Customer Reviews

Grant Wins the War: Decision at Vicksburg

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An excellent analysis covering the entire scope of Grant's tactical operations. However, this book reaches too far. Like the title, the author's military assertions and their subsequent impact on the Union's conduct of the war are a little too grandiose. Grant did not win the war on July 4, 1863. It would drag on for two more years. But just maybe Lincoln did.

Grant's amazing victory was as much politically as tactically driven. From the point of view of Grant's career, he had to win, had to take unorthodox chances, because he was as close to being dead meat as any Union general ever came. For months and months he was bogged down before Vicksburg. We know Lincoln was so dissatisfied with Grant that he sent Charles Dana to Vicksburg as the President's special envoy to see what was really going on.

General Banks, a Lincoln political appointee and very close friend, was driving north from Baton Rouge toward Port Gibson and Vicksburg. Banks stalled and Grant was ordered by Halleck (via Lincoln??) to assist Banks. Grant disobeyed this command from the then General in Chief of all Federal armies and went his own way. WOW! Big decision. What a way to make friends when you are under the looking glass.

Last, placed within Grant's command structure is another Lincoln political appointee and friend, General McClernand, who Grant subsequently relieves prior to Vicksburg's capitulation. Is he thumbing he nose?

At Vicksburg we see Grant's first inclination to tactically detach himself from direct supply and communication lines. But what caused it? Was it Pemberton's chauvinistic defense of Vicksburg and Grant's straight forward desire to defeat his foe? Or was it the internal pressure within the Union army and Grant's desire to save his career that forced Grant to do very, very differently from then current military principals, causing him to develop this amazingly different set of operational plans he would resort to again and again during the remainder of the war?

Last, from the Confederate side there is Jeff Davis' incredible stupidity. Did Jeff Davis hang Joe Johnston out to dry? And lets not forget Pemberton's direct disobedience to his theater commander's, Joe Johnston's order: Save the army, abandon Vicksburg. Why did Jeff Davis never censure Pemberton not only for the loss of Vicksburg, strategically and psychologically important to the South as it was, but also the loss of an entire army, complete with thousands of men and irreplaceable stores, arms and ammunition? And why does Davis again relieve Johnston from command, not reinstating him until the final hours of the war?

Seen simply from the viewpoint of the Union high command, i.e., a traitor in his midst (McClernand), a presidential spy at headquarters (Dana), an unwillingness to unite forces with a fellow field commander (Banks) and the disobedience of his direct superior's orders (Halleck's), Grant should be thankful for Lincoln's reaffirmed evaluation of him: "I cannot spare this man; he fights". Good for you, Charles Dana.

Grant's military victory at Vicksburg IS amazing and this book is as good an account of it as there is. But the author fails to live up to his title's claim. Grant's political coup (Lincoln's willing recognition of his ability despite his incredible disobedience and non cooperation with Lincoln favorites) is even more incredulous than his military one. Had not Meade just beaten Lee at Gettysbury on the very same day that Vicksburg fell? Which would have been of more immediate importance: a captured Confederate army on the Mississippi River or a victorious Confederate army next door to Washington? If Lee had won at Gettysburg, Vicksburg would have been what it will always be, a spectacular feat of arms. But Union army and Northern political concerns aside, maybe, just maybe, Jeff Davis and Robert E. Lee lost the war that fateful day when they made the conscious decision to risk swapping Vicksburg for Washington and lost their gamble on both counts.

The most important item to come from the Vicksburg conflict was not Grant's victory as much as it was Lincoln's recognition of Grant as his next General in Chief. And in that vein it was not Grant's victory at Vicksburg but Lincoln's subsequent promotion of Grant over Meade that won the war.

I bought this book in advance for a trip to Vicksburg. It was very good describing the two armies and their political and economic fortunes. I am not a war person but this book provides enough context to keep me engaged.

Arnold's book about a pivtoal campaign covers many details on many overlooked battles and raids in the Civil War: Champion's Hill (Baker's Creek), Big Black River, Jackson, Port Gibson, and Grierson's raid through Mississippi.

Arnold's descriptions of the battles were interesting with notes on individual bravery without becoming too bogged down in details. Particularly interesting were the descriptions of the Union army's march on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi River and the Union navy's several attempts to pass by Vicksburg's siege guns.

I also appreciated the author's balanced criticisms of leaders on both sides:
1) Pemberton, the Confederate commander, was too vacillating and involved in the petty politics that doomed the Confederacy in the West. Conflict between Confederate leaders Johnston, Davis, and Beauregard further doomed Pemberton.
2)Grant made the inexcusable mistake of leaving his own wounded on the battlefield after a charge on the Vicksburg works because of his faulty perception that to care for his wounded would be an admission of weakness.

My main complaints were the lack of sufficient maps - while the maps in the book were well-drawn and sufficiently detailed, more were needed, particularly for a campaign such as Vicksburg.

In conclusion, I recommend the book as an entertaining and informative read on an important campaign.

Arnold's story of Grant's Vicksburg campaign justifies the title: "Grant Wins the War." The author combines a solid factual recount with analysis and strategic discussions.

The only complaint I had is that the book felt a little light in some areas. While significant attention was given to some aspects of the campaign, other parts seemed to receive a less thorough treatment.

This is minor, however. The author covers all facets: the political situation, personalities, strategic considerations as well as military. Grants particular genius for winning in his era of warfare is plumbed in detail. An important addition to literature on the western war, which is still overshadowed by focus on the Virginia theater.

The book elicits several fascinating questions. One which struck me was how Grant, who was taking great strategic risks with his army, still left actual battle fighting largely up to his subordinates (as did many senior generals in the war). He was a very cool and collected general for one who bore the weight of the war on his shoulders.

I very much enjoyed this book. James Arnold includes quotations from journals, letters and newspapers to add to the immediacy of his writing. The campaign for Vicksburg is laid out in detail, making the action easy to follow, but his style is never dull or tedious. And it is not just a narrative. There is lucid analysis of the strategies and actions of each of the major generals and political figures. I found the approach very even handed in its praise and criticism. I read this book over the course of 2 days because it was so absorbing (particularly since I live in Mississippi and I read during the time of the Battle of Champion Hill). Arnold's arguement that this was the decisive battle in the war is cogently argued, although I suppose it will be controversial, as everything about the civil war is.

This is an excellent account of the Battle and subsequent Siege of Vicksburg during 1863. The author, James Arnold, writes a detailed account of the events and incidents leading up to General Grant closing a ring around the defences of Vicksburg. The author covers the plans and ideas of the Union and Confederate Commanders and their political masters during this battle. His narrative of the fighting is well presented and very stiring and although you could probarly find more detailed accounts, he still tells a great story. I had only one problem with this book and that was the authors narrative in connection with map 8, The Battle of Champion Hill. I felt that his directions mentioned in the text did not match the map but maybe I was wrong (maybe someone can let me know?). Either way this is a good story and well worth the time to sit down and read.

An excellent analysis covering the entire scope of Grant's Vickburg's operations.

But like the title, a little too grandoise in its assertions. Grant's amazing victory was as much politically as tactically driven. Here we see Grant's first indclination to detach himself from direct supply and communication lines. But what caused it? Was it Pemberton's chauvenistic defense of Vicksburg (and Grant's straight forward desire to defeat his foe) or was it the internal pressure within the Union army (forcing Grant to do very, very differently from then current military principals)that caused him to develop this amazingly different set of operational plans he would resort to again and again during the remainder of the War?

Prior to this victory, Grant, as a general, was probably as much at risk to continuing his command as any time subsequent in his military career. He had horrifically bogged down at Vicksburg. General Banks, Lincoln political appointee and close friend of Lincoln's, is driving North from Baton Rouge. He is stalled outside Port Gibson and Grant is ordered by Hallack (via Lincoln??)to assist him. Grant disobeys this command from the then General in Chief of all Federal armies and goes his own way. WOW! Big decision.

Also, within his command structure is another Lincoln political appointee, General McClernand, who Grant relieves prior to Vickburg's capitulation.

Last, there is Jeff Davis' incredible stupidity (did he hang Joe Johnston out to dry)and Pemberton's direct disobedience to his theater commander's, Joe Johnston's order; save the army, abandon Vicksburg. Why did Jeff Davis never censure Pemberton not only for the loss of Vicksburg, strategically and psycologically important to the South as it was, but also an entire army, complete with thousands of men, stores, arms and ammunition? And why does Davis again relieve Johnston from command, not reinstating him until the final hours of the war?

Seen simply from the viewpoint of the Union high command,i.e., a traitor in his midst, McClernand, an unwillingness to unite forces with a fellow field commander, Banks, and the disobedience of his direct superior's orders, Halleck's,he should be thankful for Linclon's non military, non political eveluation of him: "I cannot spare this man; he fights".

Grant's military victory at Vicksburg is amazing. But his political victory (Lincoln's willing recognition of his ability despite his incredible disobedience)is even more incredulous.

Other than the fact you can never have too many maps this book was extremely well written. Great detail on brigade actions - specific but flowing pretty smoothly with the overall battle action. Really liked the summary analysis' throughout the book. Focused and, to me, impartial.

Arnold's book is a good solid history of the Vicksburg Campaign. His descriptions of the battles and the strategic and tactical issues facing Grant and the Confederacy gives one an understanding of what problems faced the parties and how they were resolved. His description of the battle of Champion Hill is the best part of the book, as one can feel the bravery of the soldiers involved.

The books limitation is Arnold's almost infatuation with Grant and the need to make Vicksburg the pivotal battle of the war. While the strategy that Grant utilized was daring and unorthodox that does not substantiate the comparison with Napoleon. There is nothing in the campaign that demonstrates that Grant's tactics were Napoleonic in nature.

Whether Vicksburg was the pivotal battle of the civil was may be true. However, Arnold did not make the case that it was. A Union loss at Gettysburg surley would have had a dramatic impact on the Unions will to continue the war. While the issue of which battle was more important was not important to the Vicksburg story, once the issue was raised Arnold should have at least spent more than a moment discussing Gettysburg.

As a story about the Vicksburg Campaign, the book excells.