Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia [Paperback]

Professor Gabriel Gorodetsky (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: April 1, 2001

This important book draws on vital new archival material to unravel the mystery of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 and Stalin's enigmatic behavior on the eve of the attack. Gabriel Gorodetsky challenges the currently popular view that Stalin was about to invade Germany when Hitler made a preemptive strike. He argues instead that Stalin was actually negotiating for European peace, asserting that Stalin followed an unscrupulous Realpolitik that served well-defined geopolitical interests by seeking to redress the European balance of power. Gorodetsky substantiates his argument through the most thorough scrutiny ever of Soviet archives for the period, including the files of the Russian foreign ministry, the general staff, the security forces, and the entire range of military intelligence available to Stalin at the time. According to Gorodetsky, Stalin was eagerly anticipating a peace conference where various accords imposed on Russia would be revised. But the delusion of being able to dictate a new European order blinded him to the lurking German danger, and his erroneous diagnosis of the political scene-colored by his perennial suspicion of Great Britain-led him to misconstrue the evidence of his own and Britain's intelligence services. Gorodetsky highlights the sequence of military blunders that resulted from Stalin's determination to appease Germany-blunders that provide the key to understanding the calamity that befell Russia on 22 June 1941.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Gorodetsky's diplomatic history of the period immediately preceding WWII effectively refutes the argument, made most popular by Viktor Suvorov's Icebreaker, that Stalin authorized the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 because he was preparing to bring revolutionary war to Europe and wanted to neutralize Hitler. Having examined recently opened Soviet archives, Gorodetsky, a professor of history at Tel Aviv University, shows that, while Stalin feared a German attack, he thought he could work out a traditional balance-of-power arrangement with Germany that established recognized spheres of influence. The reason Stalin succumbed to this delusion, according to Gorodetsky, was that he distrusted Britain more than he feared Hitler. He loathed the idea of becoming Britain's pawn, believing (not without reason, as it turned out) that a Soviet-British alliance would make cannon fodder of the poorly prepared Red Army. Gorodetsky reveals that Stalin both courted and bullied the leaders of Bulgaria and Turkey in hopes of gaining control of the Bosphorus and then using that control as a bargaining chip when striking a balance of power in the region. As for the contention that Stalin planned to export revolution by war, Gorodetsky, like many before him, observes that Stalin's purges of the officer corps had rendered the Red Army ill-prepared for a defensive war, much less an attack on Nazi Germany. Though stiffly written in some places, this thorough analysis of Soviet diplomatic brinksmanship makes it more than clear that Stalin was ultimately driven more by a combination of paranoia and realpolitik than by Bolshevik ideology. (Sept.)
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Library Journal

The latest work from Gorodetsky (history, Tel Aviv Univ.; Stafford Cripp's Mission to Moscow, 1940-42) approaches the 1940-42 period in an exhaustive detail that has never before been possible. Making extensive use of recently opened Russian archives, Gorodetsky reexamines the events surrounding Hitler's 1941 invasion of Russia. Drawing on the files of the Russian foreign ministry, the general staff, the security forces, and personal diaries, he gives as complete a picture as possible of this most tumultuous time, giving the reader new insights into the war's tense negotiations and key players' political motivations. This book will dispel many of the long-held myths about the start of history's most written-about war. No historical collection can afford to be without this book; highly recommended for both academic and public libraries.AMark E. Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 384 pages
• Publisher: Yale University Press (April 1, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0300084595
• ISBN-13: 978-0300084597
• Product Dimensions: 8.6 x 5.7 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (13 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #796,520 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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23 of 30 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars provocative, January 3, 2000

By 

Gill E. Winnik "giorausa" (New York) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (Hardcover)

You don't have to be a historian to be interested in the strange relationship between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the late 1930's and1940-1. The actions of these foresworn enemies who became bedfellows and then violent enemies again were always a source of frustrations for many noted personalities of the period. They were an enigma to many others. I found this book, with its access to many former secret documents a brilliant map to the happenings of that era. The author was able to turn a potentially boring load of official documents into an exciting drama. If you are interested in todays and yestedays political trickery....you must read this book!

26 of 36 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Authoritative Interpretation of Stalin's "Grand Illusion", January 19, 2001

By 

Barron Laycock "Labradorman" (Temple, New Hampshire United States) - See all my reviews
(HALL OF FAME REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (Hardcover)

Few events in the history of the Second World War inspire as much controversy and debate as the circumstances surrounding the legendary chaos and lack of preparedness of the Soviet forces at the onset of Hitler's invasion of Russia with Operation Barbarossa. Given Stalin`s legendary cynicism and distrust for the West, it has been hard for historians to accurately determine what Stalin's motives and perspectives were during the period of time preceding the invasion, and as to whether it was a calculated and very dangerous risk he was willing to take, or if, on the contrary, he and the Soviet army were suddenly caught unaware and off-guard by the most daunting frontal assault in the history of WWII. This book magnificently addresses these historical questions in a captivating, authoritative, and magisterial argument that it was, at least in Israeli author Gabriel Gorodetsky's opinion, a combination of all of the above that led to the astounding Russian debacle and military collapse of 1941.

Gorodetsky emphatically rejects the idea that Stalin was in fact beat to the punch while planning an invasion of his own, posting instead that Stalin was convinced based on circumstances as well by his own preoccupations with internal Russian concerns that Chancellor Hitler would, at least temporarily, live up to his non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. The author marshals a convincing and well-substantiated argument detailing a multitude of circumstances that lead him to conclude he had little to fear from Hitler in the short term, but recognized and was preparing for the ostensible long-term threat to Mother Russia once Hitler had conquered the rest of Europe. In this sense, he discounts, and even ridicules, what he considers to be the preposterous notion that Hitler struck preemptively against he saw to be an imminent threat from the Russian army massed all along the border with Poland for a strike against the Third Reich.

Instead, the author argues that Stalin's fabled paranoia, his concern with consolidating power, and his unfounded concerns with possible internal threats emanating from the General Staff of the professional military led to a wide-ranging set of purges within the ranks of the officer corps and vitiated the capability of the army to conduct offensive operations. Under such circumstances, it would have been suicidal to propose aggressive action against such a well-prepared foe as the Wehrmacht would have been at that time. Indeed, the Soviet experience in the campaign conducted the year before against Finland had convincingly disabused them of any illusions they might otherwise have had regarding their state of war readiness.

In essence, the portrait of Stalin painted in this work is that of a man literally obsessed with the historical precedents of Soviet diplomacy and political intrigue. After a year spent dabbling in the deep waters of international bargaining with England, France, and Germany, and skillfully playing them off each other to gain ground for Russia, he hoped to watch the west beat each other into the stone age. Thus, having concluded he had somehow successfully negotiated his way into a fabulous and harmless bargain with the devil, he just couldn't bring himself to believe the devil would then promptly double-cross him. After all, Hitler needed all the raw materials and petroleum products Stalin alone could give him, making Hitler immune to the kinds of slow death via blockades that had so damaged Germany during WWI. Why would he then turn on the one country he needed to stave off any threats from the Allies.

This in essence was the "grand illusion" he subscribed to: that based on the mutual benefit to both countries of the non-aggression pact, he could successfully negotiate his way out of immediate danger until he and the Soviet Union was better prepared in the mid 1940s to take on the Nazis. This is a terrific book, and one I highly recommend. It already has become a standard text, and will, I am sure, become a perennial favorite. Enjoy!

34 of 51 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Bizarre interpretation of documents, March 22, 2002

By 

Thomas Titura (Traisen, Austria) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (Hardcover)

The latest book by Gorodetsky is nearly useless.
The way in which G. interprets for example diary-entries of Dimitroff is absurd and completely misleading. Luckily these diaries have now been published in german language (Aufbau Verlag) so that everyone can read for himself what Dimitroff really wrote - in full - and not just the selective parts Gorodetsky presents.
Also, the way in which Gorodetsky presents the clearly offensive soviet force disposition in 1941 is a bit of remarkable absurdity.

Gorodetsky claims in one sentence to have corrected Suvorov's claims that Stalin was preparing an offensive against Germany. But how? Where is Gorodetsky showing that the numerous arguments of Suvorov are actually wrong?
The next bit of absurdity is that Gorodetsky writes that soviet doctrine was clearly offensive - but of course not in reality.
Another proof of Gorodetsky's fear to provide full documentation is that he doesen't provide the full text of the "Considerations..." from May 15th, 1941 where a preemtive strike against Germany was advocated by the General Staff. Gorodetsky claims that this document was written behind Stalin's back and that it has never been approved. Anyone who knows only a fraction about the great purges of Stalin in the Red Army can clearly see the bizarre absurdity of such a claim. Vassilievsky, Zhukov and Timoshenko would have ended in the hands of the NKVD and would have been executed had they written such a proposal against Stalin's intentions!

Gorodetsky knows that would he provide such important documents with their full text, the reader would reach quite different conclusions than claimed in the book. That's why Gorodetsky most of the time quotes documents that can't be checked by the readers.
One should rather read Joachim Hoffmann's "Stalin's war of extermination" or Albert Weeks forthcoming "Stalin's other war. Soviet Grand Strategy 1939-1941" because there one can find proper documentation and learn about Stalin's real intentions.