Customer Reviews

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks)

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In a field that still remains open...and, in fact, in many ways, depends on the contributions of knowledgeable and dedicated amatures, Luttwak's work stands out as truly original contribution in the field of Roman military history. His thesis, that there was, in fact, a coherent, centrally controlled and over-arching and outwardly directed, military strategy that was actualised through an evolving empire-wide frontier policy that is both traceable in and understandable through, the archaeological record is a singularly original contribution that has potentialy major implications for our approach to and understanding of, roman socio-political, military, economic, and governance mechanisms. Luttwak has implicitly reinterpreted the conventional understanding of the roman world and in so doing he has opened the door to a broader, more coherent and,ultimately, more satisfying understanding of the functioning of the empire.

It is the kind of contribution that perhaps only someone with the background and ability to apply a strategic vision and strategic frame of reference, could possibly make. As far as I know, it has never been done before in this field.

Its now 25 years since Luttwak published Grand Strategy and the work continues to resonate in the field. Judging from the rate of continuing citations, it would appear to be virtually impossible to write on the subject of roman military history, frontier policy, or even imperial governance without dealing,in some way, with Luttwak. His contribution simply won't go away.

Much time has passed since Luttwak wrote and, in the interim, Isaac has published his exhaustive, excessively detailed and, ultimately, convincing, refutation of Luttwak based on his review and analysis of the roman southeast frontier. But I don't think it matters...and besides, Isaac himself may be wrong...because what Luttwak has really achieved is to force a decisive shift in the frame of reference that we use to think about, analyse, and understand the Empire. Luttwak has reminded us, emphaticaly, that not withstanding the absence of a coherent body of written source material,we can and should think about the forest once in a while instead of endlessly pursuing counting and identifying only the trees that make it up. He shows us that such an approach can be highly rewarding.

In my opinion this is NOT a dry work and, more than anything, it simply requires an interest in the roman empire and its functioning in order to be read and understood. Luttwak does not take the relentlessly scholarly approach that Isaac does but he does do his homework and he is familiar with his topic. Because he's not Isaac, he's infinitely more readable...and my copy, which I bought in soft cover about 5 years ago, had virtually all of its pages out of order...and I still got thru it!

I

Really helps you to see the Rome Empire as a nation, not just a army. Luttwak helps you to understand the goals and stragtegy used to reach those goals by the Romes who DID not want to spend all their money and manpower on defending their frontier, YET still wanted some kind of defenese, which would to be flexible enough to handle both raiders and full scale invasions. Makes a lot of sense. It is a tad dry, as one reviewer pointed out and you might not agree with all the view points, but if you are interested in the Roman Empire, this is a book to think about.

This book is a very interesting analysis for everybody who wants to know more about the strategy of the Roman Empire. While also very accessible to non-experts, even experts or people who have read a lot about Rome will learn a lot and see things a new way.

Mr. Luttwak splits the time of the roman empire into time periods of same strategy. This strategy changed a few times through the centuries.

One of the most interesting points is that the Roman Empire did have trouble expanding its Empire beyond the size of Augustus Principate because the roman army could not apply its full military force in the border areas because of the evironment there. The roman army's core was the heavy infanterie and with this the legions were strong and hard to stop or defeat but they were also slow. Therefore in areas where enemies had something to defend (cities, fields, etc), the power of the roman army (also using their siege capabilities) was very high and therefore it could apply this potential military might either in direct military success or into political power which then helped the romans to create client states around their empire which served as buffer states against any potential enemy attack.

But the forested middle Europe, the desert areas of Arabia and North Africa and the plains of Iran and Ukraine were wide and the people who lived there did not depend on a city structure which they needed to defend. Therefore they could avoid a direct confrontation with the Romans (which was their main strength) and apply their way of fighting to the Romans. The Roman army could still penetrate these areas, but only under above average costs and had trouble keeping this area under their control. Examples of this are the losses of Crassus against the Parthians and the losses of 3 legions against the Cherusci in the Teutoburg Forest.

Very good book!

If you are interested in Roman history, this book is a MUST read. It was written 25 years ago and it still remains a reference point in Roman history - even historians who do not agree with Luttwak have to discuss his thesis (eg Ferrill). The problem with so many contemporary historians before this book was that they systematically ignored or misunderstood the forest, despite their detailed knowledge of the trees. For example, there was an incredible abundance of detailed studies of Roman fortifications in Great Britain, but barely anyone bothered asking the question of why the Romans gave up conquering the northern half of the island - a conquest that would have eliminated the need for such fortifications . This is an important question, because ignoring it implies ignoring the general principles guiding Roman expansion and defense across the empire. Luttwak's study provides an answer to this type of questions or, at the very least, poses the problem.

Luttwak, an accomplished military strategist who has worked with the Pentagon in the past, ties together literary and archeological evidence from the Roman world, and adds his strategic insight to come up with a theory of the principles guifing the "grand strategy" of the Roman empire. Although one might doubt that these principles were consistently pursued at that time, Luttwak's analysis is fascinating. Moreover, his analysis of the role of the army in the early Roman empire (when an army of 250,000 men protected an empire stretching from the Rhine to the Euphrates) provides a wonderful analysis of the timeless principles of deterrence, and "power" as opposed to "force". There are only two faults to this book. First, that its author has always refused to be dragged into the polemic debate among historians that followed the book's publication - inevitably, this makes it impossible to write a 2nd edition. The second fault is that the book does not extend beyong the 3rd century; this is a real loss because it would be interesting to hear Luttwak's thoughts about the decline of the Empire.

I do not agree that this book is only for specialists. I am of the opinion that it is a book for history lovers. And, moreover, it is for any person who wishes to understand how a highly developed society managed to defend its way of living. It most valuable because it depicts the success of the Roman system in the first two centuries of our era. The Third Century depicts the problem of a World power which has began its decline.
Reading the book you understand the Roman system, and you learn how a society must be prepared for selfdefense, and even for attack, if it wants to survive.
If you translate this book into the idiom of the early XXIst Century, you realize how our declining Western Civilization must behave in order to protect itself, and its inhabitants, from its external -and even internal- threats.

This is a unique work in that it tries to explain an overall strategic picture of Roman Imperial defense through the principate and into the turbulent third century when the empire as a political entity was in real jepordy of being swept away by internal and external threats. In somewhat technical terms, he goes on to explain how Roman Imperial security evolved over time starting with the early principate. Then going into the Flavian, Antonine and Severan eras. Luttwak does a great job in outlining the threat, security measures and strategies of each different era. Extensive notes allow for additional study. Even though written almost 30 years ago, it is still very relevant. It is striking how simmilar the strategic problems faced by ancient Rome are today faced by the U.S. My only critisism is that he does not go into any detail of internal security measures or how these relate to strategic defense. Otherwise an excellent work.

Even if you don't agree with Luttwak's point of view, you'd have to agree that he makes a good argument. Many people feel that the Roman army of the glory years (i.e. 100-300AD) was a front line frontier garrison force that ended up being too thinly spaced to defend so huge a territory. Luttwak argues that what it was, in fact, was a set of frontier picket forces set up to warn the REAL army units, which were set up as "rapid deployment forces" in rear staging areas to react to danger from any direction. As a result, the Roman empire was able to defend itself with a ridiculously small standing force.

While the book is very thin and very readable, I think it would help if the reader learned a bit about the basics of the Roman army and empire first. Graham Webster's excellent volume, 'The Roman Imperial Army,' comes to mind. Still, it is a good read on its own, and from a broader standpoint, a good illustration of how the academic mind works to prove and illustrate an idea. I know I certainly felt a little smarter after reading it!

I have had Luttwak's book for many yes...I have read it twice. It's fun to read. He's got the details right, but I agree with Isaac in "The Limits of Empire." that a "Grand Strategy" didn't exist for multiple reasons. I taught Roman History for a number and I specialized in the Late Roman period, 285-602 AD. Roman military strategy and tactics changed over time to meet defence needs and in response to the taxation system that supported the world's first professional army. In the Early Empire legions were often doubled-up in response to tactical offensive and defensive needs. In the Later Empire army units were usually much smaller and spread over a wider frontier area to make delivery of supplies much easier (one motive among several). Other smaller units were concentrated into mobile field armies. Cities built walls, if they had none and or repaired them. The Romans may not have had a "Grand Strategy," but they certainly were conscious of what they doing, however different from what we think they were doing, which is what historians try to find out. I think the Romans made deliberate choices regarding regional defense needs, tactical responses and battlefield techniques to challenges from their enemies, but as Isaac points out their motives are often very different from the ones we assign to them from our perspectives. There's sufficient documentation from primary sources to indicate that strategic concerns were on their minds. It was written about by ancient authors. But it was not grand strategy, but perspectives on how to defend the Empire best. It was not a matter of strategic doctrine, but something more immediate and less abstract. So, for example, what looks like a "Grand Strategy" by 350 AD is actually the result of ad hoc army, finance and adminstrative reforms some of which were first introduced at the end of the 3rd century and modified and added to. New policies were introduced in response to percieved needs. There was an attempt to create uniformity throughout the military, financial and the administrative systems for the sake of control and efficiency (of course there were local and regional differences), but this is not a Grand Strategy. Luttwak provides a tightly argued thesis from what I call a vertical perpsective. He's looking for logical decision-making and "defined ideology" to quote Isaac (p.373 op. cit) who points out that when we look for this kind of strategic thinking in the ancient authors and archaeology, the matter is much less defined. Roman actions and motives cannot be neatly packaged or made to fit into the kinds of theoretical concepts we are used to employing. There was no such thing as a Roman strategic "defense" doctrine equivalent to the Nato doctrine (Isaac p. 374). It's an anachronism. Both books, however, make an insightful and valuable contribution to the study of the Roman Empire and are well worth reading.

Edward Luttwak is the premiere scholar of contemporary grand strategy. In this book he brings his unique talents to the problem of Imperial Roman grand strategy. Luttwak has put together a fine and scholarly analysis of how the Romans kept their empire secure, and, how, ultimately, they failed to do so.

The book is divided into three chronological sections. In the first Luttwak discusses the system under the early empire (or principate) from Augustus to Nero. He describes this system as being the "Republican Imperial system," by which he means that the system of empire used here was the old hegemonic system employed by the expanding Republic. Luttwak clearly praises this system for getting the most security at the lowest cost.

Part two deals with the system from Vespasian to Marcus Aurelius. Luttwak describes the system in this period as being fundamentally different from that of the first. This system reflects the changed nature of the Empire from a hegemonic power to a state power. The chief object was no longer to defend Rome and Italy, but to provide complete security for every province of the Empire.

The third part is focused on the military (and general) crisis of the third century. In this section Luttwak looks at the cost of maintaining a defensive system in relation to the benefits of doing so. Ultimately, he argues, the Roman Empire had to collapse because the benefits the provinces associated with being a memeber of a larger state were not worth the cost.

It has been argued that Luttwak ascribes too much clarity of thought and purpose to the systems he describes. Other scholars have said that there is no evidence to support the thesis that the Roman Imperial machine ever sat down and planned a defensive system. Of course this is true, and does not counter what Luttwak is saying. Indeed, Luttwak himself says that the system was not necessarily planned as a whole, but evolved from responses to specific crises. He says, actually, that the lack of a "grand strategy" actually led to the collapse of the imperial system in the west. The primary evidence for this, as Luttwak argues, is that in the third period, whenever possible, the Romans reverted to the defensive strategy of the second period despite the fact that it was clearly outdated. Others have argued against Luttwak's analysis by claiming that the tactics used in one part of the Empire were dissimilar to those used in another. He does not make a claim counter to this, though. In fact, one of the strengths of this book is that it provides much detail on the different ways that the overall concept of a particular strategy was employed in the different regions of the Empire.

Finally, the language Luttwak uses here is concise and clear, and definitely understandable by people unfamiliar with the jargon of the military and historical communities. In addition to this astute and understandable analysis are lots and lots of excellent maps and diagrams. They alone are worth the price of the book.

Anyone interested in the Roman Empire or military history must read this ground-breaking work. As the debate on the policies of the Roman Empire continues, Luttwak's work will continue to be a prominent point of refference.

This book is approachable to the strategist, the scholar and the simply curious. Well-written and well-reasoned, Luttwak has produced yet another excellent book. The approach of using modern strategical analysis on Roman politico-military affairs is something that has long been missing from studies of the Roman Army. Certainly the armchair legates who cry that the death of the Roman Empire was in its failure to continue expanding should read this book before continuing to rant their expansion-without-profit creed!