In Good and Real, Gary Drescher examines a series of provocative paradoxes about consciousness, choice, ethics, quantum mechanics, and other topics, in an effort to reconcile a purely mechanical view of the universe with key aspects of our subjective impressions of our own existence.Many scientists suspect that the universe can ultimately be described by a simple (perhaps even deterministic) formalism; all that is real unfolds mechanically according to that formalism. But how, then, is it possible for us to be conscious, or to make genuine choices? And how can there be an ethical dimension to such choices? Drescher sketches computational models of consciousness, choice, and subjunctive reasoning--what would happen if this or that were to occur?--to show how such phenomena are compatible with a mechanical, even deterministic universe. Analyses of Newcomb's Problem (a paradox about choice) and the Prisoner's Dilemma (a paradox about self-interest vs. altruism, arguably reducible to Newcomb's Problem) help bring the problems and proposed solutions into focus. Regarding quantum mechanics, Drescher builds on Everett's relative-state formulation--but presenting a simplified formalism, accessible to laypersons--to argue that, contrary to some popular impressions, quantum mechanics is compatible with an objective, deterministic physical reality, and that there is no special connection between quantum phenomena and consciousness.In each of several disparate but intertwined topics ranging from physics to ethics, Drescher argues that a missing technical linchpin can make the quest for objectivity seem impossible, until the elusive technical fix is at hand.
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"A breathtakingly original assault on all the Big Issues! When philosophers get stuck in ruts, it often takes a brilliant outsider tojolt them onto new ground, and Gary Drescher, coming to philosophy from AI, offers a startling feast of new ideas. I'm sure some of them are right, but I can't tell which! Can you?"--Daniel Dennett, author of *Brainchildren*, *Sweet Dreams*, and *Breaking the Spell*
"*Somehow* the brain must be the mind --- *your* brain must be *your* mind. How can we get to a vantage point from which we can understand this? The steady march of neuroscience, or the mincing crabwalk of academic philosophy, will take you only a few steps. Dan Lloyd has found a delicious way of seducing our imaginations into brand new places, the places we have all been trying to reach: try mind dancing in this new genre, the neuroscience novel of consciousness."--Daniel Dennett, author of *Brainchildren*, *Sweet Dreams*, and *Breaking the Spell*
About the Author
Gary L. Drescher is an independent scholar and was recently Visiting Fellow at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. He received his Ph.D. in computer science from MIT in 1989 and is the author of Made-Up Minds: A Constructivist Approach to Artificial Intelligence (MIT Press, 1991).
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27 of 28 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
Explain to people that they are fully natural, caused creatures, that they don't have contra-causal free will, and they often suppose you're dallying with fatalism. Explain that there is no provable basis for morality outside the natural world, and they often assume you're a moral relativist or nihilist. How can we construe human choices as anything but illusory if all we do is completely determined? How can we judge behavior right or wrong if there are no supernatural ethical foundations?
In Good and Real, computer scientist and independent scholar Gary Drescher mounts a mind-bending attack on these and other problems that arise when commonsense conflicts with the science-based view that we inhabit a purely physical, mechanistic, deterministic universe. (Please fasten your seatbelts.) Establishing that we are in such a universe is just one of his projects, set forth in a chapter called "Quantum Certainty." Drescher explains and defends Hugh Everett's relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics in which there is no collapse of the waveform and in which the evolution of the (locally branching) universe in configuration space is fully deterministic. This unflinching fidelity to the mathematical quantum formalism is quite the opposite of pop-quantum physics, for instance as popularized by the film What the Bleep Do We Know, which gives the putatively undetermined conscious observer a special role in "creating" reality by collapsing the waveform. Here as elsewhere in the book Drescher draws a tough-minded, unpopular conclusion: sorry, we don't create our own reality.
Nor is consciousness something that transcends mechanism. Rather, Drescher explains in "Dust to Lust," it's what happens when a representational system goes recursive and starts taking its own episodes of representing as objects of further representation. Consciousness isn't something extra generated by recursion, it is recursion (of a particular type), and so not anything that can't be instantiated by a sufficiently complex mechanism, for instance, ourselves. Many readers will object to such a characterization: after all, we're not just machines, are we? Well yes, we're organic machines, choice machines in fact, Drescher says, whose consciousness and rationality can best be explained as the complex deterministic functionality of achieving goal states that have many sub-goals. Sticking with science, there's no reason to suppose we're animated by something non-physical in our goal-seeking behavior, since that assumption does no explanatory work. It's here that many will likely part company with Drescher, and hold out for extra-scientific claims about our cognitive capacities, for instance that consciousness transcends the brain. Such claims support a more "optimistic" view about human exceptionalism, in which our choices have contra-causal leverage over the world. But this refuses to let empirical findings drive our conclusions about reality - a no-no of the first order for scientific naturalists like Drescher.
The discussions of consciousness and quantum physics are joined by a consideration of time in the chapter "Going Without the Flow." Drescher reminds us that, according to 100 year-old standard physics, all events are sitting statically in four dimensional space-time. The past, present and future just are - there is no cursor moving forward along the time dimension that temporarily endows each moment with reality. All moments are equally real, which means that the future is there, "waiting" to be discovered by consciousness, not created de novo by human action. Now we start to see the problem for our standard intuition about human efficacy: if the future is inalterable, aren't choices futile?
Before tackling this problem, Drescher explains how the illusory impression of the flow of time arises, and further, given that basic physical laws don't specify a temporal direction, why it is we only observe events evolving forward in time, not backwards. As is often the case in this book, readers will find the explanations challenging; not because the writing isn't lucid (it is, and often entertaining) but simply due to the conceptual complexity and counterintuitiveness of the material, which sometimes translates, inevitably, into what are politely referred to as technicalities. Although the gist of his conclusions can be grasped without tangling with the tough parts, to decide if he's right requires you grapple with them.
The last third of Good and Real is devoted to the twin problems of choice and ethics in a deterministic universe, and if your mind isn't already stretched, this will definitely do the trick. If we are choice machines, whose every decision is etched inalterably in the space-time manifold, and whose consciousness isn't privileged in creating reality, why bother to act for the sake of what already exists? Part of the answer is relatively straightforward: if we didn't bother to engage in choice making behavior, which ordinarily includes considering alternative possibilities, then we wouldn't be as likely to achieve our goals. And choices needn't involve our being causal exceptions to nature:
"Thus choice...is a mechanical process compatible with determinism: choice is a process of examining assertions about what would be the case if this or that action were taken, and then selecting an action according to a preference about what would be the case. The objection *The agent didn't really make a choice, because the outcome was already predetermined* is as much a non sequitur as the objection *The motor didn't really exert force, because the outcome was already predetermined.* Both choice making and motor spinning are particular kinds of mechanical processes. In neither case does the predetermination of the outcome imply that the process didn't really take place." (p. 192, original emphasis)
But the rest of Drescher's answer takes us way down the rabbit hole, first by means of the seemingly innocent example of safely crossing the street, followed by his solution to Newcomb's Problem, a notorious thought experiment about choice and prediction that has divided philosophers for decades. It turns out, says Drescher, that it makes sense to act as if your choice had an effect on conditions preceding the choice, even though there's no causal link between your choice and those conditions. There exists what he calls a subjunctive means-end relation, a non-causal link between action and desired states of affairs. Therefore, Drescher argues, it can be rational to act for the sake of states of affairs that you know already obtain. If this seems completely counter-intuitive, join the club. Making it intuitive or at least logically transparent is Drescher's goal, which in my case was not achieved, at least at first pass (which says nothing about whether he's correct, since it will likely take several passes to fully understand the argument).
The capstone of Drescher's tour de force is to apply the rationality of appreciating subjunctive means-ends relations to the classic problem of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and from that derive an ethics grounded in enlightened self-interest. Agents caught in the dilemma who are smart enough to grasp the reality of subjunctive means-ends links will see that it's in their best interest to cooperate, not defect. This insight, generalized, becomes the rational basis for Kant's categorical imperative and the golden rule. Unlike Kant, however, Drescher posits nothing beyond the physical space-time continuum and goal-seeking choice machines (us) to establish this most basic ethical maxim. So, perhaps, he has fully naturalized it.
The scope of Drescher's ambition in this volume will not have escaped the reader. But he doesn't come across as ambitious or overbearing, just curious and relentlessly logical, wanting to get to the bottom of the best puzzles that unvarnished reality offers. That he ventures into such diverse territory might make specialists suspicious, but Drescher seems to have done his homework. Deciding whether he's right in any given instance will, however, require a close reading of his arguments and an evaluation of his evidentiary basis, for instance in consciousness studies, physics, game theory, and behavioral economics. Many of us non-specialists will likely have to reserve judgment, but can we suppose that standard intuitions about choice and reality, comforting though they be, are better than Drescher's carefully thought out if counterintuitive conclusions? Here are the big questions, addressed by a gifted, independent-minded thinker, made real for us in all their perplexity, and it's good that we should catch at least a glimpse of well-argued answers that form a satisfying whole. A deterministic, godless universe can, it seems, offer a sufficient basis for human efficacy and ethics.
Note: Gary Drescher's first book, on artificial intelligence, is Made-Up Minds, MIT Press.
Another recommendation: "A breathtakingly original assault on all the Big Issues! When philosophers get stuck in ruts, it often takes a brilliant outsider to jolt them onto new ground, and Gary Drescher, coming to philosophy from AI, offers a startling feast of new ideas." - Daniel Dennett (from the book jacket)
In Good and Real, computer scientist and independent scholar Gary Drescher mounts a mind-bending attack on these and other problems that arise when commonsense conflicts with the science-based view that we inhabit a purely physical, mechanistic, deterministic universe. (Please fasten your seatbelts.) Establishing that we are in such a universe is just one of his projects, set forth in a chapter called "Quantum Certainty." Drescher explains and defends Hugh Everett's relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics in which there is no collapse of the waveform and in which the evolution of the (locally branching) universe in configuration space is fully deterministic. This unflinching fidelity to the mathematical quantum formalism is quite the opposite of pop-quantum physics, for instance as popularized by the film What the Bleep Do We Know, which gives the putatively undetermined conscious observer a special role in "creating" reality by collapsing the waveform. Here as elsewhere in the book Drescher draws a tough-minded, unpopular conclusion: sorry, we don't create our own reality.
Nor is consciousness something that transcends mechanism. Rather, Drescher explains in "Dust to Lust," it's what happens when a representational system goes recursive and starts taking its own episodes of representing as objects of further representation. Consciousness isn't something extra generated by recursion, it is recursion (of a particular type), and so not anything that can't be instantiated by a sufficiently complex mechanism, for instance, ourselves. Many readers will object to such a characterization: after all, we're not just machines, are we? Well yes, we're organic machines, choice machines in fact, Drescher says, whose consciousness and rationality can best be explained as the complex deterministic functionality of achieving goal states that have many sub-goals. Sticking with science, there's no reason to suppose we're animated by something non-physical in our goal-seeking behavior, since that assumption does no explanatory work. It's here that many will likely part company with Drescher, and hold out for extra-scientific claims about our cognitive capacities, for instance that consciousness transcends the brain. Such claims support a more "optimistic" view about human exceptionalism, in which our choices have contra-causal leverage over the world. But this refuses to let empirical findings drive our conclusions about reality - a no-no of the first order for scientific naturalists like Drescher.
The discussions of consciousness and quantum physics are joined by a consideration of time in the chapter "Going Without the Flow." Drescher reminds us that, according to 100 year-old standard physics, all events are sitting statically in four dimensional space-time. The past, present and future just are - there is no cursor moving forward along the time dimension that temporarily endows each moment with reality. All moments are equally real, which means that the future is there, "waiting" to be discovered by consciousness, not created de novo by human action. Now we start to see the problem for our standard intuition about human efficacy: if the future is inalterable, aren't choices futile?
Before tackling this problem, Drescher explains how the illusory impression of the flow of time arises, and further, given that basic physical laws don't specify a temporal direction, why it is we only observe events evolving forward in time, not backwards. As is often the case in this book, readers will find the explanations challenging; not because the writing isn't lucid (it is, and often entertaining) but simply due to the conceptual complexity and counterintuitiveness of the material, which sometimes translates, inevitably, into what are politely referred to as technicalities. Although the gist of his conclusions can be grasped without tangling with the tough parts, to decide if he's right requires you grapple with them.
The last third of Good and Real is devoted to the twin problems of choice and ethics in a deterministic universe, and if your mind isn't already stretched, this will definitely do the trick. If we are choice machines, whose every decision is etched inalterably in the space-time manifold, and whose consciousness isn't privileged in creating reality, why bother to act for the sake of what already exists? Part of the answer is relatively straightforward: if we didn't bother to engage in choice making behavior, which ordinarily includes considering alternative possibilities, then we wouldn't be as likely to achieve our goals. And choices needn't involve our being causal exceptions to nature:
"Thus choice...is a mechanical process compatible with determinism: choice is a process of examining assertions about what would be the case if this or that action were taken, and then selecting an action according to a preference about what would be the case. The objection *The agent didn't really make a choice, because the outcome was already predetermined* is as much a non sequitur as the objection *The motor didn't really exert force, because the outcome was already predetermined.* Both choice making and motor spinning are particular kinds of mechanical processes. In neither case does the predetermination of the outcome imply that the process didn't really take place." (p. 192, original emphasis)
But the rest of Drescher's answer takes us way down the rabbit hole, first by means of the seemingly innocent example of safely crossing the street, followed by his solution to Newcomb's Problem, a notorious thought experiment about choice and prediction that has divided philosophers for decades. It turns out, says Drescher, that it makes sense to act as if your choice had an effect on conditions preceding the choice, even though there's no causal link between your choice and those conditions. There exists what he calls a subjunctive means-end relation, a non-causal link between action and desired states of affairs. Therefore, Drescher argues, it can be rational to act for the sake of states of affairs that you know already obtain. If this seems completely counter-intuitive, join the club. Making it intuitive or at least logically transparent is Drescher's goal, which in my case was not achieved, at least at first pass (which says nothing about whether he's correct, since it will likely take several passes to fully understand the argument).
The capstone of Drescher's tour de force is to apply the rationality of appreciating subjunctive means-ends relations to the classic problem of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and from that derive an ethics grounded in enlightened self-interest. Agents caught in the dilemma who are smart enough to grasp the reality of subjunctive means-ends links will see that it's in their best interest to cooperate, not defect. This insight, generalized, becomes the rational basis for Kant's categorical imperative and the golden rule. Unlike Kant, however, Drescher posits nothing beyond the physical space-time continuum and goal-seeking choice machines (us) to establish this most basic ethical maxim. So, perhaps, he has fully naturalized it.
The scope of Drescher's ambition in this volume will not have escaped the reader. But he doesn't come across as ambitious or overbearing, just curious and relentlessly logical, wanting to get to the bottom of the best puzzles that unvarnished reality offers. That he ventures into such diverse territory might make specialists suspicious, but Drescher seems to have done his homework. Deciding whether he's right in any given instance will, however, require a close reading of his arguments and an evaluation of his evidentiary basis, for instance in consciousness studies, physics, game theory, and behavioral economics. Many of us non-specialists will likely have to reserve judgment, but can we suppose that standard intuitions about choice and reality, comforting though they be, are better than Drescher's carefully thought out if counterintuitive conclusions? Here are the big questions, addressed by a gifted, independent-minded thinker, made real for us in all their perplexity, and it's good that we should catch at least a glimpse of well-argued answers that form a satisfying whole. A deterministic, godless universe can, it seems, offer a sufficient basis for human efficacy and ethics.
Note: Gary Drescher's first book, on artificial intelligence, is Made-Up Minds, MIT Press.
Another recommendation: "A breathtakingly original assault on all the Big Issues! When philosophers get stuck in ruts, it often takes a brilliant outsider to jolt them onto new ground, and Gary Drescher, coming to philosophy from AI, offers a startling feast of new ideas." - Daniel Dennett (from the book jacket)
5 of 6 people found the following review helpful
By Joel Kelso
Format:Hardcover
The thesis of this book is that a basic misunderstanding of the nature of human consciousness lies at the root of at least three apparent paradoxes: the arrow of time (if the laws of physics are reversible, why are we clearly moving forward in time), the interpretation of quantum mechanics (how can the universe seemingly depend on whether or not someone is watching it), and free will (if the universe is in principal completely predictable, what does it mean to say we choose anything ?). The author's resolutions involve carefully re-examining the premises of each paradox under the assumption that consciousness is a process that is part of the physical universe and not something somehow separate.
If you are sure that consciousness is a supernatural phenomona, this book will be gibberish to you.
The author goes on to talk about counterfactual reasoning, which was a key to resolving the paradoxes. He posits that understanding descision theory that correctly incorporates counterfactual reasoning (there is a good explanation of evidential and causal decision theory and where they each fail) can explain several features of human ethics.
I started out in agreement with the book's premises, and found the arguments generally convincing and helpful, although I feel that the parts about counterfactual reasoning and ethics as a bit speculative.
If you are sure that consciousness is a supernatural phenomona, this book will be gibberish to you.
The author goes on to talk about counterfactual reasoning, which was a key to resolving the paradoxes. He posits that understanding descision theory that correctly incorporates counterfactual reasoning (there is a good explanation of evidential and causal decision theory and where they each fail) can explain several features of human ethics.
I started out in agreement with the book's premises, and found the arguments generally convincing and helpful, although I feel that the parts about counterfactual reasoning and ethics as a bit speculative.
4 of 5 people found the following review helpful
By Danny Hillis
Format:Hardcover
I am proud to write a review for this book, because I am convinced that philosophers of the future will look back on it as being ahead of its time.
Drescher establishes a comprehensive framework for studying some of the most difficult problems in philosophy, starting with a mechanistic view of the mind. With these tools, he dissects some of the most perplexing philosophical problems, questions about mind and body, consciousness, cause and effect, and moral choice. Drescher demonstrates convincingly that many our intuitions about free will and moral choice are not only not contradicted by a mechanistic view, but can be supported by it
I expect this book will not achieve the recognition it deserves for many years, because Drescher's way of thinking will be not be easy for readers with twentieth-century assumptions. Yet I am convinced that philosophers of the future will look back at this book in wonder, not because his ideas will be strange to them, but because they will find it surprising that we had so much trouble accepting them.
Drescher establishes a comprehensive framework for studying some of the most difficult problems in philosophy, starting with a mechanistic view of the mind. With these tools, he dissects some of the most perplexing philosophical problems, questions about mind and body, consciousness, cause and effect, and moral choice. Drescher demonstrates convincingly that many our intuitions about free will and moral choice are not only not contradicted by a mechanistic view, but can be supported by it
I expect this book will not achieve the recognition it deserves for many years, because Drescher's way of thinking will be not be easy for readers with twentieth-century assumptions. Yet I am convinced that philosophers of the future will look back at this book in wonder, not because his ideas will be strange to them, but because they will find it surprising that we had so much trouble accepting them.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
4.0 out of 5 stars
Ambitious naturalistic philosophy
'Ambitious' does not do justice to the scope of this book's project of explaining no less than all of reality and dispelling the most beguiling of modern philosophical paradoxes. Read more
Published 1 month ago by haig shahinian
4.0 out of 5 stars
Good conclusions backed by unconvincing arguments
This book tries to derive ought from is. The more important steps explain why we should choose the one-box answer to Newcomb's problem, then argue that the same reasoning should... Read more
Published on April 28, 2009 by Peter McCluskey
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