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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) [Paperback]

Elinor Ostrom
4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)

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Book Description

November 30, 1990 0521405998 978-0521405997
Congratulations to Elinor Ostrom, Co-Winner of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009! The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) + The Medici Effect: What Elephants and Epidemics Can Teach Us About Innovation + Thinking in Systems: A Primer
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Editorial Reviews

Review

"In this ambitious, provocative, and very useful book Ostrom combines a lucid theoretical framework with a series of diverse and richly detailed case studies...she tightly reviews and critiques extant models of cooperation and collective action and argues powerfully that communities of actors are sometimes able to maintain a common resource for long periods of time without outside intervention." Contemporary Sociology

"Ostrom's book is an important contribution to the problems of Commom Property Resources that is, the lack of well-defined property rights over a certain resource. Elinor Ostrom convincingly shows that there are many different viable mixtures between public and private, in particular self-organization and self-governance by the users of the common property resource. The book makes fascinating reading, particularly as it is well written." Bruno S. Frey, Kyklos

"This is an important book that deserves to be read widely in the policy community as well as the scholarly community....this analysis leaves us with provocative questions whose examination promises to broaden and deepen our understanding of human/environment relationships at many levels." Oran R. Young, International Environmental Affairs

"Cambridge University Press has published an impressive series called 'The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions.' Elinor Ostrom, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, has made an important contribution to the series with Governing the Commons....In large part, the book is a fascinating and detailed examination of common ownership of various natural resources." Dean Lueck, Constitutional Political Economy

"Students of common-property resource regimes will find much of great interest in the volume." Barry C. Field, Land Economics

"...timely, well-written, and a useful addition to our understanding of the challenges of natural resource management....useful for undergraduate and graduate students as well as field practitioners interested in the development of scientifically based research. It provides a firm grounding in the theoretical underpinnings that should guide empirical investigations....Ostrom offers a unique source of information on the realities of resource management institutions coupled with the challenge for continued examination of institutions in order to develop better ways to address the CPR challenge." Gordon L. Brady, Southern Economic Journal

"Ostrom's book makes an important contribution to the emerging literature on analytical institutional economics. Her work reminds us that analysis of institutions and institutional change is an important aspect of a broader political economy that underlies meaningful economic policy advice." Daniel W. Bromley, Journal of Economic Literature

"This is the most influential book in the last decade on thinking about the commons. For those involved with small communities...located in one nation, whose lives depend on a common pool of renewable resources....Governing the Commons has been the intellectual field guide." Whole Earth

"A classic by one of the best-known thinkers on communities and commons." Yes! A Journal of Positive Futures

Book Description

Neither the state nor the market have been successful in solving common pool resource problems. This study accordingly analyzes communal interests in land, irrigation communities, fisheries, etc. and proposes alternative solutions.

Product Details

  • Paperback: 298 pages
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press (November 30, 1990)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0521405998
  • ISBN-13: 978-0521405997
  • Product Dimensions: 6 x 1 x 9 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #105,742 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

4.3 out of 5 stars
(13)
4.3 out of 5 stars
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
72 of 74 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Hints on how to read Governing the Commons November 13, 2008
By A.G.
Format:Paperback
Elinor Ostrom's Governing the Commons is a wonderful introduction to the world of "common pool resources," a.k.a. CPRs. Technicalities aside, a CPR is a resource that grows over time but can be harvested by more than one person. The classic example of a CPR is the English grazing commons, popularized in Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons." Forests, fisheries, and smog-free air are also good examples.

In her book, Ostrom takes an ethnographic approach to studying the management and mismanagement of CPRs. The key question for managing such commons is sustainability. Without some kind of enforceable agreement among those who would harvest a CPR, the resource will rapidly be depleted and possibly destroyed. Ostrom argues that good collective management can arise naturally from communities of people with a mutual interest in the sustainability of commons. In a series of detailed case studies, she lays out conditions ("design principles") that seem to allow -- or prevent -- the good governance of the CPR in question.

Once you've seen these design principles, they seem to pop up everywhere. "Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions" sounds a lot like the idea of local adaptation in the diffusion of innovations literature. "Monitoring" sounds like the role middle managers play in corporations. "Minimal rights to organize" sounds like the First Amendment.

Overall, Ostrom's book is an open-ended classic. It provides a great description of common pool resources through the lens of ethnographic case studies, plus a framework for looking at CPR problems in general. Ostrom never advances of specific theory of governance. Instead, she lays out many interesting and suggestive examples and principles. The field of CPR research has expended in many directions since Ostrom started it -- it's worth going back to the source to see where it all began.

Hints on how to read this book:

* To really motivate your reading, alternate chapters with Jared Diamond's Collapse. (But skim Collapse; it can be tedious.) Reading about how mismanagement of common pool resources led to the failure of entire civilizations will put an edge on your curiosity about how we can do better.

* As you read Governing the Commons, play the "Is a [blank] a CPR?" game. Switch on a radio to any news program. As soon as the topic becomes clear, mute the radio and ask yourself if the situation can be described as a commons. (The sub-prime bailout? Presidential elections? Somali piracy?) Odds are the answer is yes. It doesn't have to be a natural resource to be a common pool resource -- this analytical frame is extremely handy.

* If you're a scientist, don't read Ostrom looking for a clear, falsifiable theory. She never gives one. Instead, she describes a broad framework for considering the interaction between environment and government. It's a great seedbed of ideas -- but those ideas will need to be cultivated before they can be tested.

* Ask yourself about scaling cooperative management. Unfortunately, Ostrom never tackles this problem. She never gives much thought to whether what works in small communities can be scaled to the level of nations or the world. She can't -- ethnography simply can't cover that much ground. Consequently, "scaling" remains (even after 20 years) one of the great unanswered questions of collective governance.

PS -- If you figure the scaling problem out, please do us all a favor and fix global carbon emissions.
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34 of 35 people found the following review helpful
4.0 out of 5 stars Addressing the Collective Action Problem August 2, 2007
Format:Paperback
Ostrom attempts to refute the belief that only through state and or market-centered controls can commonly pooled resources (CPRs) be effectively governed. Ostrom writes, "Communities of individuals have relied on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern some resource systems with reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time" (p. 1). Governing the Commons sets out to discover why some groups are able to effectively govern and manage CPRs and other groups fail. She tries to identify both the internal and external factors "that can impede or enhance the capabilities of individuals to use and govern CPRs."

The first section of the book examines both state-controlled and privatization property rights regimes, and illustrates failures in both regimes; namely, that central authorities often fail to have complete accuracy of information, have only limited monitoring capabilities, and possess a weak sanctioning reliability. As such, a centralized governing body may actually govern the commons inaccurately and make a bad situation worse. In the case of privatized property rights regimes, Ostrom illustrates two main points: 1) it assumes that property is homogenous and any division of property will be equitable; and 2) privatization will not work with non-stationary property (fisheries, for example).

After discussing the state-controlled and privatization property rights regimes, Ostrom attempts examine the causes of successful CPR governance, and the catalysts which lead to failure. Being part of the "new institutionalist" school, Ostrom seeks to examine the rules, structures, and frameworks within the various CPR governance structures. Ostrom has discovered a number of "design principles" within the successful CPR governance cases. These principles include: 1) a clear definition of boundaries, 2) monitors who either are appropriators of the resource or accountable to the appropriators, 3) graduated sanctions, 4) mechanisms controlled by the appropriators used to mediate conflict and when necessary, change the rules, 5) a congruence between the rules used and the local conditions.

In other words, Ostrom suggests that these "design principles," form a cooperative institutional structure. If the correct institutions are in place, the players will see cooperation as the best means to gain optimal outcomes. These mechanisms create a confidence between players that defections will be minimal, and those that do defect will be sanctioned accordingly. Additionally, the institutional structures create an environment in which resources are distributed in such a way that all (or at least most) players benefit. As such, many of these institutional structures must be accompanied by a good deal of trust between players. This can only be developed over time and is most likely to succeed when the number of players in the CPR is reasonably small.
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26 of 27 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
"Governing the Commons" has become a classic, not only within the literature of political science, but more broadly throughout the social sciences. In the book, Elinor Ostrom argues brilliantly and compelling for a third way of avoiding Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons," in addition to privatization (conversion of the commons to private property) or government regulation (conversion of the commons to public property). Though numerous examples, Ostrom demonstrates how users of common property resources have managed, in various places around the world, to sustainably manage those resources through local, self-regulation. In other words, common property regimes can avoid the "tragedy of the commons."

Ostrom recognizes that common property management regimes do not always work. Indeed, the seem to fail as often as they succeed. To explain why this is the case, and to help predict the likelihood of success or failure, Ostrom develops an elaborate and very useful model of common property success/failure. In the 15 years since she published "Governing the Commons," that model has not been significantly improved by other scholars. Her book remains as current and important today, as it was when she first published it in 1990. It is required reading for all social scientists, indeed anyone, interested in resource conservation and property systems.
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Most Recent Customer Reviews
4.0 out of 5 stars Solid Work with many New, Good Ideas, but Suffers Slightly from Length...
Overall, this is a great entry by Elinor Ostrum. She gives relevant background stories and information about the issue of "The Commons". Read more
Published 16 days ago by Nicholas Danowski
5.0 out of 5 stars Refreshing
It was a pleasure to read a well thought out, fact-based, report on issues and actions related to successful and unsuccessful examples of collective action.
Published 8 months ago by Bill
5.0 out of 5 stars She won the Nobel Prize in Economics for a reason!
I was blessed with a few great professors in college. Interestingly, two of them were recipients of Nobel and Pulitzer Prizes. Read more
Published 10 months ago by Rick in the Midwest
5.0 out of 5 stars A Rorschach book that suggests as many intriguing puzzles as it solves
This is a great book. It might be a little technical in the first chapter due to the discussion of game theory, but I think the writing is sufficiently lucid that you can get what... Read more
Published 17 months ago by E. Husman
4.0 out of 5 stars An interesting point of view about the policy.
The game theory could be applyied to the reallity of the policy? The argument of this book is very interesting because, if many authors have a negative idea about this possibility,... Read more
Published 23 months ago by Edoardo Angeloni
5.0 out of 5 stars Laying the Groundwork for a Third Way
Elinor Ostrom's "Governing the Commons" can be divided into several segments. First, an introduction to traditional theory regarding the management of Common Pool Resources. Read more
Published on January 1, 2010 by Rufus Burgess
2.0 out of 5 stars Big gap
I have but thumbed it yet; interesting and case-based; but I immediately feel the big deficiency in its not addressing the politics of Allegiance, which over-ride even self... Read more
Published on November 30, 2009 by T W Gulliver
5.0 out of 5 stars We need more people like Ostrom
I am surprised that there's little review activity going on for this book, even though the author has won the "fake nobel" prize (i.e. Read more
Published on November 24, 2009 by Un francais en angleterre
4.0 out of 5 stars Mandatory read for all natural resource or environmental managers.
Aldo Leopold wrote, "We must learn to live on a piece of land without spoiling it." Ostrom's body of work analyzes how people in different places are attempting to do that. Read more
Published on November 14, 2009 by O.A.E. McMurdo
4.0 out of 5 stars conventional theory applied to odd cases
Ostroms' book covers a variety of cases where allocational difficulties arise. She employs sound economic reasoning in analyzing a number of cases where ordinary property rights... Read more
Published on May 21, 2002 by D. W. MacKenzie
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