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Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse (Modern War Studies)

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This well-written and extremely interesting book breaks new ground in its examination of Nazi Germany's inability to effectively wage coalition warfare with its allies - Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland.

Author Richard L. DiNardo shows that the Third Reich's partners followed Germany because they hoped to benefit from Hitler's New Order, rather than from either a common ideological adherence to Fascism or a common commitment to save Europe from Bolshevism. Hitler and his generals, however, were reluctant to fully incorporate their allies into their wartime command structure or strategy. Dinardo shows that this reluctance was a legacy from the First World War, when, for the most part, Imperial Germany refused to take its allies seriously.

DiNardo discusses Hitler's own attitudes toward his allies (he prefered bilater over multilateral arrangements) and then examines the performances of the Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland in North Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. Some, such as the Italians in North Africa, performed much better than is generally recognized in the west. Most were hampered by a shortage of modern equipment, especially tanks, fighter aircraft, and bombers. All, however, collapsed relatively early in the war. Indeed, according to DiNardo: "The twin German disasters of Stalingrad and North Africa effectively destroyed the Axis as a military alliance."

The ability to wage effective coalition warfare differed among the various services of the Wehrmacht. The German Navy was probably the most successful, although due to differences in doctrine and technology, the cooperation between German and Italian submarines was not as effective as it could have been. Next came the Luftwaffe, although it failed miserably in the sharing of technology, particulary aircraft and aircraft engines, with its allies. Finally, came the army, which, DiNardo notes, cleary took the prize when it came to failure in coalition warfare. The major exception to this was Rommel's conduct of coalition warfare in North Africa.

The German War Ministry too was of little help with its extortive practices, which ensured that the Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Finnsh armies remained hopelessly outclassed in terms of weapons and equipment against their Soviet opponent.

Foruntately for the Western Allies, the inability of Hitler and his generals to build a functional and effective basis for coalition warfare contributed significantly to the downfall of the Third Reich. Indeed, as the Allies knocked knocked one Axis power after another out of the war, the Germans were forced to come to their rescue, burdening the already debilitated German war industry and armed forces.

"Germany and the Axis Powers" thus contributes to a better understanding of the defeat of Nazi Germany and the valuable contributions of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland during World War II to the Axis - and the Allies!

Richard DiNardo believes that the Germans failed to develop an effective coalition because of competing strategic goals and the inability to train and arm other Axis powers. DiNardo writes that the Germans and their fellow Axis partners had competing strategic interests. The Finns wanted to fight a purely limited campaign and did not want to help the Germans in seizing Leningrad. While the Romanians wanted to take Odessa and not help the Germans advance farther east, and constantly wanted to fight their other Axis ally Hungary. Mussolini however devoted too much Italian arms to the Eastern Front and left Rommel's Afrika Korps exposed to Allied attack. To make matters worse the Germans failed to adaquately arm and train thei Axis allies during the advance to Stalingrad and thereby leaving the Sixth Army's flanks open to Soviet counterattacks. The only weakness of this book is that Dinardo doesn't compare the failed Axis coalition with the more effective Allied powers. Otherwise this is an excellent book which details what not to do in coalition warfare.

"Germany and the Axis Powers" is an in-depth analysis of the ability of the Axis powers to conduct coalition warfare. This book is excellent for anyone wanting to go beyond the "History Channel" level of knowledge on World War II. Using original source material, the author provides rich details to describe his thesis. The quality of the historical research is along the lines of Gerhard L. Weinberg's epic "A World at Arms". While the author uses a chronological framework to scope his thoughts, he avoids telling the entire history of World War II. Instead he remains focused on the key events that framed German attempts at coalition warfare. The work requires a good general knowledge of World War II history, which most readers of this book will already have.

While Germany's alliance with Italy is well known, I found the chapters on Germany's attempts at coalition warfare with Hungary, Finland, and Romania to be the most interesting, since these countries are rarely discussed in most accounts of World War II. DiNardo correctly describes the differences between coalition warfare and parallel warfare, a key component to understanding World War II coalitions. Breaking out the different levels of coalition warfare conducted by the German Army, Navy, and Air Force set the book apart from more basic accounts. Dinardo also avoids "wehrmacht envy" which taints many books on the Germany military. He provides an accurate and balanced view of German military capabilities, without falling in love with the subject.

I recommend this book to any serious student of World War II military history who really wants to get to heart of the German way of war.

In a world with so many accounts about German forces in WW II and so little known subject about its Allies, finally we have probably the best book about Germany's allies, including here Romania, Italy, Finland and Hungary. I would rather rated this book with 6* for the excellent coverage.
In particular, the Romanian participation on Eastern Front, as well the prewar period, is well-written, giving a lot a new and interesting information. As DiNNardo stated in his book the Romanian and other allies could perform much better if provided with new equipment from Germany. It was always promised but very few arrived and too late. Finally, the German own misconduct of the coalition war was responsible for almost 2 mil. casualties among its allies. Their performance and conduct was far more better than it is generally known in the books inspired from german sources. (who, by the way, had many reasons to blame, for their defeat, weather, allies, Hitler and enemy's superiority!)
The author maintained a clear objectivity for the whole book. He made good reserches about every aspect written in the book concerning each country.
The conclusions are the best paragraphs in my opinion.
Maps are probably the weakest link of this book; even the photos are missing, the book is still comprehensive and solid.
I never found so far such comprehensive coverage about Germany's allies. Good job and well done Mr. DiNardo!
An excellent book, it deserves all money...

Germany And The Axis Powers: From Coalition To Collapse by Richard L. Dinaro (Professor for National Security Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College) is an introductory work of impressive scholarship focused upon the intricate probabilities that the Axis coalition was little more then an ignorant grouping of claimed Hitler followers. Incorporating newly recovered facts of the battles fought from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and North Africa, Germany And The Axis Powers unveils an entirely different history than previously perceived by military historians. A seminal work recommended for professional and academic 20th Century Military History reference collections, Germany And The Axis Powers is highly recommended for its profoundly educational and informative content to all World War II historians and students of the era.

This book is meant to be a military analysis of the World War II axis however it comes off as an excellent diplomatic history. It shows that Germany has never been able to grasp the concepts of coalition warfare and its do it alone strategy was always going to be its undoing. The first part of the book looks at the history of German warfare before World War II. The analysis with regards to Operation Barbarossa is deeply flawed. The assertion that Russia was the primary target of Germany's desires is wrong. The evidence shows a greater tendency towards Britain than Russia. Also the analysis of Japan's role in the coalition is something that deserves further looking into. I think the author dismisses it too quickly.
Despite those flaws this really does provide a comprehensive look at how the Axis functioned and especially the role of the minor powers like Romania and Hungary. It is very easy to see that while Germany nominally had control each of these Axis powers was able to contribute in their own way. The end of the Axis comes with the battle of Stalingrad and the demolition of the Axis forces as well as the failures in North Africa. The lack of Axis supplies was a tremendous problem and one that was not going to be overcome without early strategic victories. When these were not made the loss became inevitable. This book is a very clear military analysis and accomplishes a lot in 200 pages. Despite the few flaws mentioned I highly recommend the book.

Having followed the career of this distinquished historian, this work has tremendous value. DiNardo's thought process is quite organized and very cerebral. It is obvious the research balances his writing considering that today's fact-finding is often shortchanged or erroneous from over use of the internet. The author did his homework.

Although I don't have much interest in German history during this period, I found the book engaging. This is certainly a work that should belong on private library shelves of each World War historian. Excellent!!