Boyd has produced perhaps the most readable and accessible defense of open theism thus far in the debate. He covers most of the biblical and philosophical aspects in a manner that is easy to comprehend for the untrained reader.
Boyd's main thesis is that the Bible presents its readers with two motifs: the openness motif (that the future consists of possibilities rather than certainties) and the motif of future determinism (that some things are certain to happen). He begins by examining the determinism motif, and gives a representative survey of those Scriptures usually proffered by classical theists to suggest that God's knowledge of the future is exhaustive in every detail. He is generally about 50/50 on target with his observations, and one gets the feeling that one would be hard-pressed to eke out of the biblical information available that every single aspect of the future is foreknown (or even predetermined) by God in advance. Boyd is careful, on the whole, to look at the context of statements about God's knowledge of the future, and convincingly demonstrates in a number of instances that what is being affirmed is not God's exhaustive foreknowledge but God's certainty about the plans he has designed to carry out.
He is on shakier ground when it comes to examining the stories of Peter and Judas, and he needs to go further to explain how God could know with absolute certainty what action they would take, since everything Boyd has said so far in his thesis would seem to suggest that God could only be certain of the likelihood (albeit a very high probability) of things happening the way he predicted.
Boyd explains well how future settledness and future openness work together, and how the two motifs are adequate to explain much of what the Bible reveals about God's sovereignty and foreknowledge. God sets limits within which we are to exercise free will, and this therefore gives him knowledge of a particular breadth of different possibilities. He sets certain parameters which condition the scope of human freedom (therefore some things are determined), but within those limits there are possibilities (therefore some of the future is open).
He goes on to examine some of the passages that point to future openness. He demonstrates adequately that the motif is definitely there in Scripture. However, to his detriment, he tends to go overboard and find the motif where it really isn't there. For example, when God asks the question, on more than one occasion, 'How long will...' the most obvious thought to occur to the reader is that what he is saying is rhetorical (a clear understanding of language acknowledges that grammatical structure does not always equal function). If Boyd is to claim otherwise, the burden of proof is upon him. He makes this error on a few occasions. The other major observation about this section is that Boyd's style, though comprehensible, becomes rather pedantic, even patronizing. There is an excess of question marks and italics as the author labors the point that the openness motif is incompatible with traditional assumptions about God's foreknowledge. He is generally justified in his points, but his manner becomes rather tiresome.
By the time he gets onto describing the practical advantages of holding to an open theism, Boyd has done a sufficient job to convince the reader that something along the lines of an open view of God is required by Scripture. He reinforces time and again, and quite sincerely, I think, that it is the study of Scripture that has led him, primarily, to adopt the open view. He highlights some compelling advantages to believing open theism, and does a good job of presenting it as an attractive option which neither limits God, nor takes away from His glory. However, on attempting to use open theism as a solution to the problem of evil, he fails to interact with another theme of Scripture, that God will ordain 'evil' within the scope of his plans. In discussing Job, he casually dismisses the thought that God was responsible for what happened to Job, that it was all in his plan, and labels those who suggest such things 'Job's comforters'. However, was it not Job himself who acknowledged God's hand in what happened, and was not Job said to be blameless in what he said of God? Using the example of an acquaintance who underwent much suffering, Boyd castigates those who suggested it might be part of God's plan to shape her or teach her, and says this would make God a pretty lousy teacher. However, if Boyd's system is right, who is he to make such a judgment? Surely, if we have free will, God can well ordain such events to teach us things, or to shape us, and if it fails, the responsibility is solely down to our stubbornness or unwillingness to learn. Boyd seems to allow no room for suffering of that nature.
In the final (and strongest) section, he deals with objections. His ability to offer clear and vivid illustrations is his greatest asset here. He ably demonstrates that the openness debate is not about God's omniscience, for on both sides of the debate proponents affirm that God's knowledge is perfect and complete. The real issue is the content of that knowledge. That is, if the future is not really there to know, then it is no limitation to suggest that God does not have that knowledge. He also offers a useful defense of the open view of God's sovereignty, and makes it his aim to turn the tables on classical theists by suggesting that it is their conception of God that takes away from his glory, and limits his power.
The flaws are not big enough to challenge Boyd's overall thesis. His biblical and philosophical arguments are not easily dismissed, though it is admitted that his conclusions need fine-tuning. In the meantime, Boyd's book provides a useful resource while theologians battle it out to find a middle way.
