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Responding to historians who tend to lionize Hindenburg and Ludendorff, this book argues that their exemplary reputations were the result of a self-serving public-relations campaign during and after the war. Through Asprey's capable analysis, Ludendorff emerges as a fat, ruthless martinet, while Hindenburg looms as a passive, scheming narcissist. Their successes on the eastern front are portrayed as lucky breaks, the result of intercepted Russian radio transmissions. However, there were no respites on the western front, and Asprey explains how the generals' desperation, arrogance, and lack of strategic insight ultimately exhausted the German empire. Readers will find a comprehensive and lively treatment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff's military decisions and political intrigues, but this book is more than a history. Asprey's trenchant exploration of the dynamics of power and personality make The German High Command at War a warning for what can happen if militaristic imperatives dominate a government's capacity for principled leadership. --James Highfill --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Wagnerian Tragedy,
By A Customer
This review is from: The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I (Paperback)
I would definitely recommend this book. I have read many books on the Great War, and none have given Hindenburg and, more importantly, Ludendorff (because he was really the one who pulled the strings) such detailed attention. I think the author portrayed the ideological background that so often drives Germany and its people to seek glory in conquest or transcendence through hardship and hero worship (in this case, of the book's namesakes), and that is good because too many historians forget this all too important, almost racial, Wagnerian ideological aspect to Germany's quest for world hegemony. Indeed, the author quotes one German general as comparing Ludendorff being stabbed in the back by a weak home front and politicians with Siegfried in Wagner's Gotterdamerung. However, the author lambasts Hindenburg and Ludendorff so mercilessly, without quarter, that he sometimes appears biased and as if he had an agenda to destroy the myth of the Iron Duo. This may very well be the actual case, as I think he even admitted in the preface, but still, I don't think you can blame two men for a society and political structure that allowed, even encouraged authoritarianism, and the eventual rule of such a strong man. Moreover, Ludendorff was singlehandedly controlling the entire nation, and while obviously in hindsight he made a general mess of it, he did do some remarkable things and was a master of tactics and of recognizing military skill and promoting it, if not grand strategy. The author emphasizes his failures (after all, Germany did lose), but never seems to credit the military insights of Ludendorff. These are simply stated as fact but not really anaylzed, or they are given a negative slant. Overall, however, this was an extremely informative and deatiled anaylsis of these two men, what they meant to Germany, and their place in history.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Great look at the truth ofr German dictatorship in WWI,
By S. J. Snyder "De gustibus non disputandum" (Various, United States) - See all my reviews (VINE VOICE) (REAL NAME)
This review is from: The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I (Paperback)
First, this is a relatively unbiased book. Asprey doesn't ding Germany for dictatorial tendencies, contrary to what some may think; rather he ding the dictator, Quartermaster-General Ludendorff, who executed a bloodless coup against Kaiser Wilhelm II.That is, in essence what started in 1916, and was complete by the time German relaunched unlimited submarine warfare in early 1917. That said, Ludendorff had plenty of fellow-traveler idiots in both the German military and in Wilhelmm's cabinet. A stupid Grand Admiral, Tirpitz, who clamored for the naval expenditures that antagonized the UK, then was afraid to use his toy in war. A series of spineless chancellors and ministers, emasculated by Wilhelm and afraid of Ludendorff when he sought to push them aside. And, in front of him? A puppet figure concerned to the nth degree about image, Field Marshal Hindenburg -- the man who did NOT win Tannenburg (neither did Ludendorff, of course), but rode that combination of myth and manipulation by Ludendorff to head the German Army. Ludendorff deserves his military hacking down to size, too. The one positive thing, on the tactical side, was his development of stormtroopers. Otherwise, his rejection of the tank was idiocy in both tactics and larger strategy. His "Kaiser's offensive" was little better than the attrition warfare of two years earlier. The real hero in Germany? The common soldier and common civilian, even more than in World War II, under a dictatorship in some ways as restrictive as Hitler's Germany, and with even tighter restraints on food and raw materials.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A book with the ring of truth,
By
This review is from: The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I (Paperback)
I agree with the previous reviewers. I would give this five stars, save for the fact that I would have liked to see more detail on some points. Still, this book changed my thinking about the Great War for all time. Study of the 1914-18 war is an exercise in frustration -- so many "what ifs," such an unsatisfactory conclusion. I suspect I will go to my grave still debating Haig's generalship -- at times I tend to agree with John Terraine et. al. that we at least have to credit Haig with sound strategic sense in realizing that the war was going to be won or lost on the Western Front and sideshows like Salonika and the Middle East were a waste of effort. Then I look at the operational blunders in 1916 and 1917 and wonder whether he wasn't a bloody fool who was saved by having good subordinates like Plumer, Monash, Currie, Maxse, et al. I raise this point to illustrate that at least here there remains room for debate. I defy anyone to read Asprey's book without coming to the conclusion that Hindenburg and Ludendorff weren't criminally incompetent, waging aggressive war until they had bled their own country white. The British at least had the excuse that this was the first -- indeed only -- time in history that their army had to take on the main force of a preeminent land power (see Terraine's writings on this point). In other words, they had to fight a war they weren't ready for in 1914. By 1918, against all odds, they won. The Germans, on the other hand, squandered every advantage.
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