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The Gorbachev Factor

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In the first sentence of "The Gorbachev Factor," Archie Brown tells his readers that his work "is neither a history of the Gorbachev era, nor a biography of Mikhail Gorbachev." On reading that, this "country boy" had to ask..."well what is it?" Well, by the end I knew: Brown's work is an outstanding analysis of Mikhail Gorbachev's influence on Soviet history in the 1980's. It is a well written, well researched and well documented account not just of Gorbachev's role during this time, the the myiad factors that influenced Gorbachev. Now, there "ain't" no doubt that Brown likes Gorbachev. While Brown points our more than ove of Gorbachev's faults, the lion's share of Brown's work tend to vindicate his actions and elevate his intent. But this is no simple apology for the leader of a regime that fell. Rather, it is an in-depth look at the incredable challenges and paradoxical results of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership of the Soviet Union.

Archie Brown has written a thought provoking and sympathetic analysis of the political leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev spanning his rein as Secretary General of the Central Committee (president) of the Soviet Union from 1985 to its collapse in 1991. Brown argues it was the "Gorbachev Factor," the Secretary General's role as a reformer, an initiator of change that totally transformed the Soviet Union's political system to that of a pluralist structure based on a democratic socialist model. Although the author admits this is not a biography of Gorbachev and points out the importance of placing the man within the context of political, economic and social events of the time, Gorbachev remains the central focus of this work. Brown counters several of the myths, both emanating from the West as well as within the Soviet political structure regarding the pros and cons of Gorbachev's tenure. Brown states Gorbachev had an agenda of four transformational reforms when he took office in 1985. Individual chapters in the book cover these goals in detail. First was the plan for economic reform (Chapter 5). Second, Gorbachev envisioned the liberalization of the present political system (Chapter 6). Third, involved revising Soviet foreign policy including replacing the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Bloc countries with a cooperative alternative; drastically reduce the Soviet military presence in those countries; pull out of Afghanistan; and ending the Cold War between East and West (Chapter 7). A forth consideration involved the nationalist question concerning sovereignty and statehood within the borders of the Soviet Union, and the challenge of preserving that union (Chapter 8). What Gorbachev did not envision, nor had he anticipated, emphasizes Brown, was the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Brown believes Gorbachev's greatest contribution lies in the political arena. Brown claims Gorbachev acted more like a western politician than any of his predecessors. Gorbachev it seems was able to pull off impossible political feats while working within the constraints of the Soviet system. By 1989-1990, argues, Brown, Gorbachev surely made the Soviet political system "different" than the one he had inherited. By "different," the author means the government became a pluralist system with the introduction of contested elections and the establishment of autonomous political organizations. As the author notes, this became a double-edged sword as a result of losing the eastern countries, "the fruit of the Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War," a conservative element, headed by the real culprit in Brown's view: Boris Yeltsin, began to exert pressure. Brown counters those who claim Gorbachev initially paid lip service to Marxist-Leninist ideology and bent to pressure from the far right. Brown simply illustrates that Gorbachev required the use of subtle vocabulary instead of attacking the Soviet system head on. Gorbachev did not want to become another Khrushchev and be ousted from office before his task was completed. The failed August 1991 coup and his eventual resignation in December ironically made the latter prediction a reality and initiated the criticisms of Gorbachev as a failure. Brown emphatically states the collapse of the Soviet Union was the direct result of pressure exuded by Yeltsin's conservatives, and the August plotters of the failed putsch, not any fault of Gorbachev's. Brown admits Gorbachev was less successful in the economic arena as well as dealing with the "Nationalist question." According to Brown, the Soviet Union had no historical president of an open market economy. By 1990, most agriculture as well as the total industrial sector was still state owned, while smaller shops and businesses were on their way to attempting the economic transition. Brown is deservingly sympathetic too Gorbachev's chairmanship of the Novo-Ogarevo Committee (1991), an attempt to call representatives of the independent statehoods to negotiate and compromise state sovereignty and preserve the union. Six of the fifteen states refused to attend and the ensuing stagnation resulted in Yeltsin's climb in political popularity over Gorbachev and the latter's eventual political demise. The last point emphasizes a central theme of the book: Gorbachev's popularity. Brown claims that up to the failed August 1991 putsch and beyond, Gorbachev's popularity remained high both in the West and within the Soviet Union. The author gleans from participant memoirs, election results and, most importantly, public opinion surveys. The latter hails from the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, also known as, The All-Russian Center. This data previously unavailable to scholars dispels the notion that Gorbachev was a hero in the West for being the first to proclaim that communism is dead and widely unpopular in the USSR. The author also utilizes numerous "conversations" and interviews with scholars, writers, and politicians both East and West. A plethora of secondary sources in both Russian and English language fills the seventy-one pages of conversational notes consisting of paragraph length citings. Besides obviously crediting Gorbachev as being the mover and shaker in this dramatic political transformation, Brown credits the communist party collectively for bringing to the office of General Secretary a liberal reformer in the personae of Gorbachev. Gorbachev political skills avoided a costly if not bloody delay in this process. Brown agrees along the lines with Steven Kotkin (Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000) in that Gorbachev abhorred violence and a bloody military intervention was not an option for Gorbachev. On the other hand, however, contrary to Kotkin's thesis, Brown seems to suggest that the collapse of the Soviet Union, though not envisioned by Gorbachev in 1985, was inevitable. Had it not been Gorbachev, it would have been someone else in the stable of "New Thinkers" emerging within the new generation of Soviet political hierarchy. But it was Gorbachev, and Brown, though somewhat long-winded at times, succeeds in portraying with this work.