A portrait of Vietnam's most important military leader, General Giap, discusses his military tactics and campaigns, his role in the Vietnam War, and his impact on the pivotal battles of that war, from the 1940s to the fall of Saigon in 1975.
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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
British diplomat Colvin, who served as consul in Hanoi during the 1960s, can't quite keep a focus in this loosely structured biography concerning Vo Nguyen Giap's controversial career as a self-taught general and key figure in the Vietnamese revolution. Instead, he regularly drifts away from Giap to present a highly impressionistic narrative of the First and Second Indochina Wars. Colvin's bibliography lists archival material from France, the U.K. and the U.S. Even casual students, however, may perceive the author's heavy reliance on such standard accounts as Bernard Fall's Street Without Joy and Gunther Levy's America in Vietnam. Colvin's analysis of Giap seems to be similarly derived in large part from Robert O'Neill's General Giap and Peter Macdonald's Giap: Victor in Vietnam. The author's interpretation of Giap as a first-rate practitioner of war as a synthesis of military and political approaches is defensible, albeit conventional. But his insistence that Giap, rather than his Chinese "advisors," planned the Dien Bien Phu campaign of 1953-1954 must be evaluated in the context of Quang Zhai's trailblazing article "Transplanting the Chinese Model" in The Journal of Military History (October 1993). More generally, Colvin's case for the success of Vietnamization after 1969 seems seriously overstated, as does his argument that South Vietnam's collapse in 1975 was in good part the result of abandonment by the U.S. Neither position is sustained by the limited scholarship of a work that is more a personal statement than a serious intellectual contribution.
Copyright 1996 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 1996 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Kirkus Reviews
Not a biography, but a subjective military history of the 194575 Indochina wars, in which the British author argues that the Vietnamese victories were primarily due to French and American mistakes rather than the superior leadership of the commanding Vietnamese general, Vo Nguyen Giap. Colvin, who was British consul in Hanoi from 1965 to 1967, presents a wealth of battlefield detail about the French and American wars in Vietnam. He describes many battles and skirmishes, and thoroughly examines tactical and strategic details. The military history is generally accurate, although Colvin makes the grossly untrue statement that the US Army and Air Force in Vietnam ``lived in air-conditioned bases.'' Along with the facts, Colvin includes his opinions, arguing, for example, that the US could have stopped a communist victory in Vietnam by mining the northern ports and letting loose an ``aerial interdiction'' on northern borders in 1965 to prevent war materiel from entering North Vietnam. Colvin characterizes Gen. Giap and North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh as ruthless if brilliant men who depended on the calculated use of ``terror and patriotism'' to propel the war effort. Giap, Colvin says, was an overrated commander who was victorious because of his willingness to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives and because of the large-scale support he received from China and the Soviet Union. Colvin criticizes some aspects of French colonialism but credits the French with having ``great virtues'' in colonial Vietnam, such as building ``small but lovely cities.'' Colvin condemns the American war strategies of attrition and Vietnamization. Most startlingly, Colvin attributes the communist victory in part to the actions of some elements of the American antiwar movement. A ``revisionist war crimes tribunal today,'' Colvin says, ``would have no difficulty in naming the accused: Jane Fonda, Eldridge Cleaver, and the rest of them.'' A battlefield history is marred by unsupported historical speculations and opinions. -- Copyright ©1996, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Giap out endured us,
By
This review is from: Giap: Volcano Under Snow (Hardcover)
Giap's errors aided by bigger mistakes of his enemies, the French and Americans. Goal was to gain surprise and win with a lesser force as he could not match firepower. French could not use draftees, Americans could not bomb the Hiphong harbor until too late. The major source of supply of the VC. Giap had no military training.
Washington could not agree on nature of war, insurgency, conventional, or both, and could not agree on objectives. Marine Combined action Platoons were working, but Westmoreland killed them for Khe Sanh. De Lattre defeated him 3 times, producing 20,000 casualties. He died in 7 months of cancer. In August 1945, marched into Hanoi. At Dien Bien Phu, he also had big attacks in other parts of the country, which dissipated French strength. After 1956, before 1961, By 1963, the NLF had a 100,000 men who were ready to cut off South Vietnam in the middle. more than 5,000 RVN officials were kidnapped and killed by the VC. By 1963, the NLF had a 100,000 men who were ready to cut off South Vietnam in the middle. By 1968 the VC numbered 200,000, 350,000 by 1967. For Tet, Giap wanted to carry the war to the American family, and that is what he did. The peace agreement of Jan 1973 allowed existing North Vietnam units to remain in the south. In June 1973, all funds for Vietnam were cut off by Congress. No more guns, ammo, oil, or spare parts. March 1975, Ban Me Thuot was taken. Ho signed agreement March 6 1946 with French to get the Chinese out of North Vietnam. There were 250,000 of them there, looting, and making trade deals screwing the Vietnamese. Gen Leclerc when he took over, said to make peace with Ho and leave. The French govt refused, so he left. The Brits, Trevor Wilson persuaded Graham Greene to write his book to be anti American rather than anti French. Thus the Quiet American. The French screwed themselves,. Admiral d'Argenliew sabotaged the 1946 conference by creating Indo china subject to French rule, not autonomous. Compromise was tried until Dec 19, 1946. Then the fighting began. In 1947 the American accepted Bao Dai as a figurehead. In 1947 even the French Communist party wanted a military solution. Gen Alessandri was Corsican , had his men cut off all rice to the North Vietnamese. In 1949 the French and Giap's troops took turns in killing the Chinese who were fleeing China which had been taken over by the communists. Gen Lattre and Gen Gavin had the same enclave strategy, only 10 years apart. Gen Navarre arrived to take over in May 1953. Navarre said he was required to defend Laos, which meant he had to take Dien Ben Phu. Gen Cogny said Giap could bypass Dien Bien Phu if he wanted, and it would not help defend Laos. It could act as a mooring post for raids against the supply trails though. It immobilized 3 French regiments. With Dien Bien Phu at his back, Giap could not take Laos. The French air folks did not like the distance, weather, anti aircraft and condition of the air fleet for Dien Bien Phu. Orders were issued Nov 114, 1953 to take it. On Nov 22 Cogny visited it as did many other people, including Graham Greene who liked it. A large scale map of Dien Bien Phu was recovered from an ambushed officer. By Feb 15 the garrison had lost 840 soldiers and 120 officers and NCOs. Ammo was not resupplied for a whole week due to other priorities. By March 13, the Viet Minh had them surrounded and it was too late for a breakout. Had they left earlier, they could have attacked the Viet Minh in their rear areas and done a lot of damage. The French had only 75 fighter aircraft. In 1966 we could put 200 aircraft into one raid. The Viet Minh main force had 110 regiments. On Jan 25, 1954, the major powers agreed to a condreence to be held in Geneva to settle the Indochina and Korea questions. Around Dien bien Phu, there were 50,000 viet Minh combatants and 31000 support with 23,000 more further back. The French had 13,000 troops, only 7000 being combatants. By April 15, there were 35,000 Viet Minh with 12,000 others vs. 5,000 French. On April 27 the Viet Minh morale was very low. They were being slaughtered. By the end, they had lost 23,000 men. The monsoon was very bad, stopping aircraft from helping. It fell on May 7. The cease fire was signed on July 20. Group mobile 100 was destroyed between those dates on Rt 19. On June 4 Emperor Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister, a post he twice had refused, considering Bao Dai as a French puppet. Too bad Bao Dai did not choose Dr Phan Quang Dan, later arrested an tortured by Diems brother. Had he done so, Vietnam might have survived.
6 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
I wouldn't call this book racist, but it's still worthless,
This review is from: Giap: Volcano Under Snow (Hardcover)
I have read this book thoroughly. There are many passages that will raise the antennas of people with high racial sensitivity and make them suspect Colvin of suffering from some sort of Eurocentrism. I would chalk this up as inexperience and naivete as opposed to maliciousness. Why do I say so? Because everywhere in the book, one encounters stereotypes of _EVERYTHING_ and _EVERYBODY_, including stereotypes of French colonials, of the American military, of Chinese military strategy (which the author then projects wholesale onto the NVN army). And that is just a sample list. A man who can swallow so many stereotypes can't be too bright.The prevalence of these stereotypes also degrades other aspects of the book: If Colvin can't critically examine stereotypes, can he really critically examine details of battles before reciting them back to us? How can we be confident that the details are accurate and not just rote recitation of whatever Colvin has been told, or of whatever document he happened to get his hands on? We can't. And that's too bad -- because the only thing this book has is a lot of details about some battles. And if we can't even take those details at face value, there isn't anything left....
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
the rantings of a truculent old man,
By
This review is from: Giap: Volcano Under Snow (Hardcover)
Don't bother with this book. As others have pointed out the writer is a racist. (And a very bad writer.) He is also a bit loose with the facts, especially given what is known about kissinger's negotiations with the DRV and his duplicity with the Thiem regime. The author attempts to whitewash the corruption of succesive RVN governments, but at times a few contradictory facts slip through.
All in all a waste of time, with no redeeming qualities. Hopefully the author spares the world another book and concentrates on gardening or heavy drinking to fill his remaining years.
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