Customer Reviews

Glory Enough for All : Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle of Trevilian Station

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Phil Sheridan's battle against the Confederates at Trevillian Station is covered in 391 pages with maps, photos, orders of battle, statistics on loses, an excellent bibliography, and index. Author Eric Wittenberg has done an outstanding job of narration, explanation, and interpretation of the battle. (Wittenberg's knowledge of the Union cavalry adds to the book immensely, as does his keen appreciation of the landscape.) This text is a treat for Civil War buffs and would be a great addition to the library of descendants of those on both sides who were participants.

Mr. Wittenberg is the author of several books on cavalry operations in the Eastern Theater, all well documented, informative and very readable. This book is my personal favorite. He hits the "sweet spot", balancing a solid battlefield history with personal experiences of the participants. The history set up an experience, which amplifies and explains the history bridging the story to the next incident. The result is an informative history of Sheridan's cavalry raid in June 1864 with an in the saddle feel rarely found in nonfiction books.

The heart of the book is the battles of Trevilian Station on June 11 & 12, 1864 and Samaria Church on June 24, 1862. Trevilian Station is Sheridan's attempt to cut the vital Virginia Central Railroad and Samaria Church is Hampton's attempt to capture Sheridan's wagon train. The two battles do not stand-alone but exist in Sheridan's cavalry raid, with the raid firmly placed in Grant's Overland Campaign. This means that the reader never forgets the total operation and the war. Very often, battle histories do not include or spend very little time on the larger issues causing us to miss this vital information.

This raid contains a who's who of Eastern cavalry personalities: Philip Sheridan, Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and George Custer are well known, Thomas Rosser, Matthew Butler, Alfred Torbert, Wesley Merritt and David Gregg much less so. Each man has an interesting word portrait with a detailed account of his role. Mr. Wittenberg draws some interesting conclusions about the battle and the men. As always, his conclusions are well supported and thought provoking, making for a book that is both an introduction with something for the more knowledgeable too.

Mr. Wittenberg makes a convincing case for the decisiveness of this cavalry battle and campaign, and his evaluations of Sheridan, Hampton, Fitz Lee, and others are fair and incisive. He did not need to prove his stature as an authority on the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, but clearly has done so with this volume and with his subsequent works.

I had the chance to visit the Trevilian battlefield recently, and used this book as a guide. In spite of the paucity of markers (maybe that's a good thing!), it was easy to follow the action using the author's excellent endnotes, maps, and descriptions of terrain.

A local preservation group recently purchased a large portion of the June 11 battlefield, which is a very good sign. Anyone interested in the Civil War's eastern theater should not miss this book.

It is about time that a true scholarly description of this long neglected but fascinating battle has been written. It destroys quite a number of myths! Sheridan was not invincible. The Confederate Cavalry did not die at Yellow Tavern with J.E.B. Stuart (it died at Appomattox with the rest of the ANVa). That Wade Hampton was a capable and perhaps more suitable cavalry commander for that period of the war. I bet that with even numbers that Hampton would have trounced Sheridan. As it was, outnumbered he stopped Sheridan cold and hurt him bad.

The battle is exciting, complex and had Hampton had just a little more strength Sheridan would have been in bad trouble; as it was he was hard pressed to claim any real results.

It is also hoped that this draws more attention to the preservation of this battlefield, which is in pretty good shape- but the bull dozers will come eventually.

This is a book for learning Civil War personalities, style of command, how cavalry fought in the civil war and documents this battle superbly. Well done and well worth the price od admission. I'll be on the outlook for more by Messr Wittenburg.

An excellent study of a little known but very important 1864 cavalry battle in central Virginia. In addition to providing a very entertaining and detailed look at each side's maneuvering during the battle, the author also puts the battle in the context of Grant's overall attempt to finish off the war in Virginia during 1864, and Robert E. Lee's attempt to thwart those designs. As a result, it becomes obvious why stopping Sheridan at Trevilian's Station was such an important strategic victory for the Confederates. The book also provides good analysis of the leadership, good and bad, on both sides.

After the disastrous battle at Cold Harbor, Grant realized the area around Richmond left little room for maneuver. Now aware that the Confederate works at Cold Harbor were far too strong to be taken, and refusing to surrender the initiative, Grant proceeded to revise his entire strategy. His new plan was to cross the James River and capture Petersburg, 25 miles below Richmond. If he could garner Petersburg and Hunter could capture Lynchburg, Federal troops would control the railroads and could starve Lee into surrender. But to cross the James he needed a diversion, a big one.

Similar to ordering Grierson's raid through the State of Mississippi, which enabled Grant to cross the Mississippi River totally unopposed and subsequently invest Vicksburg, Grant employs the same strategy to cross the James and invest Petersburg. Sheridan was ordered to take Torbert's and Gregg's cavalry divisions north to Charlottesville, destroy the railroad and join Hunter in his attack on Lynchburg and ultimately join Grant south of Petersburg. In so doing Grant anticipated the withdrawal of all Confederate cavalry under Hampton north, away from Grant's intended James River crossing points.

This is the story of that movement. So successful was this strategy that Grant literally stole a march on Lee, who had absolutely no idea where Grant's army had disappeared to. Grant's entire 75,000 man army crosses the James undetected. But in one of the most amazing battles of the war, Wade Hampton engages Phil Sheridan at Trevilian Station and stops him cold. With Hunter subsequently defeated in the Shenandoah, while Grant's strategy of crossing the James undetected is a resounding success, his pincer movement against Petersburg is defeated in detail.

Eric Wittenberg tells the amazing story of the Trevilian engagement. It was a hard fought contest producing 8 Medal of Honor winners for the Union. No one will ever know how many similar awards could have been granted to Confederate participants but the Confederate cemetery still bears mute testimony to the numbers who fell there.

A useful and vivid study of the largest all-cavalry battle in the Civil War. The author's trenchant criticism of Sheridan is especially interesting as he does most of his work on Michigan cavalry--thus can't be accused of Southern partisanship. It's a long and detailed account, including plenty of quotes for human interest as well as an assessment of the battle's tactical and strategic import. In a larger context, it works well to fill a gap--cavalry actions get less scholarship than I think they should--and to offer a perspective on Sheridan that differs slightly from the norm.

After finishing Gordon Rhea's excellent series on the Overland Campaign, I was excited to pick up Mr. Wittenburg's study of the Battle of Trevilian Station. Since it occurred between two campaigns (the conclusion of the Overland Campaign and the beginning of the Petersburg Campaign) not much has been written on Sheridan's Second Raid and I was hoping that Mr. Wittenberg would fill that gap. I was sadly mistaken. Mr. Wittenberg uses an abundance of post-war accounts with a sprinkling of contemporary diary/letters. As a "noted historian" I assumed that Mr. Wittenberg knew the limitations of using post-war accounts that wax heroics and honor. Mr. Wittenberg also makes several factual errors. For example he writes the area around Chilesburg was "picked clean" of forage because it was the site of numerous Federal marches, when in fact the only troops that were near Chilesburg were Confederate soldiers of A.P. Hill's Corps. These factual errors ultimately reduce the quality of the work. And finally the author makes many unsubstantiated claims of Sheridan's poor performance. While Sheridan by no means performed well at Trevilian Station, Mr. Wittenberg makes no attempt to objectively examine Sheridan's performance.

Hopefully Gordon Rhea's final book on the Overland Campaign (slated to be published soon) will objectively examine this interesting, and long-forgotten battle.

Great civil war book. Made me change my mind about Sheridan. Worth your money.

Like so many books and articles as well as art I found this book heavily in favor of the South. The North is often made to seem lacking in good Generals or often even in good horses. It is always something!! I really only liked this book because it was about a train station and I am a train collector. Actually I have read many books about the civil war since I was 16 years old and have visited many of the important battle sites. I even collect toy soldiers and here I am 68 years old!
What are the good points about this book? One is that it is easily readable and the story flows evenly with good maps which is rare in civil war books. It also does a good job of describing the content of the battle, going into the purpose of the raid, as well as the many difficulties of being in a troop of some 9000 men trying to engage an elusive enemy. I also found that Sheridan's tactics in trying to lead the Southern cavalry away from Grant's movements to Petersberg were justified. Also remember it was under Grant's approval that this raid was conducted. Since that goal was accomplished I would say that the raid was successful and disagree with the authors opinion that it was a failure.
What is not so good about this book? I would say that it could have used a few more maps in some strategic places, that the battle of Samaria seemed more like an after thought and was not very well described. Most of all, the books inherent Southern bias made me wonder how accurately the battle is described in spite of the rather large amount of documentation included at the end of each chapter. But since the documentation included many references to the First Maine Cavalry in which some of my relatives served at least now I have to find another book to read which is often the outcome of reading one book on the very Lost Cause.