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4.0 out of 5 stars Clear writing meets clear thinking, September 7, 2009

By	Earth that Was - See all my reviews

Pullitzer prizewinning journalist Edgar Mowrer wrote:

"In winning the war FDR left nothing to chance. In planning for peace he bet the future of the American people on one card, that the Soviet Union would prefer peace and collaboration with the West to armed and ideological expansion. He was warned of the risk. He deliberately took the risk. And he lost."

Hanson Baldwin quotes Mowrer and examines six of the key cards the US played in World War 2. Baldwin was not just a "war correspondent" but a military affairs journalist during war and Cold War period. This 1949 book, essentially an extended pamphlet of 108 pages, has not been outdated by subsequent releases and has stood the test of time.

"Unconditional surrender" seems to have been hatched by Roosevelt over a meal without any serious strategic debate or subsequent review. "L'etat c'est moi!" Stalin never accepted it, Churchill acquiesced and (in behavior similar to his treatment of the RAF's "Bomber Harris") tried to pass the blame back onto FDR once the policy's high cost became apparent.

Baldwin's "Great Mistakes of The War" focuses on six American mistakes only. "Unconditional surrender" tops the list. In Europe the failure to support Churchill's "soft underbelly" strategy and the diversionary campaign into southern Germany away from Berlin's end game are added. In the Pacific, Macarthur's failed strategy for the defense of the Philippines (and the inter-service rivalries it fostered) and the costly diplomatic and materiel "appeasement" of Soviet Union are discussed. In the later case, this "strategy" was essentially half baked and based on the vain hope of bringing Russia decisively into the anti-Japan war. Bad intelligence and a total lack of any serious analysis of what the Soviets, or even hopes for air bases in Siberia, could actually bring to the Pacific campaign were missing despite diplomatic offers being made to Stalin. Baldwin caps his work with his best chapter, a dissection of the moral and strategic nullity, the dropping of the atomic bomb, an act Baldwin says graces America with "the mantle of Genghis Khan."

Baldwin describes each mistake and it's impact on the course of the war. Baldwin's writing style is sharp, crisp and to the point. This in no way compromises Baldwin's analysis. If anything brevity forces Baldwin to concentrate on the essentials.