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48 of 49 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A compelling story marred by errors and style, July 31, 2007
Halsey's Typhoon is a World War II disaster-survival tale about Typhoon Cobra enveloping the U.S. Navy's Third Fleet, commanded by Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey, in the Philippine Sea in December 1944.
The best part of the book, by far, is the second half. Participants, primarily surviving crew members of the three sunken destroyers or the destroyer escort Tabberer which rescued 60% of the survivors despite its own severe damage, relate their experiences during the storm, floating in the water for 24-48 hours, being rescued and recovering These survivors' and rescuers' tales, related recently to the authors by a handful of remaining veterans, are informative, frightening, fascinating, memorable and inspiring. I'm glad their firsthand experiences, even in part, have been published.
Unfortunately, apart from the survivors' personal narratives, this book's deficiencies are many. The authors seem to have relatively little knowledge of either the Navy or World War II, with misused terms and questionable characterization events being too numerous to itemize. Examples include referring to the flag flown at the bow of a naval vessel as a "battle guideon" (an Army term for what the Navy calls a battle jack); calling a ship's mess deck its mess hall; repeatedly referring USS Monaghan as having "drawn first blood" when it sank a Japanese mini-sub inside Pearl Harbor thirty minutes after the attack started whereas it is widely acknowledged that USS Ward sank a Japanese mini-sub outside the entrance of Pearl Harbor before the aerial attack even commenced; describing MacArthur's invasion of Luzon as a "stepping stone" toward Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Japan itself when it was arguably more of a strategic distraction from Nimitz's Central Pacific island hopping campaign through Guadalcanal, Guam, Saipan, etc. that actually established the air bases from which the U.S. directly struck Japan in 1945 and opened the route to Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
Also, the book needs serious editing to eliminate wordiness, inconsistencies (e.g., ascribing different ranks or titles to the same people within the scope of a few days) and questionable or obscure metaphors. For instance, does it make sense to describe Halsey's belated decision to allow his command to break formation in order for individual captains to concentrate on the safety of their ships to being like "Mrs. O'Leary reporting her cow missing?" The authors' wordiness and commitment of space to irrelevant biographical details or wartime events may have been a way to deal with the fact that a concise rendition of their most original and compelling material would have filled perhaps just half as many pages.
Finally, apart from the sunken destroyers and their principal rescuing vessel, former-President Ford's experiences on the USS Monterey and descriptions of near-disaster on the USS Aylwin, there are few details about what happened to any of the other vessels during the typhoon. Finally, there is nothing whatsoever about how the typhoon affected the war effort. How long did it take before the damaged Third Fleet was again combat ready? What impact did the loss of Third Fleet air cover have on the Army's Mindoro campaign, which was the reason Halsey was so reluctant to release his ships from formation? The world wants to know...
The book's three sections - The Fleet, the Storm and The Rescue - are divided into twenty-five unnamed chapters that total 266 pages. An Epilogue (immediate post-storm events), Afterword 2006 (post-WWII careers of some figures in the narrative), four-page bibliography, an index and miscellaneous addendums bring the page count to 322. Twenty-eight B&W photos illustrate some of the key characters and ships and endpaper charts depict locations relative to the typhoon track. There are no footnotes.
Recommended to naval history and WWII buffs, survival/adventure tale fans or anyone who lost a relative at sea during WWII due to the recounting of individual veterans' experiences. Not recommended to people seeking information about WWII campaigns and strategies or those seeking tightly composed nonfiction prose.
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24 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Men and an Angry Sea, Part II, November 29, 2007
In 2007 two different publishers released two different books on the 1944-1945 typhoons that sank three ships in the U.S. Third Fleet. Under the command of Admiral William Halsey, the U.S. Navy lost more men due to these natural disasters than it did at the battle of Midway. Bob Drury and Tom Clavin's "Halsey's Typhoon" was the first one to make it to book stores and garnered more attention and sales than Buckner F. Melton Jr.'s "Sea Cobra." Given the timing and focus of these two books, this review will compare and contrast the two. In short, there is no question that Melton wrote the better book.
The illustrations of carriers, battleships, oilers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts compared to 30, 60, and 90 foot waves is the best feature of Drury and Clavin's account. It gives landlubbers a good idea of how rough seas are problems for some ships and not for others. The shortcomings of this book, however, are much more significant. First, the book ignores altogether the second typhoon Halsey sailed into. Melton discusses this one, but not at length. This brevity is understandable, the second typhoon did less damage and sank no ships. It does show, though, that the commander and staff of the Third Fleet learned little from their experiences with the first typhoon despite efforts to do so. The problem that Drury and Clavin have is that this second storm undermines their argument that Halsey was largely blameless for sailing into the typhoons.
The mechanics of publishing also favor Melton. Drury and Clavin have only one map. Melton has nine. He also provides an extensive bibliography and footnotes, whereas Drury and Clavin have a brief bibliography and make no effort to provide any sort of documentation on their sources. Drury and Clavin also make a number of basic mistakes when it comes to nautical matters and use maritime terms incorrectly. Examples include "helming" a ship; calling a battle jack a "battle guideon" (an Army term); referring to a ship's mess deck as its "mess hall." They also put generals in the Japanese Navy Ministry and refer to the Army Ministry as the "War Department" (an American term). Stylistically, Melton is the better wordsmith. Drury and Clavin use too many editorializing adverbs ("legendary" or "untold") to exaggerate the significance of their story.
Much more significant is the thesis of each book. Drury and Clavin make Lt. Cmdr. James Marks, captain of the USS HULL, out to be the main villain in this incident. The HULL was one of his ships lost in the first typhoon. This charge seems reasonable at first, but Marks' seamanship does not explain why the USS MONAGHAN and SPENCE sank, nor does it explain a number of close calls on other ships. It seems that the two authors allowed crewmen from the HULL that they interviewed for the book to use the opportunity to settle old scores with Marks. In fact, Drury and Clavin do not spend much time talking about ships other than the HULL while Melton does. Melton also gives much more attention to the post storm investigation. Since Marks was the subject of an official investigation, Drury and Clavin argue this was proof enough of his guilt. The fact that there was no court-martial or that the other captains died in the storm makes this observation rather weak. Melton gives a much more nuanced description of the investigation. Halsey rather than Marks was the main target of the investigation and the board placed primary blame for sailing into the storm on the Admiral. There were a number of mitigating circumstances, though, and Melton is good at describing them. This incident is no black and white morality play.
In short, Melton offers a much better book than Drury and Clavin.
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16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
They Forgot Basic Seamanship, May 10, 2007
Having been on a DE attached to the Seventh Fleet in the calmer waters just south of Leyte at the time of this disaster I learned about it through scuttlebutt later and then, of course, in following years from all that was written about it. All of it was especially poignant for me because we had operated with the Hull, the Spence and the Monaghan before all this happened and they and their crews were my (our) friends. This book, however, told the full story and I was not only glad to read it but glad that it has been told so well and with so much accurate detail. While it's easy - and maybe accurate - to write this off as just one of those things that happen in war, nothing in the book changed my original opinion fomed over the years that Halsey was more interested in meeting his schedule than protecting his fleet, that he should have made arrangements for fueling his screening DDs nd DEs long before the disturbance hit and that the skippers of these lost DDs should have much earlier broken station and headed for calmer waters. When things start to get carried away by the wind as powerfull as this and the barometer starts dropping like it did and you are almost in irons it's time to run for calmer waters; and these captains did not. Ignore seas like this at your peril; and a Captain's first duty is to his ship.
Had a bit of problem at times keeping up with the navigation as described, but othewise a good book.
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