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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
16 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Another Missed Opportunity...,
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This review is from: Guilford Courthouse 1781: Lord Cornwallis's Ruinous Victory (Campaign) (Paperback)
This book was an outstanding opportunity to bring the scholarship on the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, one of the most decisive of the War of the American Revolution, up to date. However, this book on the whole is a miss for three reasons. First, there was no apparent attempt to use archival material from the Maryland or Delaware State historical associations, from which much material is available on those units of the Continental Line from those two states. The Maryland and Delaware Continentals were arguably the best of the Continental units that formed the hard core of the American regulars and were on a par in discipline, training, and combat performance with the well-trained British and German regular regiments that fought against them. The 1st Maryland wrecked to British battalions during the course of the battle, and the Delawares, under the dauntless Captain Robert Kirkwood, performed both in the screening and skirmish role as well as taking part in the hard fighting at the American third line.Next, there is no reference that shows that the Company of Military Historians, with its excellent resources, was used in the preparation of this volume, which would have helped with uniforms and equipment. This is especially telling in the third color print by the artist depicting the defeat of the 2d Battalion of Guards, which wore a compaign uniform from its deployment to North America in 1776 to the end of the war. The Company of Military Historians is a treasure trove of information and not to use them, or their excellent publications (their Journal and the hardback publication, Military Uniforms in America, edited by Col John R. Elting, and having contributors such as Herbert Knotel, Frederick P. Todd, H. Charles McBarron, Clyde Risley, and Henry Larter) is a major error. Last, and most importantly, the staff at the Guilford Courthouse Military Park was not consulted by the author. If they had been, it would have been found, among other things, that the American third line, where the bulk of the Continental infantry was posted, was actually further back in the woodline than previously thought. The park historians are excellent and are continually finding and updating material and knowledge and if a book is being done on the battle, they should be both consulted and used as references. This the author failed to do. Hence, the book, as and when published, was outdated and inaccurate from the beginning and therefore useless as a reference to the battle. Again, a major mistake that irreparably damaged this volume. Minor mistakes, such as having a picture of the Battle of Eutaw Springs on the cover, stating that British grenadiers of the period wore mitre caps instead of bearskins, stating that the Delaware Battalion had a Virginia company assigned (they were brigaded with Washington's cavalry and a rifle company for the battle, but the riflemen were not part of the battalion), and overstating Gates strength at the Battle of Camden further denigrates the reliability of the book. Lastly, I found it very strange that Hatch's The Battle of Guilford Courthouse, published by the National Park Service in 1971 wasn't used as a reference, or at least wasn't listed. It is full of primary source material, orders of battle, strengths and losses for both sides, and is an essential reference for any study of Guilford Courthouse. This volume is not recommended, and as a last piece of information, I have been told that the staff of the Guilford Courthouse National Military Park will not stock it in their excellent book store as it is inaccurate and not up to date. That in itself says a lot and is a definitive verdict on the inherent value of the volume.
14 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Decent but Weakened by Exaggerations & Omissions,
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This review is from: Guilford Courthouse 1781: Lord Cornwallis's Ruinous Victory (Campaign) (Paperback)
According to Angus Konstam, author of Osprey's Campaign Series volume 109, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in 1781, "marked a turning point in the war [the American Revolution]." Konstam has written an interesting and detailed account of the clash of American General Greene's army with British General Cornwallis' army near an obscure North Carolina courthouse in March 1781. Konstam's account is decent, but should be given the plethora of secondary and primary sources on this subject. However, readers should be forewarned that this author has a tendency for exaggeration and bizarre interpretations of fact. Guilford Courthouse 1781 begins with a fairly lengthy 20-page introductory section that outlines the background to the campaign. The standard sections on opposing commanders and opposing armies total 14 pages and offer a decent synopsis of the two armies that fought at Guilford Courthouse. The campaign narrative itself is divided into two separate chapters: a 13-page chapter on the maneuvers of both armies in the weeks prior to the battle and a 34-page chapter on the battle itself. The author concludes with a short aftermath section, notes on the battlefield today and a bibliography. The campaign narrative is supported by five 2-D maps (the war in the south in 1780-1, the race to the Dan River, the road to Guilford Courthouse, the battle at Weitzel's Mill, and the initial deployments at Guilford) and three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (one for the British attack on each of the three American defensive lines at Guilford Courthouse). There are also three excellent battle scenes depicting actions at each of the three lines. Overall, the graphic quality of this volume is quite good. There are a number of important omissions in Konstam's campaign narrative. First, the author provides no breakdown on casualties for either side. A quick search on the internet provided this information, in the form of the post-battle casualty reports from Greene and Cornwallis, broken down by individual units. This is a significant omission, particularly in a battle that involved less than 7,000 combatants. Second, the American order of battles appears to be inaccurate; Konstam does not list the Delaware Battalion or North Carolina militia cavalry, although they both suffered casualties in the battle and are mentioned in other sources. These flaws may seem minor, but seem to indicate a slap-dash approach to the subject. The author also betrays an annoying tendency for exaggeration throughout the text. During the early phase of the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, Konstam uses a contemporary source which claimed that after the first volley from the North Carolina militia that, "one half of the [British] Highlanders dropped on that spot." Yet if one bothers to look up the casualty data for the British 2/71st Highlanders - data the author neglected to include - one can see that this battalion suffered only 29% casualties during the entire battle, not 50%. Konstam then exaggerates, claiming that when the Highlanders returned fire, "great gaps were blown in the American line." Again, the casualty data indicates that the North Carolina militia suffered only 11 casualties out of about 1,000 men during the battle, so the reader might question if losing one man out of every 100 constitutes "great gaps." Instead, the North Carolinians ran as fast as they could, which is why so few were hit. Indeed, the missing casualty data would demonstrate just how badly the American militia performed at Guilford Courthouse: 11 of the 18 militia deaths occurred in one of the Virginia brigades, meaning that the other three ran after suffering only 1-2% casualties. The author also clearly exaggerates the strategic significance of the battle when he claims that, "by failing to defeat Nathaniel Greene's army, Cornwallis had committed a strategic error which cost Britain the very southern colonies his men fought so hard to keep." The turning point in the American Revolution occurred with the victory at Saratoga in 1777 and subsequent French intervention, not due to some indecisive clash in the backwoods of North Carolina. It is also a non-sequitor to argue that the Battle of Guilford Courthouse inevitably led to Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown seven months later, since Cornwallis had many options that might have changed the result. Konstam's contention that Guilford Courthouse was a British victory is equally exaggerated, if not absurd. If the British won the battle, why did they abandon their wounded and retreat 200 miles to coast! All six British battalions suffered over 20% casualties and Cornwallis' army had become almost combat ineffective. Guilford Courthouse was truly indecisive; neither side accomplished their mission and both armies retreated. A little military analysis might also have gone a long way in this volume. Konstam mentions that Greene's troops established defensive positions after the battle to inhibit a British pursuit, which raises the question - why didn't Greene establish obstacles or defensive positions prior to the battle? Greene occupied the battlefield the night prior and had at least 12 hours to prepare, along with ample manpower and certainly plenty of trees. Readers should recall that the Massachusetts militiamen were able to construct a sturdy redoubt atop Breed's Hill in 1775 that cost the British attackers dearly. Nor is there much analysis of the American battle plan. Why did Greene fail to form a reserve, despite his 2-1 numerical superiority? Cornwallis' did have a small reserve - only about 18% of his army - but he used it to influence the battle at critical moments. Greene wasted half his cavalry (Lee's) by deploying it in wooded terrain on the flank, when it could have been massed to provide a mobile reserve. Finally, Greene negated his 2-1 numerical superiority by placing his troops in three lines that were not mutually supporting or even visible to each other, thus allowing Cornwallis to attack each line sequentially and defeat it.
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