-I would recommend this book highly. It's lucidly written with playful wit while covering an array of topics that concern both atheist and theist alike. Baggett and Walls' (Henceforth Baggett) essential point is that morality does not make sense unless it is given by God. This book is such a good read, in part, because this thesis is so applicable, especially in response to the New Atheism crowd who believe they can have a sensible morality apart from God.
Baggett constructs a moral apologetic by offering multiple versions of the moral argument. He details a theistic ethic. And by answering normativity, epistemic, autonomy, and arbitrariness objections, Baggett strengthens the moral argument not only for God's existence but also for God's love and moral goodness as perfect, necessary, and recognizable.
These discussions also inform our understanding of natural law, the problem of evil, conquest narratives, and the moral relevance of the Trinity, incarnation, resurrection, and afterlife. The moral argument for God's existence is powerful and persuasive but too often neglected in natural theology.
Some of the specific subject matter is given below as preview.
The author addresses the Euthyphro Dilemma and seeks the best reconciliation. Both horns of this dilemma are uncomfortable and undesired by theists: to affirm that something is good because God commands it is to invite arbitrariness, but to affirm instead that God commands what is already moral makes it seem as if morality is independent of God and God is accountable to it. Murray Macbeath's response is that God chooses actions because they maximize our happiness, which might be the reason they are moral. This question will be a motif developed throughout the text as Baggett proceeds to answer it.
Baggett defends an Anselmian conception of God against charges that it is unbiblical and that it wrongly predicates moral goodness and perfect moral goodness of God. The "conceivability argument" is specifically addressed and rejected. It states that because God's sinning is conceivable, sinning is possible, and God is thus not impeccable. This argument is problematic, for conceivability is a fuzzy concept. This argument does not seem to be employing a definition of epistemic possibility, and if it is instead using conceivability to mean something closer to imaginability, our ability to think of the proposition with mental clarity, then that is equally problematic given that there are propositions known to be true that our imagination fails to sufficiently grasp.
He argues that in order for the moral argument to provide rational reason to believe in God, God's goodness must be recognizable. Otherwise the word "good" is being used to refer to something that isn't recognizably good, an equivocation. For this reason, he rejects Calvinism. Calvinists ascribe to radical voluntarism, the former horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, that whatever God does is good because he does it (arbitrariness). Baggett challenges this notion by posing counter examples. What if God commanded us to torture children? This would immediately strike us as intuitively wrong, and to admit it as "good" would entirely erode any intelligible understanding of what goodness is.
Baggett does not claim that the moral argument settles all apologetic concerns relating to God's existence; however he it does point to a transcendental source (God). Confidence in morality as real, objective, prescriptive, and authoritative is requisite for a workable moral argument for God's existence. Nonetheless, someone can be rational in believing in objective morality even while doubting God's existence because there are good reasons for moral realism by itself.
He condones the atheist for believing in objective morality, for she, whether she realizes it or not, is accepting the seeds of the moral argument. Two sorts of atheists broadly represent the opponents discussed throughout this book: the moral objectivist and the Nietzschian. The former, perhaps the New Atheist crowd, attempts to make sense of morality without God, while the ladder rejects it. Baggett encourages the atheist to cultivate his sense of moral realism, for it is that conviction that may point to a more coherent (and likely theistic) set of beliefs.
There seems to be something profoundly right about not giving morality up, the author states. In trying to understand the truth of reality, morality is one subject too obviousness to toss. The Calvinist too, who Baggett critiques as lacking a true sense of God's recognizable love, still holds that God loves everyone.
Once again, this is a fantastic read, not only for a student of philosophy, but also for the convicted laymen. It is fluid and accessible meanwhile challenging but fun. Seriously, read it.
-John Hare wrote an interesting and helpful review of this book. One point of his I wish to discuss as it is, I believe, a bit unfair. Hare states that the book would be better off without chapter four, A Reformed Tradition Not Quite Right. This was the chapter I mentioned above which dealt with Calvinism's resultant unintelligible definition of goodness. First of all, and I admit this is trivial of me to mention, Hare notes the book's sarcasm towards Calvinism. While this is true, it's actually quite funny and part of Baggett's humorous writing style.
Secondly, Hare states that "They do not discuss either the biblical texts that lie behind the Calvinist view or the motivation that also lies behind it." Hare is assuming that Baggett is providing philosophical arguments against Calvinism while ignoring the scriptural or exegetical arguments for Calvinism. This is not the case. Baggett's philophical arguments should cause us not to reject Calvinism prima facie, but to reflect on the alleged scriptural interpretation supporting Calvinism and reexamine those verses. Baggett illustrates that the Calvinist, upon admitting that goodness is something defined simply by what God commands (voluntarism), even if that command is to torture babies, is left with an unintelligible sense of God's goodness. We should take great pause here beacuse we know that the concept of God's goodness or omnibenevolence is essential to our interpretation of the scriptures. If Calvinism discards a concept that is obvious to a careful interpretation of scripture, what else might they discard? The skepticism should cause us to reaxime how the Calvinist is performing his exegesis.
LAD