German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916 (Cambridge Military Histories) [Hardcover]

Robert T. Foley (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 14, 2005 | ISBN-10: 0521841933 | ISBN-13: 978-0521841931

The term "Battle of Verdun" has become synonymous with senseless slaughter. This book offers a new perspective on one of the twentieth century's bloodiest battles by examining the development of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War in 1871 to the First World War. Its use of recently released German sources held in the Soviet Union since the Second World War sheds new light on German ideas about attrition before and during the First World War.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"stimulating and exciting book" The International History Review Holger H. Herwig, University of Calgary

"The intense faces on the dustjacket of this superb scholarly work portray well the professionalism of German officers watching a military operation. Part of a new series of Cambridge military histories edited by Hew Strachan, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun by Robert T. Foley benefits from records returned by the Soviets in 1988, including copies of diaries kept by major participants." - Michael J. Zeps, S.J. Marquette University

"In many ways a ground-breaking look at Erich von Falkenhayn's contributions to the German war effort while Chief of the Great General Staff, from late 1914 until he was sacked in the aftermath of the failure of his deliberately provoked battle of attrition over Verdun. Marshalling some compelling evidence, the author demonstrates that despite Verdun, Falkenhayn in fact was chiefly responsible for most of Germany's victories during his tenure in command, despite the frequent necessity of beating off efforts to replace him from enthusiasts for Hindenburg and Ludendorf; the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive, the Warsaw operation, the destruction of Serbia, and a series of successful defensive operations in the west. And then the series of complex misjudgements and mistakes--not all by Falkenhayn--that led to Verdun. An interesting book, that offers some useful insights into the inner workings of the German high command." - The NYMAS Review

"This is truly an engaging, well-argued and nuanced analysis that reveals much not only about the Verdun Campaign, but also about the structure, fragmentation and disfunctionality of the Imperial German political and military systems." - Len Shurtleff

"The book is truly a fascinating effort well worth reading" - Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

"An academic study of military thought, Foley's work is impressively accessible o the non-specialist reader. It merits reading by intellectual and cultural, as well as military, historians. It is based on an immersion in published nad unpublished primary sources." - Daniel Todman, Queen Mary University of London, England

Book Description

For almost 90 years, the term battle of Verdun has been synonymous with senseless slaughter. By examining the development of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War in 1871 to the First World War, this book offers an unprecedented understanding of one of the bloodiest battles of the twentieth century. Dr Foley makes use of recently-released German sources that have been held in the Soviet Union since the Second World War to shed new light on German ideas about attrition before and during the First World War.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 316 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (February 14, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521841933
• ISBN-13: 978-0521841931
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.3 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,623,161 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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37 of 38 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent, March 3, 2005

By 

P. Hederer - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916 (Cambridge Military Histories) (Hardcover)

Robert T. Foley's new book, "German Strategy.." is an examination of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War to the First World War. It culminates in an in-depth investigation of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916, including the role of the Verdun battle in his overall plan.

The book is extremely well researched, and a look at the book's

bibliography shows the hard work, and amount of research the author put into his study. Sources include many unpublished documents from various archives in multiple countries.

On the salient point of Verdun, and Falkenhayn's true intentions, the author weaves a larger picture of German strategy for 1916, with the Verdun battle being but a piece of an overall larger plan. Foley himself admits that reconstructing Falkenhayn's true plan is difficult, due to the amount of secrecy and disinformation involved-that being said he does an admirable job.

Most interestingly Foley does not include Falkenhayn's famous "Christmas Memorandum," of 1915 as one of the pieces in reconstructing the Verdun puzzle. He states that because the authenticity of the Memorandum has never been established, and in fact, has been disputed, he does not include it. Instead, he relies on first hand accounts of conversations with Falkenhayn, and plans requested from, and submitted by, various German armies along the Western front.

He builds a picture of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916 which is compelling. Verdun was to be the means to draw the French reserves into battle, inflict casualties on them, and weaken other areas of the French front by drawing troops to the Verdun battle. The Verdun battle was also to provoke a premature Allied counter-attack, which would be bled white by German forces on the defensive. Once these aims had been achieved Falkenhayn would use his own reserve forces to launch attacks at other points along the front. Foley also gives a detailed description of the execution of the Verdun battle and how it went wrong.

His book ends by explaining how the failure of Falkenhayn's strategy led the German military to abandon its attempt at a strategy of attrition, and return to the strategy of annihilation.

Foley's book it well written, with copious notes on sources, and well balanced. He even includes footnotes such as, "For a differing view see."

By presenting a comprehensive view of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916, with Verdun as only one aspect of that strategy, the author goes a long way towards removing the shroud of mystery that has surrounded Falkenhayn and objectives for Verdun.

12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Switching the Basics of Strategy During a War, August 15, 2008

By 

seydlitz89 "seydlitz89" (Portugal) - See all my reviews

This review is from: German Strategy and the Path to Verdun (Paperback)

What happens when the basic strategic assumptions that a country has used to formulate its war plans are shown to be misguided or worse? What happens when these assumptions are at the same time part of your country's strategic culture, the way that your military staff officers have been taught not only to fight, but to think about war? How does one implement such changes against ingrained resistance from the very military that one is attempting to reform?

Failure is likely, and the aftermath for the commander attempting such a radical rethink is liable to be very unpleasant. Consider that even given the best of circumstances, any commander would be hard pressed to change so much under the pressure of war.

Consider the case of Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff from November 1914 to August 1916, who is remembered formost today as the architect of the bloodbath of Verdun.

Robert T. Foley's book traces the strategic discussion back to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, when the German strategic theorist Colmar von der Goltz made the case that it was the second part of the war, not Moltke's seemingly decisive victories at Sedan and Metz, which pointed the way to the future, that being Volkskrieg, the mobilization of the people by the state bringing vast resources to bear for the continuance of the war, which had become essentially national projects, not the affairs of narrow interests.

Foley follows the pre-1914 debate and considers the opening offensives in the West in 1914 along with the rise of Erich van Falkenhayn.

Falkenhayn had his own views as to how to best end the war and also to the limits of Germany's resources. It came down to the distinction between following a "strategy of annihilation" or a "strategy of attrition" with Falkenhayn deciding that the latter was Germany's only chance. The distinction here is Delbrück's as Foley points out.

Which brings us back to the questions I asked in the first paragraph. Falkenhayn failed and in fact was not even aware of the real difficulties of the task he had attempted. He was also later burdened with the failures of his enemies, who lacked his sense of honor in accepting responsibility for their actions, especially after the war. The General comes across in Foley's account as a complex, but very understandable human being, unlike say Ludendorff who must have known the truth by the end of 1918, but never accepted responsibility, this all going back again to the choice of strategies. Had Ludendorff followed Falkenhayn's example there would have been no "stab in the back" after 1918.

In all a very interesting history of the Western Front during 1914-16 with some coverage of the Eastern Front in 1915 as well. It is interesting that as we approach the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the war, Germany doesn't look much different from Britain or France in terms of their war aims, we seem to have finally put much of the propaganda of 1914-18 behind us.

Anyone interested in the battle of Verdun and why it developed the way it did would find this book of interest, as would most interested in the First World War. Perhaps the main audience are those interested in strategic theory since this work indicates very well the dangers of changing strategic "horses" in midstream, something that is being attempted today, as it was in 1916.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Very Clear and well written, January 19, 2010

By 

Tom Munro "tomfrombrunswick" (Melbourne, Victoria Australia) - See all my reviews

This review is from: German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916 (Cambridge Military Histories) (Hardcover)

Reading this book one can only wonder why Germany was so keen to enter World War 1. It was a war in which they were outnumbered by their adversaries. In addition Britain and France in combination were economically stronger. A long war did not hold out much hope for Germany as Britain's naval strength meant that Germany would die by slow strangulation. It is clear that the Germans thought they were militarily stronger than the Entente. However they had not fought a war in 46 years.

The key to German thinking was that they could defeat France quickly before Britain was able to form up any substantial army. They could then turn their forces on Russia. Of course this all went pear shaped. The French were able to defend against the first German onslaught. This enabled the British to build up a big army in France so that Germany was outnumbered on all fronts.

This book is about Eric von Falkenhayn who took over the command after Molte had a nervous break down. The problem was what to do. The previous German strategy had been one of great decisive battles. However in 1915 the Germans did not have the strength to fight a decisive battle anywhere. The reality was that the Russians had just about knocked the Austro-Hungarian Empire out of the war and Italy and Roumania were on the verge of joining the Entente. Falknehayn was also suffering revolt from within as Hindenburg and Ludendorf sought to have him sacked.

Falkenhayn organized an offensive against the Russians which was successful. It was a limited offensive an depended on the use of artillery support to minimize casualties. This took the pressure of the Austrians who were able to then transfer troops to the Italian front. Falkenhayn was also able to put Serbia out of the war which allowed for train contact with Turkey. Throughout 1915 the Germans were able to resist French and British Offensives on the Western Front. The German successes meant that Romania kept neutral in 1915.

Having stabilized Germany's position the question is how to proceed and win the war. Falkenhayn was of the belief that it would not be possible to decisively defeat any of the Entente powers. He hoped to achieve a separate peace with one of Germany's enemies and then concentrate his forces on the powers that remained at war. This he could not achieve.

In the end he decided on a battle that was aimed at forcing France to the peace table. This was the battle of Verdun. The technique was to use artillery to cause large numbers of French casualties whilst minimizing German ones.

Lundendorf and Hindenburg were at this time advocating a decisive battle in the East. Falkenhayn was against this. He was of the view that the Russians faced with an offensive could simply withdraw. The size of European Russia meant that it would be well nigh impossible to land a killer blow.

Verdun of course failed. Whilst the German's were able to inflict significant casualties they in turn suffered large casualties due to the way the operation was carried out. The failure of Verdun allowed Ludendorf and Hindenburg to give Von Falkenhayn the boot and they replaced him.

The German's were able to bring about the collapse of Russia but their battles in the West in 1918 failed.

The book is good as it gives an insight into the development of both German strategy and the tactics they used on the ground. Simple and well written.