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Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940

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This book is extremely well done and spells out the history of American involvement in the Pacific after 1898 much better than anything else on the market. Although Miller's WAR PLAN ORANGE is also an interesting book, but from the navy's point of view, I feel this one is much better done. Highly recommend this work to anyone wanting background on the Pacific War.

Previous books on the "Orange Plan" of 20's and 30's have usually described it from a Navy point of view. Linn's book takes the various Army points of view, and shows how MacArthur's arguement to defend the Phillippines was not the majority opinion. From a strictly military point of view, the Phillippines was not worth sacrificing the Fleet and and additional troops. Hawaii, because of it's proximity to the US west coast and logistics capability (drydock and fuel tank farm)was worth defending. An interesting appendix shows that the Army consistantly stationed more troops in Hawaii than the Phillippines. With the United States making a stand against Japanese aggression in China, however, the political retoric had to be backed up with military resolve. So thousands of Army troops were sent to their doom to reinforce the Phillippine garrison in 1940-1941. This book, along with Edward S. Miller's WAR PLAN ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, gives the reader an excellent overview of US military planning and thinking vs the Japanese during the period between World War 1 and 2.

With these words, Professor Linn introduced his American Military History class to his book Guardians of Empire. Even though we were not required to read all of the chapters, I found myself wanting to finish the book due to its captivating nature.

While perhaps lacking the dry humor and probing questions of his lectures, the book manages to provide a striking look at the interwar Army, challenging common assertions of Army doctrine and planning. In the final chapter, Dr. Linn notes that in the search for what happened in 1941, people rarely go back past 1940. This book is an attempt to do exactly that. It probes the decisions, dogma and lifestyle of the American Army in the interwar period.

Wonderfully written and solidly researched, Guardians provides the best treatment of the American interwar establishment to date.

Brian Linn believes that the American annexation of the Philippines damaged rather than helped the U.S. position in East Asia. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, American military planners knew that the Philippines were extremely vulnerable to Japanese invasion but were relunctant to raise a native force that could also be a threat to the American Army. The security problems only became worse when before the attack on Pearl Harbor, MacArthur authorized the defence of the entire Philippines and not just the Bataan peninsular. As a result of America's fear of a native force to protect the Philippines and MacArthur's overly ambitious plans, the United State suffered a humiliating defeat to the Japanese in 1942. I would reccomend this book foy anyone who believes that a new American empire would enhance national security but has ignored the disasterous example of the American experience with the Philippines.

During the first forty years of the 20th Century the U.S. Army had the mission of protecting the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands from attack by the nation of Japan. Although Japan was not originally thought to be a threat, from the 1922 Naval Conference onward the army high command considered Japan as the only real threat in the Pacific. This book provides a unique and very good history of what came to be known and the U.S. Army of the Pacific.

The book provides a good deal of fascinating information on all aspects of the Pacific Army from the life of enlisted men to the strategic thinking that informed its planning. But perhaps the most interesting theme running through it is how the U.S. Army identified the Japanese threat to the U.S. Pacific Islands and sought to mitigate it.

Because of budget and manpower constraints imposed by congress, the U.S. Army in the period between the WWI and WWII was incapable of fighting any kind of war. Yet as this book shows that did not prevent the Army General Staff and the Department Staffs of the Philippines and Hawaii from developing often very well thought out strategies for the defense of the islands. In the case of the Philippines the Archipelago was first considered vital to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and a keystone in U.S. strategy. Gradually this view changed and by the thirties, the Philippines were considered indefensible against Japan and a strategic liability. Army planners sought to minimize the U.S. military presence there. This same thinking made Hawaii and especially the Pearl Harbor naval base on Oahu the keystone of a defensive arc running from Alaska to Panama which was designed to protect the U.S. Pacific Frontier.

One thing that is clear from this book and that is that the Army General Staff and the Islands' Departmental Commands were quite accurate in their defining the potential threats posed by Japan and fairly realistic in planning defensive strategies against those threats. For example the army was only too aware that the elaborate harbor defense systems that defended Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay were obsolete almost from the day they were completed. Still army planners at both the General Staff and department level tried to develop effective defensive plans. The problem was, as this book states, that there was a tradition that developed early on that allowed department commands to override general staff planning and design their own defensive plans. Thus in 1941General Short of the Hawaiian Department defined the threat from Japan primarily in terms of sabotage while the General Staff correctly saw it as a threat from air attack.

This is a splendid and pioneering study of the Army in the Pacific, a subject badly in need of more light that it has hitherto received. It brings the Pacific Army to life in a way that no one else had even attempted.

Like any book, however, it has its limitations, and as is usually true it is the ones that author was not aware of (at least at the time) and did not flag for our attention that we must take most care of. In this case the principal limitation lies in strategic view.

The Philippines, as the author makes clear, never had any intrinsic significance for the United States (or for the earlier colonial power, Spain, for that matter) -- no riches or resources to be reaped. The sole significance of the islands lay in their position. Initially, Americans had calculated (like the Spaniards before them) that possession of Manila would provide an important advantage in gaining the rewards of the rich China trade. Luzon and the rest of the islands simply came with the deal. Almost as soon as they had been seized, however, other events eroded Manila's importance in this role greatly. (Perhaps we should say "seeming importance," as there never were the prospects which had been envisioned in 1898.) Finding themselves in possession of a colony of little value, Americans not unnaturally felt reservations about spending large sums to garrison and defend it. Thus a purely nominal force was assigned to its defense, adequate only for internal security and the assertion of sovereignty. The oft-proclaimed "bastion" of the Philippines was in reality no more than a sentry post, bound to be overrun quickly in any serious assault. To invest in a real Philippine fortress or in mobile forces strong enough to quickly relieve it would involve an expense that few Americans could see as justified.

Distant events changed all that. By the late 1930s, of course, the propensity of Japan for aggressive military expansion was manifest, but that did not seem particularly threatening in itself, given that the economic resources of the country were so small relative to those of the U.S. But the outbreak of the European War in 1939, followed by the Nazi defeat of France and threat to Britain in 1940, heightened American security concerns vastly. Then in September, 1940, Japan joined the Axis Pact, making itself an ally of Germany. Japan had intended this to change American perceptions and it did that, but not in the way that had been hoped. Japan ceased to be a disagreeable nuisance in a distant place and instead clearly became a potential part of a serious threat, to be blocked if possible and crushed if necessary. Very suddenly, the importance of the Philippines' geographic position changed dramatically.

It is this transition that Prof. Linn misses in focusing on the local realities rather than the global strategic picture that dominated the awareness of Washington decision-makers in 1940-41. This broader reality is well presented in Waldo Heinrichs, "Pearl Harbor in a Global Context," in _Pearl Harbor Revisited_, edited by Robert W. Love, Jr. (London: Macmillan, 1995) (ISBN 0312095937), and in more extended fashion in the same author's _Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II_, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) (ISBN 0195061683). For the same issue from a different perspective see Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Global Conflict: The Interaction Between the European and Pacific Theaters of War in World War II," in _Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) (ISBN 0521474078), or his book, _A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II_, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) (ISBN 0521558794).

Beginning with the Japanese occupation of Vietnam in July of 1941, thereby making manifest their determination to continue down the road of active alliance with Hitler, the U.S. began to rush all available military power to the Philippines, reserving only that which was essential to the security of America itself. But years of penuriousness and neglect had left the cupboard largely bare, and re-armament was yet to produce major material results. So the Philippine defenders, like the exposed sentry, became casualties of the brutally inexorable logic of war. Brian Linn's book provides a major and largely-overlooked piece of this picture, but is somewhat weak on the overall context.

There are also other sources which the interested reader may wish to consult in order to get a fuller picture. These include John J. Stephan, _Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor_, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984) (0824825500) and the article by Richard B. Meixsel, "Major General George Grunert, WPO-3, and the Philippine Army, 1940-1941," _Journal of Military History_, 59, No. 2 (Apr 1995): 303-24. Both offer insights not fully captured by Linn. In a more recent article, "Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth," _Pacific Historical Review_, 70, No. 2: 255-92, Meixsel introduces some new evidence regarding the events in the Philippines in the 1930s and uses it to call into question some of Linn's claims.

While I have focused on its limitations, I want to emphasize again that this is a very valuable and unique book, even taking them fully into account.

The role of the American army in the Pacific between the Spanish-American war and the Second World War is often forgotten. Most don't even know the American army ahd a role so far away from home. Indeed the army was small but the stakes were high. In the wake of the war with Spain in 1898 the U.S gained a number of small protectorates and colonies in the Phillipines and Samoa and elsewhere. Eventually this became part of a defense system, but it was not merely to defend against outsiders. The Army also had a role with the local people and creating institutions. Moreover it also had to fight insurgencies that took place in the Moro area of the Southern Phillipines where Muslim insurgents fought Americans. The insurgency goes on to this day. However at the time the likes of General Pershing were used to put down this uprising with the least possible loss in lives.

This fascinating and detailed book opens up a new history of the American army and its role in the Pacific.

Seth J. Frantzman

Linn notes that the big question of WWII is, "why, with almost four decades to prepare, these (US Army) military forces proved unable to defend the nation's Pacific possessions against Japan." The author notes that the traditional approach has been to focus on events in the short-term prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, however his effort is to, "offer a somewhat longer perspective through a narrative history of the U.S. Army in Hawaii and the Philippines from 1902 to 1940....its task is not to delineate the road to Pearl Harbor, but to illuminate the numerous paths the army trod in its long search for a viable Pacific defense....For years it had foreseen both the threat and its own inability to ward it off." From a strategic perspective, this book does a good job of putting America's failure into context. It points out that although the surprise attack of 7 December 1941 was not detected, from a military capabilities standpoint there was little the Army could have done. Although I believe one needs to be careful with historical parallels, a student of strategy can see how political and economic considerations drive strategy. Indeed, a similar issue between today (2004) and then was the tension between what is required to hold ground when forces are deployed vs. the ability to deploy and sustain those same forces over a great deal of distance.

I read the book and you wonder why bother to keep troops in the Philippines if Washington just wrote off any attempt to strengthen the islands' defenses. Furthermore, thanks to the United States' racial attitudes to the Hawaians, Chinese in America and the Philippines, the Japanese-Americans, Afro-Americans, and the people of the Philippines, the United States never could nor would raise enough troops to make the islands too hot for the Japanese to conquer it or effectively occupied it.

In the book A Question of Honor, about the Polish 303 Squadron. Chapter 15 talked about the government of Poland create an underground governent that carry out its usual functions. Furthermore, just about every Polish citizen participate in indirect or direct action against the Germans. The end result was that Poland like Yugoslavia was a hotbed of resistance that the Germans could never stamp out unless they killed every one in those countries. The US government, the US military in Washington D.C. and Manila, and the American colonial government had over 2 years to learn from the Poles, but they did not, so the United States deserve to get it butt kick by the Japanese. The trouble was that it was the troops that had to pay the price, of course, many of the rank and file, the NCOs, and the officers were racist bigots themselves so they indirecly contribute to their own demise. Rank and file look upon the native women in Hawaii and Philippines as sex objects but would not or could not married them while the officers only dealt with the natives if they were members of the upper and/or rich classes; but, still look down upon those people because of their racial attitudes.