God, Freedom, and Evil [Paperback]

Alvin Plantinga (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 1, 1978

God, Freedom and Evil discusses and exemplifies philosophy of religion or philosophical reflection on central themes of religion.

Product Details

• Paperback: 121 pages
• Publisher: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company (January 1, 1978)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0802817319
• ISBN-13: 978-0802817310
• Product Dimensions: 5.5 x 0.4 x 8.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 5.3 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (26 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #59,578 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

100 of 107 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars The Free WIll Defense Prevails July 12, 2002

By John DePoe

Format:Paperback

Alvin Plantinga, O'Brien Philosophy Professor at Notre Dame, shook the philosophy of religion world with this book when it was first published in 1978. His debunking of the atheistic evidential argument from evil is strictly a DEFENSE, not a THEODICY. A defense is merely a logical way out. A theodicy would attempt to give the specific reasons God allows evil. Plantinga does not claim to know the thoughts of God, so by offering a defense, he modestly shows that it is logically compatible for God to coexist with evil. His argument is NOT one by analogy (contra another reviewer), rather it is a strict application of the rules of logic.

Even though the book is more accessible to the public than most of his others, I imagine that someone without any basic training in philosophy may struggle with the read (but a struggle is not a good excuse not to read a good book!). In addition to the defense against evil, his exposition of the Ontological argument is very interesting, and worthwhile for anyone who intends to properly understand that argument. Those in the field of philosophy have almost universally accepted it as the theistic solution to the problem of evil. If you are an atheist, I challenge you to study his arguments to understand the rational case he is making. This will definitely be an exciting and fun read for the philosopher, as well as to the thinking and outspoken theist and atheist.

(By the way, if you are looking for a good THEODICY - try MAKING SENSE OUT OF SUFFERING by Peter Kreeft, philosophy professor at Boston College.)

26 of 29 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars A Small Classic September 13, 2005

By Reader From Aurora

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

God, Freedom and Evil is a short work, originally published in the mid-1970s, wherein Plantinga addresses issues pertaining to the existence of God. The book draws upon the author's prior works, "The Nature of Necessity" and "God and Other Minds". For readers new to this area of thought Plantinga is one of the most widely respected and read contemporary philosophers.

A large part of the book is dedicated the so-called problem of evil. That is, the question of whether or not the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of an all-knowing all-powerful and wholly good God. In addressing this issue Plantinga focuses on the question of whether evil and God can logically co-exist - it is not a theodicy which seeks to explain the existence of evil. With regard the former more modest question the author is quite successful in proving that evil and God are not incompatible as had been previously argued - written nearly 30 years ago it has yet to be challenged in any significant way. Plantinga can rightfully take credit in helping this question largely disappear amongst serious thinkers. Arguments in this area now tend to be focused on the level of evil rather than its mere existence (i.e. is there too much evil to be consistent with the existence of God). As an earlier reader commented, I too find the author's argument about transworld depravity awkward - it removal, however, does not serious impact Plantinga position.

In the remainder of the book Plantinga offers some brief thoughts on the classic arguments of natural theology - I found this part of the book less helpful. Plantinga indicates that he finds the ontological argument more compelling than either the argument from design or the cosmological argument. I tend to disagree with his views in this regard.... Although with time I increasingly appreciate a certain force behind the ontological argument, it still strikes me somewhat as an artificial linguistic construct. On the other hand, I find the other two arguments more compelling than Plantinga does (I share his thought that, even if successful, the cosmological argument can offer little on the nature of God). To be fair to Plantinga, this work was composed prior to recent scientific developments that have strengthened the argument from design (particularly in the world of cosmology but, also to a limited degree in the biological sciences). A look at some of Plantinga's more recent work is also worthwhile.

Overall a good short book by an outstanding philosopher who effectively altered the argument surrounding the existence of evil. I highly recommend this book to all students of philosophy and religion. J.L. Mackie's "The Miracle of Theism is also worth a look for a dissenting view. Read more ›

19 of 22 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Most influential theistic philosopher currently writing August 1, 2003

By Adam G. Glover

Format:Paperback

Some have called Alvin Plantinga this, and, whether you agree with him or not, the title is certainly warranted. In this book, 'God, Freedom, and Evil', Plantinga analyzes several mainline arguments of both natural theology and natural atheology. He finds all atheistic arguments wanting and most theistic arguments wanting. However, Plantinga eventually settles to the crux of the matter: the problem of evil. After showing that the problem of evil is obviously NOT a deductive problem--that is, from the existence of evil is does not necessarily follow that God doesn't exist--he utilizes the Free Will Defense to combat inductive arguments against theism. Plantinga ultimately concludes that the Free Will Defense, modified and elaborated to include considerations of possible worlds, successfully answers the problem of evil.

The arguments in this book, especially Plantinga's account of Transworld Depravity and other complex issues regarding possible worlds, are quite cumbersome. Still, if one is willing to take to work to a quiet corner and faithfully think through its contents, he will not be disappointed.

Adam Glover

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Powerful indeed, quite possibly STILL the best argument against the problem of Evil September 11, 2011

By Cornell

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

The argument that destroyed the Logical problem of Evil...

Leibniz's Lapse: Contrary to Leibniz, there are possible worlds that God cannot actualize

Here's an informal proof.

Imagine a situation S in which Curley is free to take, or to refuse, a bribe. Suppose God wants Curley freely to refrain from taking the bribe in S. The most he could do to bring this about would be to make Curley free in S. Can God get what he wants? That depends on which of the following propositions is true. (Note that one of them must be true, and the other false,)

(t) If Curley were free in S, then Curley would take the bribe.
(r) If Curley were free in S, then Curley would not take the bribe.

(Terminological note: (t) and (r) are among Curley's "counterfactuals of freedom.")

If (t) is true and God makes Curley free in S, then Curley will take the bribe and God won't get what he wants. Only if (r) is true will Curley do what God wants him to do.

Now let Wt be a possible world in which God makes Curley free in S and Curley freely takes the bribe. And let Wr be a world in which in which God makes Curley free in S and Curley freely refuses the bribe. If (t) is true, then God cannot actualize Wr. If, on the other hand, (r) is true, then God cannot actualize Wt. Since either (t) or (r) must be true, it follows that God can't actualize one or the other of these worlds--there is at least one possible world which he cannot actualize.

TWD ("transworld depravity")

For each possible person, and for each situation in which that person might exist and be free, there is a complete set of true conditional propositions (like (t) and (r)) about what that person would do if she were free in that situation.... We will call these a person's "counterfactuals of freedom."

Now the sad truth about Curley may be this: His counterfactuals of freedom are such that in no matter what situation God places him, if God gives him morally significant freedom in that situation, he would freely do at least one wrong action. He doesn't have to. Curley is free, after all. But God knows that he would. Curley suffers from TWD.

Of course, there are possible worlds in which Curley is significantly free and never goes wrong. But God can't actualize those worlds without Curley's help, and Curley's counterfactuals of freedom are such that God knows that such help is not going to be forthcoming. Paradoxically, it might be that only Curley can do what's required to actualize one of those worlds.

How the FWD solves the logical problem of evil

Remember? The problem was to show that the following propositions are logically consistent.

(1) God exists--and is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

(2) There is evil in the world.

Plantinga supposes we can do this by finding a proposition implicit in the free will defense that is consistent with (1), and together with (1) entails (2). Now we can see what that proposition is. Here it is:

(3) God actualized a world in which there are free creatures who produce some moral goodness; AND all possible persons suffer from TWD, so that God could not have actualized a world in which there were free creatures who produced moral goodness and no moral evil.

It's possible that both (1) and (3) are true. Together they entail (2). it follows that (2) is consistent with (1). QED.

So why doesn't God just make different counterfactuals of freedom true?
Because then they wouldn't be counterfactuals of freedom. For God to fix your counteractuals of freedom for you would be tantamount to making do what he prefers.
God is stuck with the counterfactuals of freedom that happen (as a matter of contingent fact) to be true.

Does that mean that God isn't omnipotent?

Not at all. If the counterfactuals of freedom have a truth value at all, then for each possible person some complete set of counterfactuals must be true. Whichever set that is, no one, no matter how powerful, can make a completely different set of counterfacutals of freedom true. Read more ›