer like Liddell Hart gives the reader an opportunity for fascinating behind-the-scenes insights.

Originally published in 1948 the book uses Liddell Hart's interviews with Rundstedt, Kliest, Blumentritt, and others to review WWII in Europe from the German professional military perspective. Liddell Hart particulalry develops a view contrary to the stereotype of Hitler as an incompetent meddler in military affairs. Early in the war and even before the war, Hitler had been proven correct in his strategic assessment, so that it later became ever more difficult for the generals to dispute him when he made a series of blunders. (I hasten to add that I am speaking here only of Hitler in regard to his military role and not his sick and hateful ideology).

A book that belongs in your WWII history library. Highly recommended.

This is a must have book for any body who is interested in WWII. The interviews are with the German Generals during captivity, and for the most part is one of the most direct way of seeing their views/opinions - granted with a bit of hindsight. Very informative and well done. I do agree with one of the reviewers who mentioned that it is written in a manner that further inflates the author's ego, but one can put up with that to read the interviews. Also it is presented in a clear easy to read manner not overburdening the reader with too much details, but rather just the events in the generals own opinions/words {memoirs and such are better places for too much details}.

This also serves as a nice preliminary before continuing on to reading some of the memoirs from "the other side".

The Author's wonderful opportunity to interview German generals post WW 2 has allowed him to illuminate both strengths and weaknesses of the leadership of the Wehrmacht and its' use of strategy and tactics. Early portions of the book deal with the rise of Hitler and how the miltary leadership dealt with this (or didn't!). Their is no doubt that naivety and/or complacense on the part of the german military heirarchy allowed for Hitler's increasing control of the military. Discussion of the players of the game and how they fared both in a battle sense and in dealing with an increasingly mercurial Hitler are well covered. The book has an easy readability, but seems more aimed at a general audience rather than military enthusiasts. For historical purposes, it is landmark piece that shouldn't be missed, but it lacks the in depth coverage that I hoped it would possess - you must look elsewhere for this.

B. H. Liddell Hart notes of his speaking with German generals after World War II (Page ix): "In the course of many discussions with [the generals] I was able to gather their evidence on the events of the war before memories had begun to fade." One of his conclusions upfront (Page x): "[The generals] were essentially technicians, intent on their professional job, and with little idea of things outside it. It is easy to see how Hitler hoodwinked and handled them, and found them good instruments up to a point." With respect to that last point, I think that Hart might sometimes undercut that reflection, as he mentions the number of generals, some in high places, who mistrusted and disagreed with Hitler's approach.

Still and all, this is a fascinating book. Hart described the generals' views of combat, strategy, tactics, and politics and the end result is a rather rich sense of their various perspectives. The book begins with the military's situation before World War II began. We see some officers (such as Guderian) advocating a more mobile strategic sense (armor and mechanized vehicles leading to rapid movement of forces), whereas others were more traditional in their thinking.

Rommel is discussed (since he had died by the time Hart interviewed the generals, he used other sources and interviews with others). We learn the views and military thinking of leaders such as Rundstedt, Manstein, Student, Manteuffel, Model, Kluge, Kleist, and so on. We learn of their analysis of the lightning attack on Poland, the defeat of the French, the attack and subsequent defeat by Russian forces, and the "Battle of the Bulge," along with many other fights. On pages 301-302 is a nice summary of which generals served in which campaigns. For instance, Manstein served in Poland, on the Western front in the campaign against the French and British, and in Russia (before being "shelved" in 1944).

This is a fairly quick read and not overly technical. A good introduction to the personalities who served in high posts for the German military.

`The German Generals Talk' is an awesome book by the late British military historian B.H. Liddell-Hart. It was published a few years after WW2, so it is obviously a bit dated, but I would still consider it a must-read for anyone interested in WW2 or the Third Reich. Shortly after the war, Liddell-Hart managed to get access to several of the surviving Wehrmacht Generals that were being held in POW camps at the time. The interviews provide us with some fascinating insights into the war from the German perspective, and Liddell-Hart's own analysis is equally compelling.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book was reading the Generals' views on Hitler and their conflicting outlooks that ended up being such a decisive factor in the war. Hitler was indeed a talented strategist-to an extent-but his early successes (i.e. the Generals didn't think a quick defeat of France would be possible) went to his head and made it that much more difficult to reason with him later in the war.

Virtually all of the Generals interviewed felt they could have won the war if Hitler had allowed them a more flexible and independent strategy. Even after Stalingrad, they felt they could have gradually worn down the Red Army with a mobile, defensive strategy that allowed them to withdraw from tough positions and regroup on their own terms. As it was, Hitler vehemently forbade any type of withdrawal on principle, forcing the troops to stand and fight exactly where they were. This irrational policy assured the absolute destruction of much of the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, the Generals tended to be very stubborn in their own right, and were hesitant to consider creative new strategies that went against their orthodox training. They were mostly of the old Prussian stock and thus clashed with Hitler and his revolutionary outlook.

One of the other topics that most interested me was the discussion of why Hitler didn't invade England. It seems that Hitler had an affinity for the English and truly preferred a peaceful arrangement with them. This also seems to be the most likely reason for why the British were allowed to escape at Dunkirk; Hitler let them, as a sort of goodwill gesture. Talk about ungrateful, those Brits! Also discussed are the General's opinion on the opposing armies, the July 20th plot, and an array of other issues.

My only complaint is that some of the descriptions of military operations are a bit tedious, but since this is essentially a military history, I can't rightly take anything off the rating for this. Also, as previous reviewers have pointed out, some of the General's claims should be taken with a grain of salt, but this cannot be held against Liddell-Hart either. Overall, this was a fantastic read that belongs in every WW2 history student's library.

Certainly a very interesting book with information directly from the lips of the great German generals of WWII. This information is available only in this book, and for that reason alone, it is clearly worth the price. However, the work is rather marred by the incessant use of this vessel by Liddell Hart to, for all intents and purposes, point his nose at the world and say, "I told you so." And whilst that may have some merit, it becomes rather annoying to see him inflate his ego by statements about his own infallibility.