Customer Reviews

The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage

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If you are a fan of spy films and fiction, you will appreciate the countless times double agents are integral to their plots, and how often the Americans, say, would dangle rewards to recruit Soviet spies to come over to the other side. It worked in fiction; it never worked, not once, in any significant way, in actual spying. Frederick P. Hitz, who has a long history of service with the CIA, knows this and says it is confirmed by former CIA director Robert M. Gates and case officer Dwight Clarridge. In _The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage_ (Knopf), Hitz gives an overview of 20th century spying, comparing fiction to the real thing. It will be a book best appreciated by those who are familiar with the work of such authors as le Carré and Graham Greene, but it can be appreciated not just for the comparisons between fact and fiction, but for the many observations of fact about the spying game.

Rather than recruitments, there were walk-ins by Soviets; a spy (or potential spy) literally walked in to an embassy and offered his services. Changing sides comes from diverse motivations. Some Soviet walk-ins disliked the repression of the Soviet state. Others needed money. Aldrich Ames walked into the Washington Soviet embassy in 1985 with what he estimated was $150,000 in CIA and FBI secrets, ready to sell because he had a lot of bills for his extravagant way of living. Frequently spies have resentment towards their own bureaucracies and failures to rise in them. Sometimes people are tricked into spying. Even the James Bond novels describe a specific sort of "honey pot" entrapment, whereby the sexual liaison would be filmed and the victim forced to spy if he wanted to avoid exposure. The Soviets could apparently insist to attractive female workers that their bodies belonged to the state and had duties as lures, not the sort of order that western countries could make to their female employees. It is interesting that honey pots did not work in the opposite direction for another reason. Entrapped westerners would fret about exposure, but when such entrapment was tried on Soviets, they "...would invariably laugh off the threat of exposure as not very compelling in their country." Gadgets so beloved by the movies are downplayed here. There have been, for example, extraordinary advances in miniaturization of microphones and transmitters, but a cat equipped with a microphone makes too many sounds of its own; thus the "Acoustic Kitty" of the Technical Support Division "died a deserved death as technically infeasible."

Spy reality has affected spy fiction. Where the heroes used to be unsung good guys doing their patriotic duties, after Vietnam and Watergate, novelists like le Carré and Clancy wrote about obsessives, misfits, and power freaks who were interested in playing the spy game for itself rather than for national interest. The end of the Cold War and the effect of terrorism have potential for bringing back the hero spy. Perhaps we have hero spies now and Hitz simply is not able to sing their praises because they are still spying. His book is good at giving details of such things as the treasons of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, and also the contributions of Soviet double agents to the information Kennedy needed to decide on the Cuban blockade. It is in giving these inside stories that Hitz succeeds in conveying his thesis: leaving aside the more fantastic Bondian conceits, "...real espionage cases are often more bizarre, more deserving of a place in Ripley's than the fictional accounts."

I bought this book hoping to read an intellectual treatise of the reality faced by spies and their handlers as contrasted to fictional representations in spy novels. In short I expected an expose` of what really goes on (which is pretty mundane) as compared to riveting and thrilling adventures. What I read was a silly half-baked comparison of fictional spy characters from Ashenden to The Hunt For Red Oktober" (not really spies) to ten well-known and exposed spies, five Brits, two Soviets and two Americans (Ames and Hanssen.) There was little to learn, and what there was was well-hidden.

The author brings interesting bureaucratic credentials to the table having served in the CIA, Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, and finally as inspector general of the CIA. However, although his first position was as an "operations officer" (note the does not use the term "case officer"), he may have spent his entire 18 years at Langley, and all those after his first stint in positions requiring a lawyer. In short, his bio indicates he was the ultimate Washington bureaucrat rather than an intelligence operative. Nonetheless, one would think at least he would know something about spies from osmosis, but this book failed to display any insider knowledge, or indeed, anything that could not be gleaned from reading the fictional works referenced and widely published books by others on the real spies he used for comparisons. The best that can be said for this standard product of an Ivy League school (Princeton) and Harvard Law School is that he can write fairly well, although repetitiously.

Hitz points out that the CIA failed to penetrate the Soviet Union, was unable to ferret out Soviet agents in the CIA itself, and has become increasingly inept, bureaucratic and bureaupathic (my word.) Two statements were telling. One, that Americans were "too nice" to be successful in an inherently dirty game, and two, that meaningful contact between American case officers in diplomatic cover and Soviet targets was non-existent so that recruitment of Soviet agents was precluded. Unfortunately, Hitz fails to point out the obvious. The solution to the first problem is to stop recruiting socially acceptable personnel from Ivy League schools who cannot function outside diplomatic cocktail parties, and the second is solved by moving case officers to non-official cover where life becomes personally dangerous and have them recruit indigenous spotters and assessors. Oh wow, that means the Agency has to hire non-elite personnel who will be willing to take risks.

Hitz never discusses what makes up a good spy (access and motivation) or an effective case officer (in his term "spy-runner.") Frankly I prefer the MI term "agent handler", but spy-runner will do. Allow me to make up for what Hitz omitted. The first requirement for an agent handler is fluency in the host language. Requirements two through nine are fluency in the host language. Tenth is the willingness to take risks to accomplish the mission, eleventh is an understanding of people, and twelfth is political adeptness in handling the home office.

There are many errors in this book such as his statement that the Venona Project was not publicized during the forties and fifties due to the "sensitivity" of the project. This is a red herring since the project had already been betrayed to the Soviet Union by a Soviet Agent William Weisband in 1946 (or 1948). If there was any sensitivity it was that the American people were not ready to hear that several hundred Soviet agents were active in the Federal Government, most notably the State Department. McCarthy was actually almost spot on, leading some analysts to surmise that McCarthy had been tipped off to Venona by someone on the project. Hitz mentions the Soviet spies confirmed through Venona such as the Rosenbergs, Hiss, Currie and White, but fails to mention those spies who were not brought to trial like Ted Hall. This and other errors makes it seem like Hitz possesses little knowledge beyond what has already been published and widely accepted.

In addition, given that the CIA has become increasingly bureaucratic and incompetent, one wonders what part the author played in inhibiting or enhancing this trend as the CIA's inspector general for eight years. If this misbegotten book is any indication, Hitz does not figure prominently among the good guys.

In short, this book is amusing, but has little otherwise to offer. It will only appeal to literary types who have no personal experience in intelligence activities and can readily confuse reality with fiction. It does not present the reality of life in positive intelligence gathering that one might have expected -- rather Hitz confuses some arcane reality in his own mind with myths contained in spy books.

I enjoyed this book, though it has several frustrations. It is a relatively small book, and a relatively quick read. Overall, the text is very approachable and the subject matter broad but not deep. Each chapter is for a particular aspect of spying such as: sex, tradecraft, gadgets, recruitment, betrayal, retirement, etc. Each chapter is presented in an artificially independent manner; rarely does one chapter refer back to a reference in another chapter. I suppose this can help keep things straight, but it makes it more difficult to create a continuous thread of understanding through the whole book.

Throughout the book, Hitz compares his experiences (rarely explicitely said or rarely a specific incident cited) to about 10 fictional accounts and about 5 true-life books previously written. There are many extended quotes followed by a short interpertation by Hitz. Most of the book focuses on what the author deems an accurate (versus inaccurate) portrayal. If you are not familiar with most of the sources he uses then you may have a difficult time keeping keeping the references straight throughout the book (as I did).

I had a difficult time deciding whether to give three or four stars. The book is a nice read, but not to deep. I felt myself constantly looking for more; wondering what Hitz was leaving out, what he couldn't say and what is still classified "secret" by the government. In the end, I am not a spook so I have to give Hitz the benefit of the doubt and assume he is relatively thorough and honest.

The Great Game is a great starting point, or ending point, for any reader interested in spy fiction. It's not a tell all account of Professor Hitz's years in the CIA, it's a topical approach to espionage writ large. Read that way it's both informative and fun. I enjoyed reading the different chapters as distinct units when I had the time. I recommend the book, just don't make the mistake of some other reviewers and assume it is something it doesn't purport to be. I found it informative and quick.

The beauty of Hitz's book is that he brings to it the experience that comes from a lifelong career in the agency. It is an insider's look, and is both a fun read and an interesting look at the career of a spy.

It is truly a shame. I approached the Frederick Hitz book "The Great Game" with great enthusiasm and anticipation. As a reader of a wide number of fiction authors from the espionage genre I found the idea that an author with solid credentials in the intelligence community reviewing and commenting on these fictional exercises positively exciting. Thus, my disappointment at finding Mr. Hitz had little to nothing to say of interest.

The chapters, treating with Betrayal, Tradecraft, Assassination and similar topics, certainly address the proper subject matter. However, the chapters contents, on occasion numbering as few as four pages in length, were uniformly superficial and, worse still, occasionally repetitive. In the attempt to contrast fictional works with real life Hitz makes reference frequently to cases such as those of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and the British intelligence officer Kim Philby and his contemporaries. In not a single case, however, is an operation conducted by these men discussed, analyzed or even referenced in any depth that would illustrate the espionage activities of the actors. Discussion of these agents is limited primarily to establishing the personal and historical context in which their actions take place.

Likewise, and seemingly much worse, is the treatment given those fiction authors whose works Hitz comments upon. Lengthy quotes from the works of Le Carre, William Hood, Erskine Childers, Graham Greene, and others well known to readers of the espionage genre receive only the most cursory comments, seemingly devoid of more than "Introductory Psychology" levels of insight.

In sum, this book proves disappointing on numerous levels conceivably of obvious interest to the more than casual reader of espionage fiction to which audience the book must necessarily be intended for. The jacket blurb from Zbigniew Brzezinski promises "an illuminating perspective, based on personal experience and sharp intellect." It instead is a limited discourse, in both depth and scope, and devoid of evidence of experience. The reader must decide for themself whether the intellect is sharp or, as would be my opinion, dumbed down.

For interested readers, I would recommend instead Robert Baer's SEE NO EVIL. The reader can then use their own insight and by reading somewhat between the lines appreciate a chronicle of the strengths and weaknesses to be found in espionage, and by extension, in the fictionalized accounts of espionage to be found in English language literature.

The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage by Frederick P. Hitz is, essentially, a comparative analysis. Hitz, a longtime actual spook at the CIA compares and contrasts various actual spies (Aldrich Ames, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, etc.) life and professional histories with the writings and characters of highly regarded and well known fictional stories and spies-( John Le Carre, Tom Clancy).

Overall, the book is a great disappointment. While there is the occasional nugget of info that piques ones interest, on the whole the exercise generates conclusions that dash between the obvious to the trite.

That in itself would be disappointing enough. The real problem here is that Hitz demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the nature of spy fiction. None of the books he analyzes are written to be a primer of the spy profession. These are not procedurals, they bare novels. As such, they are written to be, more than anything else, morality plays. The issues at hand may vary between the morality of grand policies of nations or movement, the morality of spying itself, the interplay between good and evil-whatever. They are written to tell a story and express a viewpoint, not to provide ideal textbook descriptions of the art of spying. That's the role of non-fiction.

Hitz marvels that the "real world" is so much more complex, untidy, clear cut and, indeed, in some ways, far more chaotic than is portrayed in spy novels. He would have done well to remember Tom Clancy's famous quote about the difference between fiction and real life: "Fiction has to make sense."

His lack of understanding of that premise sinks this effort from the beginning.