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Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle

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On August 7, 1942, eight months to the day after Japan's "dastardly attack" on Pearl Harbor and barely eight weeks after the Battle of Midway ended a 6-month-long string of defeats for the Allies in the Pacific, elements of the First Marine Division, supported by the largest U.S. fleet yet assembled, came ashore on the beaches of Guadalcanal and two nearby islands in a barely opposed initial landing. Their mission: to capture an airfield (which the Marines named Henderson Field, in honor of Maj. Lofton Henderson, who had died at Midway) that, if left in Japanese hands, could have helped cut the lifeline between Australia and the United States.

The initial success of the landings, however, was followed by some of the fiercest land, air, and naval battles of the Pacific War. Japanese and American naval forces struggled incessantly for control of the seas around the Solomon Islands, and the U.S. Navy was unpleasantly surprised to come off as second best in some of the more famous fleet encounters, particularly in the Battle of Savo Island, where four Allied cruisers were sunk in one of the worst defeats in America's long naval history.

On land, too, Guadalcanal became a living hell for the Japanese defenders and the Marines holding a perimeter around Henderson Field. Both sides endured not only the man-made horrors of battle, but also the ravages of life in the tropical jungle, including jungle rot, malaria, and -- for the Japanese -- hunger as American attempts to stem the trickle of reinforcements and supplies slowly but surely began to succeed.

Richard B. Frank's book, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, not only covers the events that took place between August 7, 1942 and February 9, 1943, but also deals with the Guadalcanal campaign's genesis as part of the overall Pacific War's conduct by both the Japanese and the Allies. It's Frank's firm conclusion -- and the facts of the book seem to support his opinion -- that Guadalcanal, rather than Midway, was the true turning point of World War II in the Pacific. The book is extremely well done and impeccably researched, making full use of Japanese and American sources to present a fully balanced account of this extremely complex and vital campaign.

After the Americans defeated the Japanese at the battle of Midway, an offensive was planned for the Solomon Islands. The primary target was the island of Guadalcanal. In this book, Mr. Frank describes the landings and the capture of Henderson Field in vivid detail. I was also impressed with his descriptions of the fateful battle of Savo Island, where the Allies lost 4 heavy cruisers to an inferior Japanese force. Admiral Fletcher's decision to remove the carriers is discussed, along with the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, where the 5 Sullivan brothers died on the U.S.S. Juneau.

Perhaps the most interesting part of this book to me was how Mr. Frank not only provides the American viewpoint of the battle, but also the Japanese viewpoint. It was interesting to read about how aircraft and casualty claims were greatly exaggerated by both sides. I also felt that the final chapter was interesting in the way that everything was summarized for the reader. I have been reading books about the Pacific war since I was in the 4th grade, and this is the most comprehensive account of the entire Guadalcanal campaign that I have come across. This book is a must read for any World War II reader.

Before going on a 6 month tour of the South Pacific Islands I was determined to get a good chronological understanding of every battle that happened there during WWII. Guadalcanal had always been a little difficult for me to get a good geographical grip upon: the island is large, but actual battle areas were rather small; the battle continued over 6 months before the Japanese broke and was characterised by a spasmodic nature; actions were rarely large unit and the fighting was largely not against well dug-in Japanese positions, but rather characterised by long marches and concentrations against the US perimeter, and by the US against Japanese troop concentrations, and --- no understanding of the land battle is possible without understanding the sea battles.

Frank is wonderful on all counts and can really write well. At a time when both sides were reaching out to each other to do battle right at the end of their supply lines, with little depth, it was the Japanese training and perseverance that really ruled the day on the sea. On land, although Japanese soldiers were perhaps the finest fighting infantry in war (General Slim's words, not mine). They tended to be blinded by their presumed superiority and racial arrogance. They were roughly handled by the marines at first and this punishment was followed up by the later army actions to clear the North-west part of the island.

What really dominated the land battle was success at sea -- and the Americans were very lucky indeed in the opening months that the Japanese never pressed their advantage once they had initial successes at sea. If they had of the result of the battle would have been an allied defeat. Few people remember that, in these waters, were fought the only real sustained large scale engagements of surfaces ships, battleships and cruisers -- minus carriers -- during WWII. Ironbottom sound got its name from all the (mainly US) ships sunk. But out of this the general US Navy complacency gave way to a grudging appreciation that the Japanese --- with or without radar -- were a force not to be taken lightly. Over the next few months Americans took their licks, then gave as good as they got, and eventually were able to hold their own in ship-on-ship engagements (particularly destroyer actions at night), which was quite and achievement for the Americans given their relative inexperience.

Unfortunately all this took much longer than should have been the case and the grunts on shore could have been paying the final bill but for the fact that the Japanese limited their attacks to shelling the airfield (as Frank describes), usually ineffectively, but enough to scare the hell out anyone on the receiving end of the Japanese 18 inch rifles.

Japanese land tactics are also well described. The landings and slaughter of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi units are there in detail. And well they should be since, unless you know what Kawaguchi-san was actually trying to do by concentrating his troops after a punishing march through the jungle... it can be very difficult to keep track of the action.

The relief convoys are also well described and the final successful withdrawal of the Japanese is a nail biter.

It is too bad that this battle ground today remains mired in a bitter civil conflict or it would be more accessible to those who wish to see the numerous remains of this battle (and there are a lot to see on land, and by scuba or snorkel at sea).

Hands down the best book on the "canal" as US forces called it, or "Ga-jima" as the Japanese called it. A good testament to the courage of both sides in what were for the US early days of WWII.

In June, 1992, I flew into Guadalcanal to begin research on my great uncle's experience as a Marine during the WWII campaign. My plan was to retrace his steps during the months-long battle fifty years to the day after he took those steps.

Like no other book I read, this book helped me do that.

My six-month-long stay on Guadalcanal was preceded by more than a year of reading every single thing I could get my hands on about the battle. I read every book I could find in the English language -- accounts from Brits, Kiwis, Aussies -- as well as a few translated from Japanese. I spent two weeks at the Marine Corps Historical Museum in D.C. going through my great uncle's unit's combat reports.

This book was without question the book I counted on the most to understand the chronology of the battle -- who on both sides was where, doing what and when during the battle, how the battle unfolded, etc.

The Guadalcanal story has been told many times since our grandfathers came home from that war. But, to my knowledge, it has never been told in this detail. Nobody has documented the Battle for Guadalcanal better than Richard Frank.

He tells the story elegantly, with detail about troop movements, unit actions, ship names, etc. that only someone obsessed with such details (like me) would find interesting. Yet, the detail he documents doesn't get in the way of the telling of the story. The details flow with the drama. And drama there was, of course.

It's a scholarly book for scholars and a reader's book for readers. Anyone truly interested in how and why this battle was historic will find this book immensely rewarding.

If you're seriously interested in learning about this momentous battle, this book is a must-read along with William Manchester's "Goodbye Darkness."

To attempt to write a work one will describe as the "definitive account" of the battle for Guadalcanal is no mean undertaking. Firstly because of the enormity of the story, due to the fact the struggle ensued for more than five months on land, sea, and in the air, and secondly, because the story has been told by so many others over the decades. Nevertheless, Richard B. Frank has succeeded.

It is likely that many who read this book are already more or less well informed about the Pacific war. I consider myself a fairly serious student of that theater and am always eager to delve into the remotest details, as well as grand strategy and political matters that affected this great contest.

This book, from cover to cover, is an unsurpassed account of the battle, but it does not merely repeat what is likely to be known by readers already familiar with it. I will cite an example that impressed me especially.

By mid-September, the Japanese Army had amassed enough strength to potentially be victorious. Aside from the tenacity and skill of the Americans who fought them, the Japanese made two errors that may well have been decisive against them. First, in their efforts to flank the US positions to the south they made navigational errors that took them too far south. This had the effect of draining their fighting strength during the extended tortuous trek, and it placed them farther from their intended point of attack than they thought they were.

This error was then compounded by the Japanese doctrine of extreme aggressiveness. While usually this is a virtue in battle, even the most aggressive force must sometimes take some time to gather their strength and assess their situation correctly. This they did not do, so instead of a well coordinated attack that may well have overrun the defending Americans, their attack was minimally coordinated and carried out by troops already exhausted from their grueling jungle march.

I had never read of the Japanese preparations for this attack in any detail, and found Frank's account illuminating.

The other specific part of the story Frank tells that I think was undertold before is the campaign of the U.S. Army troops right up until the Japanese withdrawal. After reading some accounts of the battle for Guadalcanal, one can be forgiven for thinking it was fought strictly by Marines. (And by the way, I am an ex-Marine).

There is one thing a researcher of this quality might have included that I would have avidly read, and that is a more detailed accounting of the gradual building of American strength on the island, men and materiel. Perhaps Frank thought this would have constituted excessive detail, but since Guadalcanal was such an intense logistical struggle, to me including this information would be particularly fascinating.

Writing this book was an ambitious undertaking that succeeded. I hope to see more work from this fine author.

This is not a light read, nor should it be. While reading this book, you will not be wanting of information. Frank has loaded this volume with incredible detail. I did not give this book the full 5 star review because it needed a few more maps, eventhough the maps it contains are good. There is a plethera of names to deal with from the islands to the Japanese officers to the US officers to the ship names. This is a very thorough treatment of this critical campaign. This will stand as great reference book and a welcome addition to a WWII library. The reader should be forewarned that this is not a casual read and if one is looking for a more abridged treatment, I would refer to the Samuel Eliot Morison's volume V of the History of Naval Operations in WWII.

Thoroughly researched, and utilizing both American and Japanese field reports, Frank has written the definitive account of America's first offensive struggle of WW II. The seven naval engagements are given the same detail attention as are the multiple land clashes. Most vivid among the latter were the days and nights along Edson's ridge and the Battle for Henderson's Field. Of particular interest were the accounts of the taking of Gavutu, Tanambogo and Tulagi, adjacent islands that several works overlook altogether. This invasion should never have succeeded; we lacked both air and naval superiority, two prerequisites for any amphibious assault. In those first few months, when the enemy could have swatted us like an annoying bug, he hesitated and committed resources piecemeal, a mistake the Japanese would make over and over. The monumental strategic importance of the Solomons seems to gradually dawn on each side as the campaign progressed. Unusual for a book of such detail, from the Tenaru to Edson's Ridge to the final escape of the decimated remnants of the Japanese defenders sixth months later, the action never slows. A liberal sprinkling of front line troops' reflections would have made this a truly remarkable read. Admittedly, I've been spoiled by Ambrose.

Rich Frank provides additional proof (if ever it was needed) that frequently the best history comes from nonprofessionals. "Guadalcanal" was researched and written on the author's own time over a period spanning years, and the result is often described as "definitive." That's likely an apt assessment. Frank's tremendous work may or may not remain "the last word" on the subject, but it will certainly stand the test of time.
I disagree with those who say that the book contains too much statistical data. Nearly all the stats are grouped in the notes and appendices, which is where they belong. In no way do they detract from the first-rate text, but they're provided in a logical manner, easily referenced.
In LSO terms, "Guadalcanal" is an underlined OK-3.

Most references to World War Two in the Pacific cite the decisive American victory at the Battle of Midway as the turning point in that conflict - the high tide of Japanese aggression. This book carefully refutes that position. The Japanese were still on the offensive after Midway (in part because the Japanese Navy neglected to inform the Japanese Army of the loss of four front line fleet carriers in that battle). The Japanese were still fully capable of seizing and severing American lines of communication with Australia - depriving the U.S. of a required base for future offensive operations. The dual campaigns in New Guinea and Guadalcanal from August 1942 to January 1943 (both resulting in successful Allied counter-offensives) represented the critical shift from the strategic defensive to the offensive for the Allies for the balance of the war. As Frank so ably demonstrates, there was nothing inevitable about the six-month struggle in the southern Solomons that started when the First Marine Division went ashore August 7, 1942. Both sides suffered significant setbacks and suffered from leadership lapses at critical junctures. In the end, it was the U.S. superiority in high command decisions and material that seemed to tilt the balance. The Japanese were surprised and very slow to believe that the U.S. was committing itself to an offensive campaign so early in the war. An objective analysis reveals that the Japanese had every reason to be surprised and U.S. leaders had every reason to be pessimistic as to the final outcome, especially after the early disaster at the Battle of Savo Island revealed relative U.S. weakness in surface ship actions. Guadalcanal came to be known as Starvation Island for the Japanese and the U.S. also came to recognize the conflict as a battle for logistics supremacy - which equated to air and sea supremacy, while soldiers and marines suffered tropical deprivations and hard fighting against a fanatical foe on the ground. Frank's work attempts to tell the complete story - air, sea and land - and he is successful. No mean feat. His research casts new light on an aging but important subject. As the World War Two generation fades into the past, it is all the more important to to reassess the history and importance of these events. Guadalcanal the history by Frank is a landmark study on perhaps the critical campaign of the entire cataclysm that was the War in the Pacific.

Frank has written a detailed, exhaustive account of what was really the pivotal battle in the Pacific, something each side only recognized late in the game. He has covered the "triphibious" nature of the battles - land, sea, and air - in day to day detail from both the American and Japanese sides. He pays particular attention to the command, intelligence, and cryptographic elements that were key throughout. His research is so detailed that, for example, he can counter every daily claim of planes shot down with their actual number - including which crews survived. If you want to know what happened at Guadalcanal, read this book.

Two negatives only: The book needs more, bigger, more detailed and indexed maps. And as others have noted, the book is lacking on the human element. Medal of Honor winning performances are given a sentence (or a footnote). You won't feel you know any of the participants other than as a third party.