German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939-49 [Hardcover]

Mark Walker (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 26, 1990 | ISBN-10: 0521364132 | ISBN-13: 978-0521364133 | Edition: First

This a paperback edition of Professor Walker's full-scale examination of the German efforts to harness the economic, military and political power of nuclear fission between 1939 and 1949. The book explains clearly, in terms that the non-specialist can understand, what was involved in the Germans' quest, and in what ways the German scientists succeeded or failed in the development of 'the bomb'.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Mark Walker's new history of the German bomb program...offers a revision of earlier accounts which is backed up by a great deal of original research in German archives...The result is a meticulous account of the German bureaucratic landscape in which a few dozen scientists and officials generated paper about proposals to build a bomb...Walker has resolved many confusions in the history of the German bomb project." The Atlantic

"...informative and well-researched...In general, this is a well-concieved and well-presented book." Peter Hayes, Science

"Walker provides a valuable new version of the story of the German quest for nuclear power before 1950." Raymond G. Stokes, American Journal of Physics

"...this book is as good as any written about nuclear power in World War II, and better than most. It raises questions which should be asked not just of German physics, but of science in other national traditions and under less fearsome governments." Bruce Hevly, Foundations of Physics

"This is an excellent book: intensely researched, well written, and balanced in its judgments. Its focus on the German scientists is novel, and its discussion of the position of science in a modern state is well worth pondering." Modern Europe

"...Walker maps a part of the German scientific community with reference to its ideological and political, as well as its scientific and technological, bearings. His survey is thorough, and he guides the reader surely to a better comprehension of this crucial episode in the history of modern science." Robert W. Seidel, Isis

Book Description

According to this analysis, Germany's decision not to pursue nuclear weaponry during the Second World War came about as a result of economic and political developments, not scientific or moral considerations, and was at the time--a perfectly reasonable policy.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 300 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; First edition (January 26, 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521364132
• ISBN-13: 978-0521364133
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.2 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 15.2 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,547,360 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Very good, informative and well-written, June 2, 2010

By 

Metallurgist (USA) - See all my reviews
(TOP 500 REVIEWER)   

This review is from: German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939-49 (Hardcover)

This is a very good book, which is unfortunately difficult to find. It details the German nuclear program and why it did not lead to the atomic bomb. While an academic book, replete with footnotes and some diagrams (but no photographs), it is a very well-written, accessible to a general reader and very interesting. It is the contention of the author, backed up by his excellent scholarship, that while the German nuclear program was on a par with those of the allies up to about the end of 1941, the Germans came to a different conclusion than the allies regarding the possibility of a bomb being developed in time to influence the outcome of the war. The Germans felt that while making a bomb was possible, the war would be over before this could be done. In 1941 and early 1942 they believed that, in spite of the reverses in Russia, the war would be over in a year or so, and perhaps less. Also, believing that they were well ahead of the allies there was no fear that the allies could build one soon enough to influence the war. Thus, no serious effort was made to build a bomb. In contrast, the allies, recognized that the war would be a long and drawn out affair, so that a bomb could influence its outcome and that the Germans might be ahead in the race, so building one was a necessity lest the Germans have one first.

The author dispels the myth that the Germans did not understand how to make a bomb, or made fundamental errors regarding the physics and engineering involved. He shows that they understood how a nuclear reactor worked, developed different reactor designs and understood that a reactor could generate power and make material that could be used in a bomb. They understood that a bomb could be made with U235 or element 94 (Pu) and they developed all of the methods for separating U235 from the much more prevalent U238. In short, at least as of the end or 1941, their understand of the physics and engineering required for making a bomb was as far advanced as that of the allies. They just came to a different conclusion regarding the necessity of committing the vast amount of resources required to actually make a bomb. The author also dispels the myth that German scientists, particularly Werner Heisenberg, deliberately withheld information regarding bomb physics or tried to sabotage the bomb project. He shows, by citing documents and reports, that German scientists and engineers were forceful in stating that a powerful bomb could be built and throughout the war sought funding for research in this area. The decision not to build a bomb was economic and rational in view of their belief that the war would soon be over. By the time it became apparent that this was not going to be the case it was too late. The economic and manpower situation became steadily worse and even if they had wanted to, and could have built the vast engineering facilities that were required, allied or Soviet bombing would have destroyed them.

The author goes into the role of Werner Heisenberg in the development of the physics and engineering behind any possible bomb program and shows that it has been greatly exaggerated. He shows how the myths of the "German Bomb" came about and fully describes the efforts to clarify the history of the German efforts in the is area. Indeed his book is a very important one in dispelling these myths.

I recommend this book to those interested in WWII, the history of science and the history of the development of the atomic bomb. This book makes a great companion to Richard Rhodes' "The Making of the Atomic Bomb", which details the successful allied effort.

The same author has a newer book "Nazi Science: Myth, Truth, and the German Atomic Bomb", which judging from the table of contents and publishers material listed in Amazon, may contain some of the same information as this book, but may be easier to acquire.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Great research., June 18, 2009

By 

R. Morris - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939-49 (Paperback)

Walker has given us a meticulously researched work that is highly informative and objective. It's a recitation of history without being judgmental. It's not a page-turner, but the depth of the research makes it a compelling read.

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Appropriately advertised, May 4, 2010

By 

Ian E. Morris (Fort Myers, FL USA) - See all my reviews
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Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939-49 (Hardcover)

I received what a reasonable person would expect based on the review of the book and its condition.