Customer Reviews

German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801

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Among the silliest of the many silly ways of criticizing something is to complain that it is not what it has no pretense of being. The title of Beiser's book, as well as its length and its rather hefty price, make it sufficiently clear that it is not intended as a general popular introduction to all German Idealism. Rather, it is scholarly inquiry into a phase of German Idealism that, while not altogether neglected, is too often regarded as merely a preparation for Hegel's triumphant system. That Beiser's study cuts off at 1801 relieves him of the need to deal with Hegel apart from his relation to Fichte and Schelling, and it no doubt reveals the bias of the reviewer from Cambridge that, seemingly having missed this point, he does not also accuse Beiser of neglecting to speak about Schelling's essay on the Human Freedom, his philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, Fichte's later systems, or perhaps even Solger's aesthetics, all of which also fall within the fold of German Idealism.
Granting the self-imposed temporal constraints of his inquiry, Beiser's aim is not to exclude or marginalize Hegel and deny his significance for German idealism, but rather to rescue the singular originality and grandeur of moments within the history of German Idealism that have fallen into the shadow of the leviathan to which they gave birth. While this very effort is somewhat compromised by Beiser's epistemological orientation, and I do not entirely agree with his ultimate reading of German Idealism as a neo-Platonism anticipating the Neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer, I nevertheless admire the rigor and clarity of this work, and would strongly recommend to all those who have a more than dilettantish interest in German philosophy.

This work represents a major contribution to scholarship on German Idealism and will be necessary reading for specalists in that area. Potential readers may wonder, however, who the primary target of the book is and what it contributes to the existing literature.

First, this is not an overview of or introduction to German Idealism; if you want such a resource, the best ones are the Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (ed. Karl Ameriks), Beiser's The Fate of Reason (crucial for contextualizing German Idealism vis-a-vis Kant), and Terry Pinkard's The Legacy of Idealism (helpful for getting a long view that emphasizes GI's relevance for our contemporary situation). Thus, that it does not treat Hegel is not a legitimate criticism, and it is witless to accuse Beiser of ignoring Hegel when he provides excellent historical and methodological reasons for not advancing past 1801 and has written an entire book on Hegel.

This book advances a single thesis, which it proves conclusively: German Idealism, contrary to longstanding interpretations, is not a trajectory leading from Kant to subjectivism; it's just the opposite, it is a struggle against subjectivism. This may not be very meaningful to people who are not engaged in scholarship in Idealism, but it's a major revision of a traditional interpretation, and in proving it Beiser provides independently useful contributions to all of the thinkers and topics that he discusses, especially the early German Romantics and the origins and emergence of Absolute Idealism.

It's contributions to the existing literature are many, but I will highlight two. First, Beiser effectively demolishes views of Hegel and Schelling that assume one can ignore the role of Naturphilosophie and Absolute Idealism in their systems. These would include most of the popular Hegel scholars in the Anglophone context, such as Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard, to name only two. Beiser's demonstration in this book, which undergirds and supports his later book on Hegel (2005), that many positions attributed to a specific thinker, like Hegel, were in fact "in the air" and in no way unique to the alleged thinker, is important for understanding how badly misunderstood thinkers like Hegel still are, precisely because most readers know nothing about early German Romanticism and the intellectual context from which Schelling and Hegel drew many of their "distinctive" ideas. For anyone who thinks historical context is important, then, this book makes a major contribution to our understanding not only of the persons treated, but also of later developments in German Idealism.

A second contribution is to the development of a synthetic picture of post-Kantian Germany philosophy, one that is not indebted to Hegel's own picture but emerges from careful scrutiny of all the relevant thinkers in their cultural and intellectual contexts and tries to establish what they thought they were doing, why they were doing it, whether it worked, and what happened because of it. Beiser is uniquely positioned to do this; and for those who want to develop a historically sensitive picture of German philosophy after Kant, one could not do better, in the secondary literature, than to read The Fate of Reason; Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism; German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism; and then Beiser's book on Hegel, followed perhaps by Taylor's book on Hegel (1975).

In sum, this book is not the place to start if you want to begin studying German Idealism. Far from it; it will be most helpful and meaningful for those with a substantial background in the secondary literature and at least some first-hand knowledge of the major thinkers (Kant, Fichte, Schelling) would prove helpful, but is not necessary. Nevertheless, Beiser's clarity and skill as a writer will make this book valuable to any reader trying to understand Idealism, but its length and scholarly depth will prove forbidding and potentially frustrating to those without the suggested background.

P.S. For an extended review by a major Idealist scholar, I recommend Karl Ameriks review article, "Beiser's German Idealism."

The review below which claims that Beiser says that Hegel is "tendentious" is not correct. Beiser's text reads, "Hegel's history of the period, which interprets it as a progression culminating in his own system, is tendentious philosophically, and anachronistic historically" (ix). This is certainly not the same as claiming that Hegel is tendentious. In addition, Beiser's criticism is quite correct; Hegel's history of philosophy is quite tendentious.

Another reviewer claims that Beiser omits Kant from this text. This is an absurd claim. The first section of the book, which spans 200 pages, is about Kant.

Now that this book is out in paperback, you receive an enormous amount of well thought out scholarship for a very good price. Beiser's quest in this book is indeed epic, and his execution is deserving of praise. The basic theme that seems to hold this book together is the several attempts (notably of Kant, Fichte, the Romantics and Schelling) to show that objects external to us exist. Although I think this focus is a bit narrow, and leads him to preclude various readings of these scholars, this is something that Beiser continually informs us of. To fully explore the issues each of these philosophers raise would require twenty volumes each.

So with that I want to make a comment about the execution: I found that Besier excelled at contextualising each philosopher within their historical and intellectual period. His reading into this is immense, as is shown by his massive set of endnotes, and the wealth of bibliographic information. He picks, not just from English texts, but French and German texts, pooling the resources of two very different types of scholarship into German Idealism into one cohesive whole. But the most amazing thing about this text is its exoteric style; given the difficulty of accessing the philosophers he handles, I think that he performs an admirable job in making their philosophies' accessible (I had not read any Schelling, but I could follow along quite well).

But the main downside of this work (and the reason this is not 5 stars) is becaues of his contempt for Hegel, which he barely manages to hide at some points. Beiser seems to criticise Hegel for being a parasite on the scholarship of others, and reduced his philosophy to a "history of philosophy" which did not much more than provide a collected commentary on German philosophy from 1781-1801. I find this ironic considering Beiser is happy to relate all thinkers, particularly the Absoltue Idealists, to their sources (namely Spinoza, Leibniz, Herder and Plato), and seems to be in awe of their ability to synthesise these views. It confuses me why he would then criticise Hegel for what he adulates the others for. So at the conclusion of this work there is an abrupt ending; no concluding statements, and no summation of what he has acheived (though he always reminds the reader of what he has proved, how that fits into his thesis, and what will come next throughout each chapter). So overall I think this is a truly excellent piece of scholarship, tarnished by a dramatic piece of intellectual bias. But, having said that, I think it is an essential read for any scholar, professional or amateur, professor or student, who wants a good grasp of the most fascinating period of intellectual history. To complete your education, go and read Pippin, Pinkard, Redding and Stewart's works on Hegel.

Beiser notes, almost nonchalantly, that "this study of German idealism omits Hegel, and it is indeed a reaction against the Hegelian legacy" because he regards Hegel as "tendentious" and "unoriginal" (claims, of course, that can be made for any well-known historical figure). Setting aside the question whether ignoring Hegel in such a work is useful or even valid (I personally don't), attempting a general introductory text on German idealism using this approach is simply absurd. I could never recommend this book for someone wishing to gain a better understanding of German idealism, since it would be so misleading as to be false. If it wasn't the author's intent to write such an introduction, then he should have structured his work differently (including using a different title, such as "German Idealism Before Hegel"). If the reader clearly understood that this work was far from being a general overview, then it could be read with beneficial results. The way it stands, however, it would be like claiming to write an introduction to Greek philosophy, but to not include Plato and Aristotle, since their only value was to bring together and recapitulate the major ideas of the Pre-Socratics.