Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse (Modern War Studies) [Hardcover]

Richard L. DiNardo (Author), Dennis E. Showalter (Foreword)

Book Description

Series: Modern War Studies | Publication Date: November 19, 2005

It seemed that whenever Mussolini acted on his own, it was bad news for Hitler. Indeed, the Führer's relations with his Axis partners were fraught with an almost total lack of coordination. Compared to the Allies, the coalition was hardly an alliance at all. Focusing on Germany's military relations with Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, Richard DiNardo unearths a wealth of information that reveals how the Axis coalition largely undermined Hitler's objectives from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and North Africa. DiNardo argues that the Axis military alliance was doomed from the beginning by a lack of common war aims, the absence of a unified command structure, and each nation's fundamental mistrust of the others. Germany was disinclined to make the kinds of compromises that successful wartime partnerships demanded and, because Hitler insisted on separate pacts with each nation, Italy and Finland often found themselves conducting counterproductive parallel wars on their own. DiNardo's detailed assessments of ground, naval, and air operations reveal precisely why the Axis allies were so dysfunctional as a collective force, sometimes for seemingly mundane but vital reasons-a shortage of interpreters, for example. His analysis covers coalition warfare at every level, demonstrating that some military services were better at working with their allies than others, while also pointing to rare successes, such as Rommel's effective coordination with Italian forces in North Africa. In the end, while some individual Axis units fought with distinction-if not on a par with the vaunted Wehrmacht-and helped Germany achieve some of its military aims, the coalition's overall military performance was riddled with disappointments. Breaking new ground, DiNardo's work enlarges our understanding of Germany's defeat while at the same time offering a timely reminder of the challenges presented by coalition warfare.

Editorial Reviews

From the Back Cover

"Too much of the literature on the Second World War has treated Germany's allies the way the Germans them-selves often treated them: as an afterthought. DiNardo provides an insightful, nuanced, and thorough alternative. . . . Essential for anyone who wants to understand the Axis coalition."--Geoffrey P. Megargee, author of Inside Hitler's High Command

"Clearly, any coalition headed by Hitler was bound to be dysfunctional. Why this was the case and how it affected the Nazi war effort on the operational level is the subject of DiNardo's important and extremely well-documented study."--Alexander De Grand, author of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany

"A timely look at the way allied armies cooperate-or fail to."--Robert Citino, author of The German Way of War

About the Author

Richard L. DiNardo is professor for national security affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College and author of Germany's Panzer Arm and Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 298 pages
• Publisher: University Press Of Kansas (November 19, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0700614125
• ISBN-13: 978-0700614127
• Product Dimensions: 9.4 x 6.8 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #727,863 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland and Germany - From Coalition to Collapse, August 10, 2006

By 

Gilberto Villahermosa - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse (Modern War Studies) (Hardcover)

This well-written and extremely interesting book breaks new ground in its examination of Nazi Germany's inability to effectively wage coalition warfare with its allies - Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland.

Author Richard L. DiNardo shows that the Third Reich's partners followed Germany because they hoped to benefit from Hitler's New Order, rather than from either a common ideological adherence to Fascism or a common commitment to save Europe from Bolshevism. Hitler and his generals, however, were reluctant to fully incorporate their allies into their wartime command structure or strategy. Dinardo shows that this reluctance was a legacy from the First World War, when, for the most part, Imperial Germany refused to take its allies seriously.

DiNardo discusses Hitler's own attitudes toward his allies (he prefered bilater over multilateral arrangements) and then examines the performances of the Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland in North Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. Some, such as the Italians in North Africa, performed much better than is generally recognized in the west. Most were hampered by a shortage of modern equipment, especially tanks, fighter aircraft, and bombers. All, however, collapsed relatively early in the war. Indeed, according to DiNardo: "The twin German disasters of Stalingrad and North Africa effectively destroyed the Axis as a military alliance."

The ability to wage effective coalition warfare differed among the various services of the Wehrmacht. The German Navy was probably the most successful, although due to differences in doctrine and technology, the cooperation between German and Italian submarines was not as effective as it could have been. Next came the Luftwaffe, although it failed miserably in the sharing of technology, particulary aircraft and aircraft engines, with its allies. Finally, came the army, which, DiNardo notes, cleary took the prize when it came to failure in coalition warfare. The major exception to this was Rommel's conduct of coalition warfare in North Africa.

The German War Ministry too was of little help with its extortive practices, which ensured that the Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Finnsh armies remained hopelessly outclassed in terms of weapons and equipment against their Soviet opponent.

Foruntately for the Western Allies, the inability of Hitler and his generals to build a functional and effective basis for coalition warfare contributed significantly to the downfall of the Third Reich. Indeed, as the Allies knocked knocked one Axis power after another out of the war, the Germans were forced to come to their rescue, burdening the already debilitated German war industry and armed forces.

"Germany and the Axis Powers" thus contributes to a better understanding of the defeat of Nazi Germany and the valuable contributions of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland during World War II to the Axis - and the Allies!

7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An interesting thesis, February 7, 2006

By 

1. "John Henninger" (Littleton, CO United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse (Modern War Studies) (Hardcover)

Richard DiNardo believes that the Germans failed to develop an effective coalition because of competing strategic goals and the inability to train and arm other Axis powers. DiNardo writes that the Germans and their fellow Axis partners had competing strategic interests. The Finns wanted to fight a purely limited campaign and did not want to help the Germans in seizing Leningrad. While the Romanians wanted to take Odessa and not help the Germans advance farther east, and constantly wanted to fight their other Axis ally Hungary. Mussolini however devoted too much Italian arms to the Eastern Front and left Rommel's Afrika Korps exposed to Allied attack. To make matters worse the Germans failed to adaquately arm and train thei Axis allies during the advance to Stalingrad and thereby leaving the Sixth Army's flanks open to Soviet counterattacks. The only weakness of this book is that Dinardo doesn't compare the failed Axis coalition with the more effective Allied powers. Otherwise this is an excellent book which details what not to do in coalition warfare.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Real military history, June 21, 2006

By 

Art (Virginia, USA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse (Modern War Studies) (Hardcover)

"Germany and the Axis Powers" is an in-depth analysis of the ability of the Axis powers to conduct coalition warfare. This book is excellent for anyone wanting to go beyond the "History Channel" level of knowledge on World War II. Using original source material, the author provides rich details to describe his thesis. The quality of the historical research is along the lines of Gerhard L. Weinberg's epic "A World at Arms". While the author uses a chronological framework to scope his thoughts, he avoids telling the entire history of World War II. Instead he remains focused on the key events that framed German attempts at coalition warfare. The work requires a good general knowledge of World War II history, which most readers of this book will already have.

While Germany's alliance with Italy is well known, I found the chapters on Germany's attempts at coalition warfare with Hungary, Finland, and Romania to be the most interesting, since these countries are rarely discussed in most accounts of World War II. DiNardo correctly describes the differences between coalition warfare and parallel warfare, a key component to understanding World War II coalitions. Breaking out the different levels of coalition warfare conducted by the German Army, Navy, and Air Force set the book apart from more basic accounts. Dinardo also avoids "wehrmacht envy" which taints many books on the Germany military. He provides an accurate and balanced view of German military capabilities, without falling in love with the subject.

I recommend this book to any serious student of World War II military history who really wants to get to heart of the German way of war.