Customer Reviews

A Glimpse of Hell : The Explosion on the U. S. S. Iowa & Its Cover-Up

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Lest there be doubts, IOWA exploded due to a combination of volatile gun power, the lack of safety interlocks, and an unknown event in Turret Two which pushed the crew faster than the power and gun system could manage. The men did their best given the constraints their peers, their command, and their Navy had placed upon them. I am IOWA's last Turret One Officer, at least the last Division Officer who daily mustered men on station in preparation for gunnery, underway. I am also one of the "Gang of Four" who aided Charlie with his book. My father retired after 38 years in the submarine service, and many of the senior officers in the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy while I was an officer knew of my father, and our family. From the outset, let me say that Charlie's book underscores the degeneration of what we used to call "they Navy Family". The command does not treat spouses and children (relatives, too) as an integrated part of the command (as it did when I was a child), or, indeed, as the citizens to which they are pledge to defend. Once you grasp this point, you can understand why the chain of command treated the memory, and families, of the IOWA-47 they way it did. This is a good book for prospective khaki or bluejacket to read, it is also a good book for Americans, in general, to read as they try to figure out whether the Justice Department has an accuracy problem with WACO, whether Energy Department employees were radiated and not told so, and whether gene therapy patients are dying without NIH knowing so -- there is a pattern of professional deceit centered on Washington these days. IOWA was just the first time the Officer Corps turned on its own men in order to save a Class of ship. Charlie and Dick's books must be read together, because I agree with reviewers who think Charlie came to the assignment with preconceptions. He is a Vietnam veteran, and he served with honor as a NGFS spotter. That war has left a bad taste in many a veteran's mouth. But his preconceptions were checked against the counsel of VADM Ed Snyder, who had more influence on this book than the reviewers may understand. Admiral Snyder's knowledge of the ship and its Class was unsurpassed. He was very hard on my comments to Charlie, and more than once he ferreted out bias on my part. Do not read this book looking for the excellence of IOWA, or of the great efforts of all crew members on April 19th. It is about the investigation, and that subject tailors all other facts. The complete story of the IOWA still waits to be told, and it would have to address why a "cover-up" was required at all. My own sense is that the trail exists all the way back to the decision, in the late 1970s, to reactivated the Class. Admiral Macauley seemed to understand this; Admiral Boorda knew it. The ships were old, and needed money for overhaul, money that went into missile systems. Given the budgeting environment of the mid-1980s, it does not surprise me that an investigation into a gunnery mishap would look for "personnel error" and not a "technical" cause. Charlie, due to space constraints, does not follow this important thread. What was Congress told, who told them the ships were safe, and why was the inspection process insufficient in ratting out the lie? I had no ax to grind in cooperating with Charlie, and I asked him to contact as many crew and wardroom members as possible, including Captain Moosally. The more sources, the more informed the book. Though some of the IOWA-47 family members were annoyed I waited until September, 1991, to allow Charlie to visit me, I had a war to fight in between my time on the IOWA and my resignation from the Navy. The first time it was possible, I met with Thompson even though the Chief of Naval Information asked me not to cooperate. Many would not cooperate with Charlie. In those instances, he had to rely on sworn testimony. I do agree that footnotes would have been useful, but the book is designed to sell as "popular" literature, and footnotes are not all that popular. My motive in cooperating with Charlie was to protect Turret One, and the reputation built by the sailors, not all of them gunners mates, who helped me and Dale Mortensen make that the No. 1 gun turret on that ship. And yes, there were facts about Turret One that didn't make it into ink. I was a little conceited, as a junior officer. Phil's closeness to his sailors, however, was not the same as mine. My men could do no wrong; Dale and I set impossibly high standards and they reached them. I was very proud of them, and was perhaps too chummy in saying so. But Meyer never drank with his men for more than 20 minutes. It was a rule of my father's Navy, and it was necessary to keep the Division Officer detached, so he could say "No"  the most important word in an officer's vocabulary. We had problems; but we controlled the events that could have turned them into an explosion. At least I'd like to think we did. It may have been a big game of Russian roulette. As for Captain Moosally, I have only attributed a level of responsibility to him that the Navy does to all sea captains. Charlie may have taken the analysis beyond the Navy's standard. And focusing on Fred can be misleading; the real failure came between him and Admirals Trost and Kelso. I tossed and turned over my chance to rat on the investigation (through family connections) in May, 1989. In the end, I did not. I still feel that had Admiral Trost known what his subordinates were doing, he would have protected the investigation from corruption. Had it been 1789, and not 1989, I may have called Edney or Miceli to the Bladensburg dueling grounds to settle the matter. But I just couldn't break the chain of command. I do think that my efforts with both authors (Richard Schwoebel and I discussed his thesis for about an hour) was necessary for very personal reasons. Damnation, in fact. Had I possessed the courage to stand down the command in October, 1988, those 47 men would still be alive. All I did was write a memo, which my superior took very seriously, and who was still working on a response when the explosion occurred. True, others in the Department, or the wardroom, could have done the same, or more. Phil himself wasn't too keen on pointing out our problems to the chain of command. But that still leaves me about six percent of the responsibility. And as it turns out, I was close to exactly six percent of that Turret: Blakey, Schlein and Bopp. When I am judged for my role on that day, it will be the souls of those men who decide my fate. In the final analysis, Charlie's book asks us to examine the relationship between national service and the American citizen. As hard as I want to be on the chain of command, or the Department of the Navy, etc., I do think the federal Government represented the American people throughout this nasty mess. The American people--as represented by many of the current presidential candidates--have a checkered past when it comes to serving this nation. A people divided on the good of national service will treat those who rise above the common norm with disdain; the example set is hard to live with, isn't it? Why are people called to the McCain candidacy? Because his mind is not divided on this issue. The worst decisions in the investigation came from officers worried about the reaction from Washington, D.C., a town with fewer veterans than any other community in America. And did Charlie get my "character" right? I think he made me sound like a crazy old drag queen. If my style of leadership ever came across that way, my since apologies to the gunners of Turret One. And Forward Main Battery is still No. 1 (Turret Two included!).

I was there. As a young officer onboard the Battleship IOWA, I lived through this tragic event. This book offers the reader a singular theory about the events surrounding the explosion. Don't expect this publication to give you an objective and completely factual account of the range of possibilities for this event. This author approached his work with a pre-determined outcome and then wove a series of opinions into facts to support that outcome. While it is compelling, much of what you will read is founded in the author's pursuit of his own views. You will learn both fact and factoid. Sometimes these facts seem first-hand although they are attributed to the wife of a disgruntled officer. Much of the story is true. In fact, some of the cover-up actually extends beyond what the author uncovered. Some of it is taken out of context and exaggerated to support the author's view. And some of it is just some guy's opinion, that of the author, which is presented to you as indisputable. A wary reader will catch the argumentative manner the author takes to put forth his theory. I do not know what caused this tragedy. I know there remains no certainty in anyone's mind, (except this author and those few sources for this book) as to the true cause. Don't believe everything you read. But in this case, it is worth reading about a military system which broke down in trying to invesigate their own, it broke down in the handling of the explosives, and it broke down to the point of a possible cover-up. Their mistake was pursuing facts to support a theory to the exclusion of the other possibilities. Unfortunately, this author made the same error.

I am the Mother of one of the sailor's killed aboard the USS IOWA (BB-61). I was deeply involved in investigating the cause of the explosion. Mr. Thompson's book is well written and statistically accurate. However, much can be said as to where he places the blame. The Navy had no qualms about hanging a dead sailor out to dry. Mr. Thompson didn't go far enough into the dirty tricks the Navy used to promote their theory. Dressing a dead sailor in Hartwigs uniform to prove his location during the explosion,and giving orders for the sailors to keep the actual location of Clay's body a secret. Mr. Thompson made numerous people out to be hero's, when in all actuality they were covering their own tracks. Dan Meyer was credited with exposing the Navy's cover-up of the location of Clay's body. But, he failed to say it took over a year of begging and pleading,from me, to get Meyer's to come forward. There were no hero's that day only pawns, in a deluded man's scheme. In my opinion Stephen Skelley and Ken Costigan, were responsible for the experiments. These experiments and the faulty powder were the direct cause of the explosion in turret two on April 19th, that took the life of "MY SON". Mr. Thompson's book is just that,"a book". It can't bring my child back and it can't give me justice. I must continue my life knowing that the men responsible continue to go unpunished. My only consolation is that unless these men admit their wrong, "A Glimpse Of Hell", will be their just reward.

As a former department head who served aboard BB-61 before, during, and after the explosion, I strongly recommend "A Glimpse of Hell" to anyone with either an interest in what actually happened during the Turret Two incident or what life aboard a Navy man-of-war is actually like. This is the best publication to date which captures the command environment surrounding the explosion. The personal relations among the key leaders could be characterized as a powderkeg waiting to be ignited. The book does a good job of recognizing the differences of two of the Iowa's Commanding Officers- Captains Moosally and Seaquist, falls short of doing an adequate comparison and contrast of their leadership styles. Neither was without fault, but the book is especially lacking in failing to highlight or even mention BB-61's highly successful convoy escort missions into the Persian Gulf of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. The 87 deployment was a milestone for the battleship and deserves some recognition as how the crew proved that they could "do it right" under the proper leadership. The goal of the book was not meant to focus on the role of the senior leadership. It tries to give a balanced view of what went wrong, but falls short due to a lack of input from Capt Moosally. Even without his side of the story being provided, the book reads well and will hold the readers interest from cover to cover. As a footnote: it would have been nice to see some of the royalties/proceeds from the sales of the book go to the Scholarship fund for children of the turret victims. The author tells a good story but at times is a little too self serving and high and mighty in his role as the investigator. He, too, has his agenda and motives which are not always as altruistic as he would like the reader to believe.

I agree with the other survivor from Fla, that the book is a bunch of fairy tales and lies, and I may add alot of people who heard this and that, and who were not where they said they where and what they were doing!! In other words a LOT OF OPPORTUNIST!!!, I also find when it came to LTJG PHILLIP BUCH and Gunners Mate Senior Chief Reginald Ziegler they could do nothing right and the book makes LTJG Buch look like he was extremly INCOMPETENT AND NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. I find this in bad taste, why the author did NOT ask people who worked for LTJG Buch and Senior Chief Ziegler or better yet, why did he not ask the only two survivors of G2 Division (Turret Two Division)Kendall Truitt and myself, who would know their Division Officer and Senior Chief better. Instead he relied on information supplied by people who obviously had a axe to grind with them. An example of LTJG Phil Buch who was not a person to worry about himself, but the welfare of his Division. LTJG Buch not only used his chain of command to try and help me, but put his career on the line and went outside of Offical Navy channels and wrote to his state Senator Alfonse DeMato of N.Y. to intervene in my ongoing case with a vindictive fellow officer. With 20 years in the Navy I can Honestly that LTJG Phillip Buch was the very best division I have had the privilege to work for!! and for Ziggy EVERYONE and I do mean EVERYONE who knew him was surprised he was not a Master Chief he was a professional in every sence of the word. As for the Skipper yes he was hard, thats because he was the Captain of the ship. As everyone knows I came from the brig to the Iowa. I was treated just like any other crew member on the ship. In my contact and dealings with the Captain he was ALWAYS upfront and honest with me. For the treatment I received which was no differnt than anyone else, I will alway have the HIGHEST RESPECT and ADMIRATION for him. I know that a lot of things said about the Skipper are just outright lies, I know I WAS THERE!! Where as some of the people in the book I never saw during the RESCUE, FIREFIGHTING, SECURING THE FLOODING, DEWATERING AND THE CLEAN-UP!! I and the folks who were there would have loved there help, but the fact of the matter is plain and simple, they just wer'nt there!!! I suggest don't waste your money. John Mullahy

The saddest part of all of this is the fact that it took 10 years for someone to finally tell the truth, unfortunately it wasnt the Navy. Mr. Thompson hits the nail squarely on the head in his analysis of the mental state of the crew of the Iowa in April 1989. His portrayal of a Division Officer and Leading Petty Officer, (G-1)concerned for the safety of the men under them is also right on target. Anyone who has a personal knowledge of this tragedy and reads this book will (like this reviewer) be instantly catapulted back ten years to April of 1989.

I spent two tours of duty onboard U.S.S. Iowa; once as a young sailor in 1956-57, and again as an officer during Iowa's refurbishing in 1983-84. The Navy was my life for more than 30 years; a sizable portion of the wall in my den is devoted to Iowa photos and plaques. If only half of what author Thompson charges is true, and half of the allegations of those he interviewed, then, the Navy is guilty of gross mismanagement of this terrible accident to say the least. To blame the catastrophe on one sailor because of an oddball set of circumstances, is criminal. It would certainly appear that there was a rush to judgement by a number of senior Navy officers based on a horribly flawed investigation; some well-meaning people got suckered in and didn't do their homework. There is no reason in the world that guns designed in the late 1930's should not work flawlessly in the 90's if the equipment is maintained and the turret personnel well trained. Thompson is to be commended for bringing together a whole set of circumstances that all seemed to go wrong on that fateful day; any one or two might have caused the explosion. But, when a whole series of them came together -- powder, rammer, lack of experience, experiment, etc. etc. -- the results should have been predictable. Hopefully, lessons have been learned. This book should be a "must read" for all senior officers and public relations professionals in an out of the Navy.

I served onboard the USS IOWA as A Gunner's Mate from 86-90. Mr Thompson has written a very accurate account of the events surrounding the Turret two explosion. I highly recommend this book.

I am the sister of one of the men in Turret One, who was mentioned in the book. My brother is an honest person, with no "ax to grind" or "score to settle". The book basically agrees with what he has told us over the past 10 years. He also lost good friends in the explosion, and all he and our family have ever wanted was for the truth to come out. This book does exactly that. The truth is sometimes hard to believe and accept, but the fact is that yes, the Navy did cover up this terrible tragedy. They tried to blame it ALL on one sailor, whose family had the courage to stand up, against enormous odds, and say this is wrong! For 10 years I have lived with the knowledge that my brother could have easily been one of the 47 men killed that day. All those families deserve to know the truth, no matter how distasteful it might be to some. I do entend to read Mr. Schwoebel's book also, and encourage everyone to do the same. I challenge anyone who has different opinions and/or information to do some research and write your own book, this can only help uncover the truth!!!

This book is a MUST-READ for every leader in the military, as well as every citizen of the United States of America who cares at all about the conduct of the leaders of those who are enlisted in the armed forces! If I could, I would give it 10 stars! As the mother of one of the "Iowa 47" who died on that fateful day in April, 1989, I want to personally thank Charlie Thompson for this unbelievable work. The exhaustive investigation that he conducted in order to reveal the inconceivable facts about the farce that was purported to be an "investigation" goes beyond my comprehension. Each phase of the author's research, as detailed in this book, reveals another, even more horrific, truth about this drama as it was actually played out. There is not one stated fact that has been, or even can be, disputed by the Navy. As each page of this drama unfolds, the author holds the reader spellbound. I felt that I could have been reading an imaginative work of fiction. The absolutely most disturbing and chilling reality is, however, that what is described is NOT fictional! It has been my experience that when a loved one dies, the tendency is to idealize the behavior of the individual, and so I do understand those who believe their loved ones may have been maligned. In reality, however, Mr. Thompson was able to portray each individual he names accurately and fairly. Through the eyes of shipmates, these real characters came alive to me, and I understood who they were, without prejudice. Thank you, Charlie, for showing to the world the truth of how these brave, trusting men were sent into a life-threatening situation by their superiors without regard for their safety. The danger they faced should have been and could have been foreseen and avoided, had those in charge cared more about safety than about their own overblown egos! This head-in-the-sand egotistical attitude will surely spawn more such tragedies if those who should care do not change the system!