God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments [Hardcover]

Yujin Nagasawa (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: February 18, 2008

In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. He proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's well-known 'knowledge arguments' against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness by utilizing his own objections to arguments against the existence of God. From the failure of these arguments, Nagasawa derives a unique metaphysical thesis, 'nontheoretical physicalism,' according to which although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences.

Editorial Reviews

Book Description

This book bridges debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion through its defence of 'non-theoretical physicalism'. It proposes novel objections to Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's arguments against physicalism about consciousness by appealing to the author's own objections to certain arguments against the existence of God.

About the Author

Yujin Nagasawa is Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham and Honorary Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the Australian National University. He is the author of numerous journal articles and co-editor of There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument and New Waves in Philosophy of Religion.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 176 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; 1 edition (February 18, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521879663
• ISBN-13: 978-0521879668
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.3 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,438,621 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Yujin Nagasawa is Reader in Philosophy of Religion and Co-Director of the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham in the UK. He is author of The Existence of God (Routledge, 2011) and God and Phenomenal Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, 2008), and editor/co-editor of three books: There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (MIT Press, 2004), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), and Scientific Approaches to Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). He was awarded the Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize in 2007 and the John Templeton Award for Theological Promise in 2008. Yujin Nagasawa's website: http://www.yujinnagasawa.com

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Original and Insightful, April 26, 2009

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TiZ - See all my reviews

This review is from: God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments (Hardcover)

This book investigates knowledge arguments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. The knowledge arguments in the philosophy of mind are arguments against materialism, and the knowledge arguments in the philosophy of religion are arguments against the existence of God. Nagasawa argues that none of these arguments are successful, and develops his own theory of the human mind and the divine mind.
The knowledge arguments in the philosophy of mind are the arguments of Nagel and Jackson. Very roughly, these arguments purport to show that we could know everything there is to know about the material brain without knowing everything about the subject's psychological states (particularly what it is like to be in conscious states), and conclude that there is more to such states than the material states of the brain.
The knowledge arguments in the philosophy of religion include an argument from Grim and various arguments about concept possession. Very roughly, these arguments purport to show that God could not know various facts because of his attributes (for example, his omnipotence precludes his knowing what fear is like). The arguments conclude that God could not be omniscient, and so could not exist.
Nagasawa first explains what makes an argument a knowledge argument, and why these arguments are knowledge arguments. He then presents the knowledge arguments in philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind and evaluates them by comparing and contrasting them. Finally, he argues that his criticisms support a novel theory, non-theoretical physicalism.
This book makes original and important contributions to philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion, and integrates work in these fields in insightful ways. The arguments are constructed very carefully, and the criticisms are powerful, though I do not agree with Nagasawa's non-theoretical physicalism. The book is well organized and the writing is clear and elegant.
This is an excellent book, and I recommend it highly to philosophy students and professional philosophers interested in the philosophy of mind and/or the philosophy of religion. Some sections may not be accessible to those without previous exposure to philosophy.