God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell Paperbacks) [Paperback]

Alvin Plantinga (Author)

Product Details

• Paperback: 277 pages
• Publisher: Cornell University Press (March 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801497353
• ISBN-13: 978-0801497353
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.5 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #409,126 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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66 of 70 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An excellent discussion of the classical theistic arguments, February 14, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell Paperbacks) (Paperback)

Truly excellent. This work contains what is perhaps the best discussion of the cosmological argument in print. His treatments of the design argument and of the verificationist challenge to religious language are also first rate. While I find his conclusion--that belief in God is in the same epistemic boat as belief in other minds--less than convincing, his brillant discussion of the topic is still well worth reading. Plantinga isn't always easy to follow, but he repays careful study. Moreover, while he has written much since, this work is still an absolute must read for anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of religion.--Greg Klebanoff

25 of 25 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Important Work in the Philosophy of Religion, December 15, 2005

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Reader From Aurora - See all my reviews

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This review is from: God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell Paperbacks) (Paperback)

Alvin Plantinga's "God and Other Minds" examines leading arguments for and against the existence of God. Plantinga is arguably the pre-eminent contemporary philosopher of religion. Originally published in the 1960s this edition was re-released in 1991with a new preface.

The first part of the book discusses the classic arguments for and against the existence of God: cosmological, ontological, teleological, existence of evil and divine hiddeness. Whereas the latter part of the text argues that belief in God is rational along the lines that belief in other minds is rational. I offer a few comments.

This is an important work in the philosophy of religion and Plantinga is an important thinker in this area. That said, however, I would not recommend this as an entry point into his work. This is one of his earliest works - he has written a tremendous amount of more concise and accessible material in the interim. For students of the philosophy of religion, however, this remains an essential read. This is classic Plantinga - some clear brilliance and exhaustive examination (at times bordering on the tedious). Readers not accustomed to rigorous philosophical analysis may find it a particularly tough slog at times.

Overall this is an important work by a leading philosopher. For those starting out in this area I might suggest something by Craig (theist) or Mackie (atheist) before engaging Plantinga.

45 of 53 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Surely You Jest, November 3, 2004

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S. Guha (Redmond, Washington United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell Paperbacks) (Paperback)

If this book has a real defect, it is simply the extraordinary level of logical rigor. Rigor past a certain point is rigor mortis. It may be the most exacting discussion of arguments from other minds and from design ever written, and shows in detail (and, to my mind, pretty conclusively) that the usual forms of these arguments do not work. Whoever calls it a "survey" is talking through his hat; it is one of the most original pieces of destructive philosophical criticism since Hume's dialogues on natural religion.

The fellow who calls it a survey tells us that, while reason is powerless to justify belief in other minds, it is false that this means belief in God is just as rational as belief in other minds, because "we are compelled by experience to believe" in other minds. This is a howlingly bad argument. First of all, it is not at all obvious that we are so compelled, since there have been solipsists, Absolute Idealists, monistic pantheists, and skeptics of several varieties. The most that is obvious is that we are compelled to *act as if* there are other minds in ordinary life (ordinary American life, as opposed, say, to an ascetic in a cave)--which is not clearly the same as believing in them. Second, and more importantly, a universal compulsion to believe is not a *reason* to believe, in the sense relevant to traditional epistemology. The mere fact, if it is a fact, that we are naturally inclined (even irresistibly) to believe something doesn't mean our belief is *true*, nor does it constitute any reason to think that it's true. So to point to such a compulsion, even if it exists, is to give no justification at all for the belief. Therefore, even if belief in God is *completely unjustified and irrational*, for all this argument shows, it is exactly as rational as belief in other minds.

And further, Plantinga is not *offering* a justification of "faith" or of theism, in the sense of giving any reasons for believing in God. He is offering an argument that theism is rational, not in the sense that there are reasons for believing it, but in the sense that it is not contrary to reason to believe it without *having* reasons in support of it. These two are not equivalent, unless you beg the question by assuming that nothing is reasonable to believe except what can be proved by reason.

That doesn't mean Plantinga is right. But it does mean that these self-important, puerile criticisms reflect poorly on the critic, not on Plantinga.