Customer Reviews

The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons Now

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

This book comes at a time of important decisions concerning the continued existence of nuclear weapons in a world groping for an alternative. With the formal joining of the nuclear club by India and Pakistan the discussion on the continued existence of nuclear weapons takes on a renewed urgency.

Mr. Schell does a fine job of explaining the difficulty in getting to zero. Implicit in his work is that that the world as it presently is structured cannot escape the"security dilemma". Nuclear aboition in such a world is a remote possibility so long as nations remain in the "self-help" model of international relations. The continued anarchic situation in international affairs leaves the world with the age old game of the balance of power. What is needed is a re-conceptualiztion of how nations can relate to one another and strategies for a new international order founded on renewed spiritual insight and vision grounded in a practical expression through a new politics concerned with justice and ecological responsibility--which in the final analysis is the way out of pending conflict and is in all nations' interests. Until a commitment to a new way is made we will continue to be plagued by the nuclear threat--virtual or otherwise.

This book,serves the important purpose of reminding us that we cannot allow things to drift. History has portals of opportunity which close quite quickly. It is the time to seize the opportunity to take measures like de-alerting and horizontal disarmament described by Mr. Schell now while we have the chance. Sooner or later in an imperfect world something is bound to go wrong. Mr. Schell calls us to the task that remains unfinished. As ordinary citizens , in effect, he is asking, "What are we waiting for ?"

The great contribution of Schell's book is to describe a practicable road to the abolition of nuclear weapons. For many years a writer for "The New Yorker," Schell unravels the complicated technical issues of nuclear weaponry and missile delivery systems in comprehensible English, describing an alternative vision of how international relations without nuclear weapons might look. Framing the discussion as a debate between what he calls the abolitionists and the possessionists, Schell does not restrict himself to abstract theoretical questions of strategic doctrine, but rather devotes most of the book to an analysis of the nitty-gritty technical details of how we could reduce nuclear weapons to zero in the real world. Some of the key problems that he addresses are: what does "zero" nuclear weapons actually mean as a practical matter? how can we defend against cheating or so-called "break out"? and how can we deal with the problem that we cannot undo our knowledge about how to make nuclear weapons.

"The Gift of Time" presents an excellent and well written summary of the views of leading world thinkers and political activists on the dangers posed by nuclear weapons from Rotblat to McNamara and Gorbachev to Cranston among others. To properly evaluate this work it must be place in the perspective of Schell's trilogy on this subject starting with "The Fate of the Earth"(1981)and "The Abolition" (1983) The most ambitious of these was "The Fate of the Earth" which went beyond the mere identification of the problem to an impassioned plea that its solution called for nothing less than reinventing world politics. It received brilliant reviews from "The New York Times and other journals and was mocked by the likes of "The Wall Street Journal"Perhaps because of the disparaging nature of the latter review "The Abolition (1983) was more conservative and incremental. While "The Fate of The Earth" never mentioned the twerm "world government" the

reviewers of the Earth in both TIME and NEWSWEEK characterized it as in effect calling for some form of world government. "The Abolition" on the other hand made over 40 references to "world government" only to distance itself from the con= cept calling it neither necessary or desirable to achieve the end of reducing the nuclear danger. "The Gift of Time" refers to world government only in its interview with Alan Cranston who was national President of the World Federalists from

1949 to the early 50's. Cranston, however, suggests that while he still favors world law and the sharing of sovereignty he regards the actual term world government as politically unviable. Similarly Rotblat who has recently expressed unequivocal support for the concept of "world government" in other documents in his interview with Schell only goes as far as to state that "the long-term objective must not be just nuclear dis- armament but a world without war". Schell, how- ever does not press Rotblat for the implications of this statement as he did in the case of the other known sympathize for some form of world federation Alan Cranston. In short my chief criti- cism of Schell's otherwise excellent treatment of the nuclear dilemma in "The Gift of Time" is his timidity in raising the question of the possible need of structures required for the enforcement of disarmament whether nuclear or otherwise. 1949 to the early 50's

Schell argues that nuclear proliferation can be reversed, the doctrine of deterrence abandoned, and multilateral treaties negotiated for total nuclear disarmament. If not, we face a horrifying future where a policy of "well-managed nuclear proliferation" leads inevitably to a catastrophic "normalization" and "universalization" of nuclear weaponry.

Schell's grasp of the stunning illogic of deterrence is, as usual, ethically, politically, and strategically nuanced. But can abolition really happen? To almost everyone in the Cold War nuclear policy establishment, abolition was unthinkable in practice and unattractive as an ideal. The crucial issue is exactly what has changed since 1991. To investigate this, Schell includes twenty interviews with political, military, scientific, and intellectual leaders of the Cold War, most of whom contributed centrally to their nations' preparations for nuclear war. Interesting though they are, these interviews are shallow. The political and military men seem most concerned with the public relations value of a trendy remorse, and very few interviewees make any substantive suggestions for exiting the slippery slope leading to a horrendous new era of nuclear warfare.

Schell's own description of a pathway to abolition is vague and implausible. What he really is selling is a naive optimism that humanity will rise to the world-historical occasion. Alas, Schell's persuasive vision of the dangers we face makes it abundantly clear that such optimism is an intolerable self-indulgence.

I found the book a surprinsgly engaging read, particularly since I didnt appear to possess any strong opinions on Nuclear weapons proliferation etc.

The book opened up a discussion in my head of many issues I hadn't considered. The book could have gone into a lot more detail in order to state it's case, but I believe that it serves it's true purpose in promoting discussion about what we do with the so called White Elephant nuclear arsenals and spend our countries wealth better.

Schell's thoroughly researched and clearly voiced call to action is a must read for anyone concerned about nuclear danger.

This book highlights the instability and inherint risk to the nuclear status quo, and poses as series of pragmatic possibilities for moving away from the brink of annihilation.

Schell speaks with leading nuclear experts from the US, Russia and Europe--scientists who created the weapons, generals who prepared to use them, politicans who built policies around them, and scholars who have studied these issues for years--and lets them express their thoughts and concerns on the currnet nuclear situation. And it soon becomes clear that those who know the most about these weapons are those who recognize best the folly of relying upon them indefinitely.

In simple and accessible prose, Schell analizes a number of complex issues, introducing the readers to a number of crucial concepts such as "horizontal disarmament" and pushing the reader to imagine what a world without nuclear weapons might look like (not an easy question). He moves beyond idealism and wishful thinking, and directs the debate towards what can and must be done.

Few books contain such a wealth of valuable, primary source information in such a concise form. Fewer still contain such original, thoughtful and timely insight. A must read for both the expert and the novice.

Schell's thoroughly researched and clearly voiced call to action is a must read for anyone concerned about nuclear danger.

This book highlights the instability and inherint risk to the nuclear status quo, and poses as series of pragmatic possibilities for moving away from the brink of annihilation.

Schell speaks with leading nuclear experts from the US, Russia and Europe--scientists who created the weapons, generals who prepared to use them, politicans who built policies around them, and scholars who have studied these issues for years--and lets them express their thoughts and concerns on the currnet nuclear situation. And it soon becomes clear that those who know the most about these weapons are those who recognize best the folly of relying upon them indefinitely.

In simple and accessible prose, Schell analizes a number of complex issues, introducing the readers to a number of crucial concepts such as "horizontal disarmament" and pushing the reader to imagine what a world without nuclear weapons might look like (not an easy question). He moves beyond idealism and wishful thinking, and directs the debate towards what can and must be done.

Few books contain such a wealth of valuable, primary source information in such a concise form. Fewer still contain such original, thoughtful and timely insight. A must read for both the expert and the novice.

Schell's thoroughly researched and clearly voiced call to action is a must read for anyone concerned about nuclear danger.

This book highlights the instability and inherint risk to the nuclear status quo, and poses as series of pragmatic possibilities for moving away from the brink of annihilation. Schell speaks with leading nuclear experts from the US, Russia and Europe--scientists who created the weapons, generals who prepared to use them, politicans who built policies around them, and scholars who have studied these issues for years--and lets them express their thoughts and concerns on the currnet nuclear situation. And it soon becomes clear that those who know the most about these weapons are those who recognize best the folly of relying upon them indefinitely.

In very accessible prose, Schell analizes a number of complex issues, introducing the readers to a number of crucial concepts such as "horizontal disarmament" and pushing the reader to imagine what a world without nuclear weapons might look like (not an easy question). He moves beyond idealism and wishful thinking, and directs the debate towards what can and must be done.

Few books contain such a wealth of valuable, primary source information in such a concise form. Fewer still contain such original, thoughtful and timely insight. A must read for both the expert and the novice.

About six months ago I read a postion paper posted on a US Army War College site avocating the reasons why we must maintain nuclear weapons indefinitely. The reasoning & logic expressed perfectly mirrored Jonathan Schell's. I taught a college level course on nuclear war, and I can assure you Schell's logic like his counterpart only confuses the ignorant masses while smugly re-assurring those with a vested interest in maintaining nuclear weapons of the stupidty and naivete' of the opposite number. Thus, the blind lead willfully the ignorant to a future madness not yet envisaged. __JPC__

Jonathan Schell has a long running interest in nuclear weapons, having warned the world that Ronald Reagan was going to blow up the world in the early 1980s. It was then that the nuclear freeze was born, with Schell one of its most enthusiastic supporters. Schell opposed Reagan's proposal under START I to reduce nuclear weapons in half, calling the proposal a sham the Russians would never support. The Russians did and Reagan was right. So too with Reagans proposal on zero INF missiles and nukes. Are Mr. Schell's nuclear judgments improved over the past decade? Schell and his allies in the nuclear freeze movement have now emerged to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. How we get from here to there is not well expalined; we have to take much of this on faith. We are to trust North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan not to have nuclear weapons even if we have succeeded in stripping all nukes from the current five nuclear powers. Schell tries desperately to convince us that if only the US withdraws from the nuclear business, then the clowns and dictators in Iran, Iraq and North Korea will suddenly see the light and also give up their aspirations to be nuclear powers. Left unsaid and it appears unrealized is that nuclear weapons are for these countrys the means to a strategy of blackmail and coercion they can get with nothing else. We in the US did not make them this way. Despots and dictators did not come into the world because of the US. In fact it is the other way around. There would be many others were it not for the US. Is it a coicidence that with the advent of the end of the Cold War, with the US in ascendancy, with the US firmly in possession of a formidable nuclear deterrent, that country after country has joined the ranks of freedom and has asked the US for protection. None of these new nations to the ranks of free peoples has asked to have nuclear weapons nor made excuses how the big bad USA makes it neessary for them to have nuclear weapons. Why is this, Mr. Schell, if the US is so! threatening? The blame America first refrain was one used often by Mr. Schell and his companions in the nuclear freeze movement. But it won't work anymore. The US ratified START II some 2 years ago, while the Russian government has done little to follow suit--nor have the nuclear freeze proponents done much to push the Duma towards ratification. In fact, many in the abolitionist field have made one excuse for the Russians after another as to why the Russians should not ratify START II, even going so far as to claim that START II gives the USD a pre-emptive and disarming nuclear strike against the Russians. The qaint proposals by Mr. Schell would actually undermine deterrence. While he views the dangers of nuclear weapons seriously, he dismisses frivolously the need to maintain the very deterrence that keeps the use of nuclear weapons at bay.