Customer Reviews

The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(4)

 

 

This excellent work starts with a seemingly simple question "What is a nation?" and goes from there to question of how a group of neighboring nations can get along peacefully. The "global" part of the phrase "global nation" has meant your community in your known world. As the book shows, this has grown from Biblical times where the known world was the Middle East to the present time, where the known world is everything on earth.

So, what is a "nation"? A consolidation of tribes, as in the Bible? Groups joined by common interests, background, or language? Talbott shows that the OED definition isn't very helpful--and quotes Julian Huxley: "A nation is a society united by a common error as to its origins and a common aversion to its neighbors"--humorous, to be sure, but probably no worse than other definitions. Interestingly, the earliest successful empires often featured tolerance of different customs and beliefs and decentralization, so as to keep the subject nations or tribes from becoming rebellious. Talbott describes how Rome, Greece, the Mongols, etc, managed this.

The second part of the book deals primarily with the 20th century--with the League of Nations and the United Nations, and the transition from imperial views to the idea of shared responsibility. The concepts are more familiar to us, so this part is not as thought-provoking as the first part, but the analysis of the successes and failures of the League and the UN in terms of conflicts, civil wars, etc is very well done.

The final part of the book deals with the shift from multilateralism to unilateralism by the US, and the beginnings of a shift back to a more multilateral view. This, for Talbott, seems to be the most personal part of the book as well as being the most provocative. He quotes Truman saying that preventive war is a weapon "of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States", and he also quotes Bush I "We seek a Pax Universalis built upon shared responsibilites and aspirations." There's a lot in this section to think about, particularly as regards the role of the US in the world. Communication and transportation have made everything in the world very close: if a sparrow dies in Indonesia, should we care? If that sparrow was a pet and died of avian flu, and the owner arrives in the US 15 hours later, should we care? If Pakistan goes into chaos, is it our business? As Talbott notes, can the US remain aloof from problems elsewhere in the world? Talbott also talks about "a la carte multilateralism" where the US picks and chooses which tidbits it likes and ignores the rest. There's much here to make you pause and think--and that's what a fine book like this should do.

I was skeptical about reading this book. Many authors have tried to weave together a cogent history of the nation-state with its implications for the future. Most of those attempts have been soporific and/or permeated with personal agendas.
Strobe Talbott has succeeded admirably. It is a pleasure to read something that is not only illuminating, but is also well written (something very rare these days). Moreover, the tone is erudite without being stuffy, precise without being boring. I especially appreciated how he saved his personal commentary for only those moments when it was appropriate--and even then, he does so in a way that is subtle but powerful. He adroitly leads the reader to confront conclusions within the context of relevant facts. I could go on, but suffice to say that this is probably one of the best books I have read in the last several years.

Strobe Talbot has been an advocate for world federalism for a number of years now. Even before his tenure as Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, Talbot called for world federalism in Time magazine as the Soviet Union and its Communist allies rightfully fell into, to use Communist godfather Karl Marx's phrase, "the dustbin of history." At least Talbot makes no secret of his biases in "The Great Experiment," his look at the history of world government which is appreciated. From his post in the Clinton State Department as well as at the Brookings Institute, Talbot had a ringside seat for some pivotal years in world history and he offers his perspective on events. One may not always agree with his politics but Talbot reminds the reader how the last two decades have witnessed epic changes in international politics and relations.

There are two problems with the book. Talbot attempts to present the history of world federalism and he simply is not up to the task. Centuries fly by in the space of sentences. Talbot simply fails to provide any insight into much of the historical past. That's no big deal on say Napoleon's ambitions. There are a lot of good accounts of the rise and fall of Napoleon out there. But it is a problem when Talbot gets into the 20th century. World government had three windows in the 20th century: after World War One, after World War Two and after the fall of the Soviet empire. World federalism failed each and every time. Talbot offers little insight on these blown chances.

The other problem is harder to pin down. Talbot is not a dull writer but he is an inconsistent one. Some chapters of the book are full of passion while others make the reader think that Talbot was merely going through the motions.

Strobe Talbot was my commencement speaker when I graduated from college. I can't remember a thing he said despite being interested in international affairs and world federalism. I remember almost every episode of "Star Trek:The Next Generation" which I watched most nights in my dorm room. Gene Roddenberry was able to find a way to present world federalism in an entertaining fashion. Talbot should have taken a few lessons from Picard and Kirk. If he wanted to make a serious case for world federalism, Talbot should have tried to reach a greater audience. Instead this is a book that will only appeal to readers who already support Talbot's positions.

From the opening paragraphs of this book, it is obvious that Talbott's agenda is huge. He promises us a history of empire and of mankind's failure to cooperate with others who are different (beginning with Adam and Eve, no less). He also promises a cogent discussion of the logic of empire -- both its rise and its fall, with insights derived from a broad sweep of history (to encompass the Sumerian Empire to the present day). Lastly, he promises an in-depth discussion of what, if anything, causes America's imperial ambitions to depart markedly from those of prior empires, and promises to point us towards an understanding of America's future. He does not deliver all that he promises - but how could he? What he's proposing is perhaps a series of books, a lifetime of work, an oeuvre, an opus. The other thing that's a bit daunting is the list at the end of all the people he thanks for their contributions, assistance and reading of the manuscript. There are over 100 of them, which might explain why it sounds like it was written by a committee.

I'm still not sure what to make of the work. There is a sense of discovery that unfolds as you read, as though Talbott himself has just discovered that the gypsies have a word that describes any outsider as a barbarian, or that not all historians agree with his teachers at Hotchkiss, his prep school, regarding the role of the Huns in bringing on the Dark Ages in Europe. Unfortunately, much of what he appears to be discovering for the first time is actually old hat to scholars steeped in history, linguistics and cultural studies. Perhaps this is simply the difference between a journalist and a scholar. The gallivanting through history which transpires throughout the book leads to some startling gaps -- a discussion, for example, of the Ottoman Empire as tolerant, which surely makes you wonder if he's heard of the Armenian genocide. I'm sure a specialist in any of the fields which he condenses in his quick summary could nitpick his off the cuff generalizations, finding places where he has erred.

He is, of course, much more cogent when he finally arrives at the Clinton years -- though what is missing in this section of the book is a clear decision to embrace one level of analysis and stick to it. For example, in detailing American hubris at the end of the cold War and the ways in which the US was ill-prepared and ill-informed regarding the threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, he stresses that Americans were "preoccupied with the Monica Lewinsky scandal." Fair enough from a journalistic point of view, but surely a bureacratic politics explanation could also be constructed to explain why the EXPERTS (not the PUBLIC) dropped the ball on that one.

He's at his best when he speculates in his journalistic expert way, suggesting for example that Krauthammer's "unipolar moment" might equally have been a "multipolar moment" if only Clinton had had the courage to gamble in support of his convinctions and draw together a real internationalist coalition. I'm with the reviewer above, however, who suggested that this book represents, in a sense, Talbott's dissertation -- his laying out of his credentials for the Obama administration so they'll know who to call, provided they have an opening. Unfortunately, I think Hilary got Strobe's job.

This book contains a whirlwind history of empire and internationalism, along with Tallbott's personal anecdotes and opinions about recent history and his own vision for the future. While yes it contains the political biases that come from working in a particular administration, the biases are openly admitted, and the book still presents an interesting and refreshing point of view.

The book might not be technical/detailed enough for some, the historical descriptions might get repetitive for a serious student of history, and even a casual reader like myself might wish for a more detailed framework/plan for the future; but I still recommend the book for the overall scope, enjoyable pacing and language, and the unique point of view presented.

The author of The Great Experiment is an honest to goodness intellectual with the academic bonafides and practical policy experience to back it up. He is also an unabashed liberal but nonetheless delivers a very interesting, basically fair and highly readable book. It is not really about Mr. Talbot's politics but they do surface in his choice of anecdotes (which are interesting all the same) and the sometimes telegraphed rebukes of the Bush Administration (probably deserved). The writing is consistently good throughout but the level of detail, depending on your interests, may at times be surprising (like his excellent multi-page synopsis of the evolution of the three great religions to rise from the Middle East) and at other times over-done (like his much shorter discourse on the Gypsies in Britain). He concludes with a hopeful if not fully feasible prescription for the future but, when all is considered, this is a very useful and thoughtful book that you will enjoy reading and will refer back to as well.

This broad and sweeping analysis of multilateral geopolitics, from a western hemisphere perspective, illustrates how even intelligent, experienced and well-educated people can be blinded by ideology. Strobe Talbott is so right about the upward trajectory of human political endeavor towards global governance, and yet so far left in his conclusions and advice for how to move forward from here.

Clearly the occupation of Iraq has been a challenging effort that was miscalculated, misunderstood and mismanaged. But how can the author smugly state that Operation Iraqi Freedom is "the most ill-conceived, poorly executed, and disastrous exertion of American power in the history of the republic" with a straight face? Has he not considered the implications of the Vietnam War or even the Bay of Pigs? Or do those not count because they were launched by Democratic administrations?

Nuclear proliferation is certainly a major risk, but is global climate change really the second-most important challenge facing the civilized world in 2008? What about the threat of Islamic terrorism? How about the interdependency of global financial markets and the overextension of credit? To say nothing of the risk of the security and controls for information and data management of international military, water, energy, financial and human resources.

It's a shame that such a talented author, diplomat and political historian comes up short on such an important topic. Ignoring the obvious smacks of both hubris and arrogance. As that noted international and multilateral statesman John Adams once said, "Facts are stubborn things", Mr. Talbott.

This book, by the President of the Brookings Institute (sort of the bullpen for Democratic aides to warm up in while waiting for their team to return to the playing field), combines a quick history of (West Asian) aspirations towards world government before turning in more detail to the practices of the Clinton and Bush administrations. The history is pretty inconsequential, except it clarifies that Kant's concept of the sovereign individual is Talbott's inspiration for the humanitarian militarism he practiced under Clinton, as Deputy Secretary of State. Strikingly absent is almost any reference to trade (Adam Smith is notably skipped over in the history part; Karl Marx is included, with a description barely worthy of a cold war era high school textbook). This foreshadows Talbott's evasions when describing the Clinton administration, which will likely be remembered as much for its rapacious attitudes during various economic crises (especially the East Asia crisis) as for its half hearted interventions in Haiti and Somalia. Talbott barely says a word about the neoliberal plans that were shoved down various bankrupt countries throats, although an examination of them might raise doubts about his descriptions of a US filled with good will, if not quite enough commitment, to solve the problems of the world. He also is an unabashed elitist who expresses puzzlement at the notion that global citizens' efforts might drive the process of world integration. Not surprisingly, although he is somewhat critical of the Bush administration, he is uninterested in the worldwide popular mobilizations that urged the US not to invade Iraq. More disappointing is that, while he is close to the Clintons (he presently is an adviser to Hillary), he offers little insight into why she went along with the invasion of Iraq. His self image is clearly of someone much more cosmopolitan than the Bush administration, but every so often--particularly when he relishes the defeat of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the installation of US pawn Kofi Annan--a different individual shows through, one not much more prepared to deal with non-Americans as equals than the Bush administration. In general, the author demonstrates no impulse to lift up the rugs of US foreign policy and look at what lies beneath. The book is thus of limited interest except as a gauge of the mindset of those around Hillary Clinton.

Holey moley - I previously saved this page to get later, and the Kindle price then (last year) was $9.99. I went to download to my Kindle now and the price has gone to $13.99 - 40% increase! What gives?

I note too that the paperback version of this book is only $12.24 - Kindle books are supposed to be cheaper than the print version.

Anyone know what is going on?

TGE is basically a breezy overview of 3,000 years of political history. It's a pseudo-acedemic attempt for the author to show how well-read he is and his ability to name- and fact-drop. Yawn. If you are starting from scratch and looking for world history in a nutshell then maybe this is worth reading. Otherwise, forget it.

I couldn't justify finishing this drivil but, from what I could tell, there was really nothing here by way of meaninful analysis or anything new offered by the author. Good thing I got this for free; it is a definite waste of paper.

Not recommended.